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Introduction 
 
Translation can be a dangerous act. Though translation may 
not be among the first acts that come to mind that elicit strong 
responses, translations frequently are among the most central texts 
in changing, rupturing, and overturning worldviews. The cover 
image of this volume illustrates the extent to which translation can 
provoke strong responses: it depicts the preparations to burn the 
body of William Tyndale, an early sixteenth-century reformist and 
one of the first to translate the Bible into English, an act which led 
to Tyndale’s conviction as a heretic and ultimately led to his 
execution.  Tyndale’s goal in translating the Bible, like the writers 
of vernacular theology in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
was to make the Word available to all—something taken very 
seriously in England after the promulgation in 1409 of Archbishop 
Thomas Arundel’s repressive decrees aimed especially at 
outlawing vernacular translation or commentary on scriptural texts 
without express license from the episcopate.1 
Yet, if for Tyndale translation was a lethal occupation, 
more than half a millennium earlier it was used as an expression of 
nation-building on the very same soil.  Translation was an 
important aspect of the Anglo-Saxon King Alfred’s (ruled 871-99) 
comprehensive program of reform.  One of the earliest extant 
English translators, King Alfred allegedly translated Gregory the 
Great’s Cura Pastoralis, Boethius’s De Consolatione 
Philosophiae, Augustine’s Soliloquiae, and the first 50 Psalms.  In 
his Preface to Gregory’s Cura Pastoralis, Alfred writes, 
“Therefore it seems better to me, if it seems so to you, that we also 
should translate certain books which are most necessary for all 
men to know into the language that we can all understand…”2  
King Alfred writes that the state of learning had declined so badly 
in Anglo-Saxon England that very few could even translate a letter 
written in Latin.  His educational program, the first of its kind in 
1 Cf. Nicholas Watson, “Censorship and Cultural Change in Late-Medieval 
England: Vernacular Theology, the Oxford Translation Debate, and Arundel’s 
Constitutions of 1409,” Speculum 70 (1995), 822-864. 
2 Alfred, “Preface to the Translation of Gregory’s Pastoral Care,” Old and 
Middle English c.890-c.1450: An Anthology, Third Ed., ed. Elaine Treharne 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2010), 14-15. 
 
                                                 
  
the English-speaking world, would help build the English nation 
by promoting the vernacular as a useful and dignified medium. 
So, translation can be dangerous, political, useful, 
community-building—what else?  Translation is an art form but 
can also be a highly technical philological exercise.  If I may, as a 
medievalist of Britain and Ireland, be permitted to give one more 
Anglophone example (the contributions of this volume will 
broaden the geographical reach and theoretical scope), while 
Seamus Heaney’s translation of Beowulf won the Whitbread Book 
of the Year award, was lauded by literary critics, and revitalized 
interest in Beowulf among the general populace, academics and 
specialists in Old English bemoaned that Heaney did not do a 
sufficient job emulating traditional aspects of Old English verse, 
like apposition and style, while also criticizing translation 
decisions.  Since translating Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology, 
Gayatri Spivak has continued to assert that translation is the “most 
intimate act of reading.”3  Translation is personal, it is full of 
choices—whether to be literal or simply paraphrase, or whether to 
“domesticate” or “foreignize.” Translation is everything all at 
once, something we do without realizing it, every time we speak or 
listen—a central activity which structures our daily lives. 
Given the effect of the twenty-first century’s heightened 
globalization, translation is a necessary facet of everything we do.  
As a hermeneutical process in understanding elements of a culture 
different from one’s own, intellectuals from the ancient to the 
modern and the postmodern have addressed the theoretical 
practices and practicalities of translation.  As such, translation is a 
vital exercise for student-scholars.4  As each translator comes at 
his or her work from a unique angle based on the experiences of 
his or her life, translation and translation studies provides a vehicle 
for student-scholars to contribute unique scholarship to their fields, 
while also learning a great deal about their first language and 
themselves.  This volume addresses many issues of translation—
from papers which explore and practice the “best” methods of 
translating to intersemiotic translations of film.  The papers of this 
volume are collected from two separate conferences, The Third 
3 See, for example, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translation as Culture,” 
Parallax 6.1 (2000): 13-24, at 20. 
4 See Nicholas Kupensky’s paper “Students of the Foreign” in this volume. 
ii  
 
                                                 
  
Annual Comparative Humanities Review Conference at Bucknell 
University and a conference entitled From a Foreign Point and held 
at the Russian State University for the Humanities.  Although 
separated by many miles, both conferences had similar goals: to 
bring together a number of top student-scholars working in the 
humanities to comparatively study the importance of translation in 
the twenty-first century by turning to the multiple meanings that 
the act of translation has had in the past.  Each paper investigates 
the border spaces between languages, uncovering the crevices 
which allow the translation of the “source text” into the “target 
text.”  The volume as a whole presents the coming together of two 
conferences, conferences set in very different locations but which 
arrive at very similar conclusions: that translation studies is a 
burgeoning field that can teach us a great deal about a wide variety 
of disciplines and that student-scholars are very much at home 
within its bounds.  
 
The Third Annual Comparative Humanities Review Conference  
In her “Translation and Film: Slang, Dialects, Accents and 
Multiple Languages,” Allison Rittmayer explores the introduction 
of language into film and the resulting nuances associated with this 
technological advance.  Fundamentally a matter of translation, 
Rittmayer surveys the types of multiple language version films and 
how each attempts to translate the dialogue, plot, emotions, etc. of 
each movie.  She then discusses issues in film translation, 
including the translation of slang, dialects, accents, and use of 
multiple languages within a single film, revealing the difficulties 
associated with film translation and offering insights into these 
problems. 
James Rickard’s “Philosophy, Abstract Thought, and the 
Dilemmas of Philosophy” presents the problem of translating the 
abstract vocabulary of many philosophical works.  By examining 
terms like nomos, Epochistik, and Dasein, Rickard explains the 
“untranslatable” quality of many key philosophical concepts.  In a 
further analysis of Nietzsche’s writings, Rickard reveals how 
language works in conjunction with Nietzsche’s philosophy, rather 
than as a vehicle for meaning.  In this circumstance, the translator 
must carefully tread the line between faithfulness to content or 
form.  In this discussion, Rickard asks the question of whether 
 iii 
 
  
philosophical translation should be primarily vocabulary based or 
include the philosopher’s thought as a whole. 
In “The Great War Seen Through the Comparative Lens,” 
Steven L. McClellan comparatively reevaluates World War I by 
arguing that to fully understand the First World War we must 
examine the collective response of the national communities that 
fought it.  The paper is an exercise in “cultural history,” exploring 
multiple processes of signification revolving around the War and 
the social identities affected by it.  McClellan explores the concept 
of Modernity from various perspectives and the connection 
between WWI and the “Modern.”  He goes on to suggest that the 
language of the national community, although supposedly singular 
to the specific community, is in reality a universal logic aimed at 
totalizing.  From this perspective, different translations of 
meanings can be uncovered when thinking about the Great War. 
Hallie Stebbins’ “A Translation of Lu Xun’s  ‘阿 Q 正 传’” 
is an exercise in both the theory behind translation studies and a 
practical translation.  Surveying the different methods of 
translating Lu Xun’s work by William Lyell and Xianyi Yang, 
Stebbins analyzes the problems in their translation methods while 
beginning to enunciate her own theory.  In her translation, she 
seeks to foreignize rather than domesticate, choosing a passage 
from the source text which she did not understand in translation.  
Translating this passage herself, she makes the passage clearer 
while also encountering the many problems associated with 
Chinese translation. 
In “Transference and the Ego: A (Psycho)Analysis of 
Interpsychic Translation,” Lauren Rutter explores how translation 
is a necessary part of ordinary psychological development.  By 
reading transference as a type of interpsychic translation (from the 
drive into language within the self and then again from language of 
the self into an outward expression to the analyst), she reveals how 
the unconscious is a language to be unraveled.  However, 
simultaneously, the analyst can mistranslate the analysand’s 
unconscious and/or get caught up in counter-transference.  This not 
only puts the patient at risk, but could become too involved in the 
patient. 
In Joey McMullen’s “Overstepping Otherness: Christine de 
Pizan and Letitia Elizabeth Landon’s Genealogical Retranslations 
iv  
 
  
of Canonized Text,” he explores what he calls “genealogical 
retranslation:” how the anxiety of influence forces authors to 
retranslate their predecessors in order to move forward and try to 
eclipse those of the past.  In this paper, he explores how Christine 
de Pizan (a medieval French writer) and Letitia Elizabeth Landon 
(a Romantic poet) broke the bounds of not only the male canon but 
also patriarchal definitions of women and embraced, in the 
process, what Kristeva would call “feminine genius.” 
 
From a Foreign Point of View: Student Readings of Russian and 
American Culture  
In “Do Russians and Americans View Space in the Same 
Way?” Evgeny Makarov explores the function of language as 
mediator of ideas in terms of conceptual categories of space as 
reflected in Russian and English.  A distinction is made between 
coordinate spatial relations (distance, speed of motion and size, 
and mostly processed by the right hemisphere) and categorical 
spatial relations (mostly processed by the left hemisphere and 
categorized in languages).  The paper focuses on categorical spatial 
relations, especially preposition use, descriptions of location with 
reference to body parts, and specific frames of reference.  Makarov 
also discusses the importance of cardinal directions and explains 
spatial deixis.  It is noted that deictic references in English are far 
more rigidly defined by the speaker’s position than in Russian. For 
Makarov, English does not allow the speaker to shift the deictic 
center to any point other than where they are physically located, 
whereas Russian tends portray spatial scenes in fine detail. 
Kseniya Bychenkova’s “‘May the Forсe Be with You:’” 
The ‘Animatistic Minimum’ in the Mythological and Religious 
Consciousness,” examines the belief in an omnipresent force 
which fills the world and connects all human beings to everything 
else in the world.  In a broad survey of non-Western cultures, 
Bychenkova discusses the different understandings of this force 
and many of its anthropological implications.  Bychenkova also 
linguistically analyzes the many words which come to signify this 
impersonal force, mapping the evolution of these words across 
diverse cultures.  The paper then, after revealing the broader 
suggestions of how the concept of “animatistic minimum” can be 
used to understand American religion today, reveals how George 
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Lucas translated this age-old spiritual concept in his Star Wars 
saga as The Force. 
In Mark Winek’s “Radio as a Tool of the State: Radio 
Moscow and the Early Cold War,” he examines the role of Radio 
Moscow’s broadcasts as a part of Soviet foreign policy from the 
end of the Second World War to the 1960s.  By looking at the role 
of radio broadcasting, he explores a scantily studied, yet influential 
battle in the frigid war between Washington and Moscow.  
Beginning with the birth of broadcasting in the Soviet Union, he 
inspects the evolution of the state broadcasting apparatus up to the 
Khrushchev years, when it truly came to be a staple of the Soviet 
Union’s international propaganda campaign.  By analyzing the 
rapid evolution and massive government funding for Radio 
Moscow, Winek shows that the service was vital to propagating 
Moscow’s foreign policies through its carefully honed message. 
In “Tom Stoppard’s The Coast of Utopia in Russia: 
Cultural Adaptation,” Clara Leon explores the reception of 
Stoppard’s Tony winning trilogy of plays.  She argues that 
preunderstanding is an important hermeneutic device in 
appreciating the trilogy.  The translation of understanding then, in 
Stoppard’s plays, is highly reliant on the viewer’s/reader’s level of 
engagement with the source culture.  Her analysis engages with 
various Russian perceptions of The Coast of Utopia, giving the 
plays a cultural context within her discussion.  Further, she 
discusses the rift between preunderstanding and actual perception, 
noting the translation process which occurs when the play is 
viewed or performed. 
Nick Kupensky’s “Students of the Foreign” reaffirms the 
mission of the Comparative Humanities Review: allowing for the 
growth of the Student-Scholar through intellectual discourse and 
writing.  By reading the differences between Student and Scholar 
as paralleling an authoritative meaning found in any text, 
Kupensky accepts the plurality of meaning and validates the 
research of Student-Scholars.  He then asks what it means to be a 
Student of the foreign and reveals that for those of us who study 
that which is not our own – that which is alien, strange, different, 
or, simply, foreign – we are to be constantly reminded that we are 
going to be lifelong consumers of the knowledge of the other.
vi  
 
 

Translation and Film: 
Slang, Dialects, 
Accents and Multiple 
Languages 
 
Allison M. Rittmayer 
Bucknell University 
 
 
 The birth of the cinema was initially regarded with great 
promise as a universal method of communication.  This was 
partially true in the era of silent films as there was no need for 
translation before the introduction of inter-titles.  The images 
filmed may have contained distinct cultural markers, thus 
rendering them somewhat foreign to spectators outside of the 
source culture; however, these markers could be absorbed in the 
way a painting is absorbed.  Without linguistic intrusion, it was 
possible for spectators of foreign films to simply identify 
characters in regards to their appearance.  This identification could 
also be made easier if the spectator knew what culture the film was 
coming from, in the way that paintings are understood by virtue of 
the culture that produced them.  More often than not though, early 
silent films portrayed subjects that did not need any cultural 
translation.  The films of the Lumière Brothers capture events that 
cross cultural boundaries—the arrival of a train, children fighting, 
factories letting out.  It was not until films began to take on 
narrative structures and incorporate inter-titles that translation 
became an issue. 
 
  
 Still in the silent film era, the introduction of inter-titles, 
narration or dialogue presented on a blank screen between 
segments of action, brought translation to film in a very basic way.  
Most inter-titles were not complex or lengthy in order to 
accommodate audiences of varying levels of literacy.  This made 
translation somewhat easier because there was not as much need to 
translate style as is seen in the translation of literature.  Aside from 
an absence of elaborate style (which was provided by the acting, 
rather than the inter-titles), the problems of translating inter-titles 
are the same problems seen in translating literature.  The translator 
had to choose whether to pursue a word for word translation, or a 
translation based on the general sense or the inter-titles in their 
source language.  The fact that inter-titles generally were 
descriptive of the actions carried out on screen may have aided 
translation because the action could clarify or support any 
difficulties found in the source text of the inter-titles. 
 With the introduction of sound, the universality of film was 
largely destroyed.  This also provided the impetus for the creation 
of national cinemas; directors could now produce films that were 
specifically targeted to members of their own language group, 
which is a main component of national identity.  As such, 
characters presented in films could take on distinct identities 
through their use of language.  Every language has multiple forms, 
whether they differ by formality of tone, or regional pronunciation, 
or representation of other social characteristics.  Suddenly, it 
became easy for directors to portray differences in characters by 
the way they spoke, rather through exaggerated actions, 
expressions, or costumes as in silent films.  This also introduced a 
subtlety into character development because spectators were no 
longer presented with matter-of-fact inter-titles, which acted 
somewhat like footnotes to the film, explaining important details 
about the characters that could not be portrayed on-screen.  This 
nuance did not immediately develop, and exaggeration of action 
and costume is still an integral part of character development in 
some modern-day comedies, however the introduction of sound 
eliminated the need for directors and actors to rely on 
exaggeration.1 
1 Exaggeration has mainly been replaced by stock characters, which retain 
boiled-down elements of exaggerated characters from the early days of cinema.   
2  
 
                                                 
  
 In the beginning, sound films did attempt to retain some of 
their universality through the production of multiple language 
versions.2  MLVs were made through the process of “double 
shooting,” or shooting the same scenes on the same sets but with 
different casts and crews representative of the language versions to 
be produced.  In some cases, multilingual actors were able to be 
used, so the same cast would appear in two or three language 
versions, as was the case for Jean Renoir’s The Golden Coach, 
which was filmed in English, French and Italian.3  The translation 
of the actual scripts may have given the translated films a higher 
degree of fidelity to the originals than present day dubbed or 
subtitled productions.  This increased fidelity would come from 
two sources.  First, the translation of the script would allow for a 
more imitative target text because the translator would not be 
worried about making the dubbing match the lips of the actor, nor 
would the translator need to try and paraphrase the dialogue or 
narration in order to make the subtitles fit on the screen and keep 
up with the pace of the action.  Additionally, in the cases where 
multilingual actors were used, they would have some access to the 
source text, as well as the target texts they were trying to produce.  
Unlike voice actors reading a script for a dubbing, the multilingual 
actors would not need to simply rely on the target text produced by 
the translator.  The production of such multilingual films seems 
very similar to translation by committee to me because the actors 
would be aware of discrepancies between the translations and the 
source text, and could provide recommendations on the translation 
in the same way that actors generally have some input on any 
script they work with. 
 There are two other types of multiple language version 
films: remakes and double versions.  Remakes are simply instances 
where a production company will purchase the rights to a foreign 
film and readapting the scenario to fit the target culture.4  The fact 
that this is called “remaking” or “adaptation” implies that there are 
varying degrees of fidelity to the original film in such productions.  
An example of a remake would be the American movie Three Men 
2 Marc Betz, “The Name above the (Sub)Title: Internationalism, Coproduction, 
and Polyglot European Art Cinema,” Camera Obscura. 16.1 (2001): 28. 
3 Ibid., 28. 
4 Ibid., 29. 
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and a Baby,5 a remake of the French comedy Trois homes et un 
couffin6 (trans. Three Men and a Cradle) by Coline Serreau.  The 
American version of the film makes some minor plot and character 
adjustments, but overall appears very similar to the original plot of 
the French movie.  However, when a bilingual spectator watches 
both films, it becomes apparent that the biggest difference between 
the two versions is the tone of the film’s humor, and not on the 
level of the plot. 
 The last type of multiple language version film, the double 
version, is split into two types.  The first version is what spectators 
normally think of when they think of a dubbed film; the actors are 
all speaking the same foreign language in the original (regardless 
of the actor’s nationality), but the voices have been dubbed over in 
the target text.  The second version is slightly more complicated 
and is called either a “Babelonian” or polyglot7 film.8  This is 
perhaps most popularly seen in “spaghetti westerns” such as The 
Good, The Bad, and The Ugly, where the actors come from 
different language groups (in this case, English and Italian), and 
they recite their dialogue in their native languages during the 
filming.  The dialogue and narration is then completely dubbed 
over into whatever languages a target text is wanted in.  In many 
cases of Babelonian films, including this practice can be attributed 
to the use of non-professional actors who fit the appearance or 
nationality demanded of a role, but do not speak the language the 
movie is being filmed in. 
I have already discussed some of the challenges faced when 
translating dialogue and narration in film: synchronizing dubbed 
dialogue with the on-screen movement of lips, the spatial 
limitations of subtitling, and the need in both dubbing and 
subtitling for the translation to keep up with the pace of the on-
5 Three Men and a Baby. DVD, directed by Leonard Nimoy, 1987, Walt Disney 
Video, 2002. 
6 Trois homes et un couffin. DVD, directed by Coline Serreau, 1985, Home 
Vision Entertainment, 2005. 
7 I choose to use the term “Babelonian” because the actors speaking different 
languages could not understand each other, and the film is not really speaking 
multiple languages like a polyglot since the dialogue is standardized in the 
dubbing process.  I will discuss what I consider to be a true polyglot film later in 
this paper. 
8 Betz, “The Name above the (Sub)Title,” 29. 
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screen dialogue and action.  The other general problem of 
translation in film is distraction of the audience.  Because 
American film produces the largest body of work, American 
audiences are underexposed to translated films, as compared with 
their European counterparts.  In 2004 in Germany, 85 percent of 
films shown in theaters were of non-German origin, and of those 
films between 70 and 80 percent were from America.9  This leads 
to the European population being more accustomed to seeing 
dubbed films or reading subtitles than Americans.  Robin Queen 
states that “Audiences generally prefer that type of film translation 
with which they are most familiar.”10  Herman Weinberg adds that 
“American audiences will not accept dubbed films.”11   
I feel that this rejection of dubbing is mainly apparent in 
“serious” films and is a result of the mockery made of dubbed 
versions of Asian Kung-Fu and science fiction films where the 
dubbed dialogue is often much shorter than the spoken dialogue.  
This mockery in turn grew out of what Queen stated — since 
general American audiences are most accustomed to seeing movies 
filmed in English, they do not prefer any type of film translation, 
no matter how well intentioned.  Watching a dubbed movie 
distracts the spectator from the action of the film because they are 
faced with the lack of synchronization between the English 
dialogue and the movement of the speaker’s lips.  With subtitles, 
aside from Americans not wanting to exert the effort to read, 
Weinberg quotes Russian director Vsevolod Pudovkin saying that 
the concentration and attention required to read subtitles means 
that the spectator, “cannot be expected to gain any impression from 
the pictorial composition of the original film.”12  I can attest to 
Pudovkin’s assertion in that while attempting to analyze specific 
scenes of French films, I have to watch the scenes twice as many 
times as I would watch a scene in English.  First to fully 
understand the dialogue I watch the scene at least four times, 
although I do combine the translation of the subtitles with my own 
9 Robin Queen, “‘Du hast jar keene Ahnung’: African American English 
Dubbed into German,” Journal of Sociolinguistics. 8.4 (2004): 520. 
10 Ibid., 520. 
11 Herman G. Weinberg, “The Language Barrier,” Hollywood Quarterly. 2.4 
(July 1947): 334. 
12 Ibid., 336. 
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translation of the source dialogue rather than rely on the subtitles 
alone.13 Only after I understand the dialogue can I pay sufficient 
attention to the cinematographic techniques used by the director. 
 
I will now present a series of issues in translation that I feel 
are particularly important or problematic in the translation of film, 
including the translation of slang, dialects, accents, and the use of 
multiple languages within a single film.  The issue of translating 
slang terms is probably the one most common with literary 
translation, and it is here that I will begin my discussion.  
Translating slang is problematic in more than one way.  First, there 
is not always an equivalent slang expression in the target language 
to what is used in the source text.  There may also be more than 
one equivalent expression in the target language, which would 
force the translator to choose between expressions which might 
have slightly different connotations.  The biggest problem in 
translating slang is censorship — either performed willingly by the 
translator, or imposed by some outside body.  This censorship can 
greatly alter the impact a text has in the target language, especially 
if the use of slang is important to character development or plot 
development. 
In “Translation Effects: How Beauvoir Talks Sex in 
English,” Louise von Flotow discussed how Simone de Beauvoir’s 
use of explicit sexual terms was censored, reducing the repetition 
of specific words within sections of narration, and replacing them 
with more euphemistic terms.14  This same type of censorship can 
be seen in film translations.  In Romance15 (1999), directed by 
Catherine Breillat, some of the script falls victim to this 
censorship.  It is particularly notable in this case because Romance 
is viewed as one of the most, if not the most, scandalous, sexually 
13 If anything, my access to the source language in the case of French films is 
further distracting and complicating because I am torn between trying to listen 
and understand, but wanting to read the subtitles to make sure I am 
understanding correctly.  It is even more difficult when I am listening to the 
French and come across a word I do not know, but that section of dialogue has 
already disappeared from the subtitles. 
14 Louise von Flotow, “Translation Effects: How Beauvoir Talks Sex in 
English,” Contingent Loves: Simone de Beauvoir and Sexuality, ed. Melanie C. 
Hawthorne, (Charlottesville, VA: U Virginia Press, 2000), 13-33. 
15 Romance. DVD, directed by Catherine Breillat, 1999, Lions Gate, 2002. 
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explicit films produced in France in recent years.  The film 
follows the sexual discovery of Marie and presents frank 
depictions of rape, bondage and sadomasochism, and birth 
amongst other things.   
One of the most memorable, and more lighthearted scenes, 
is also one that succumbs to different levels of censorship in 
subtitling and dubbing.  Marie is shown making out with, and 
being groped by Paolo, the stranger she met at a bar the night 
before.  They are sitting in Marie’s boyfriend’s car outside their 
apartment when Paolo poses the question “Est-ce que tu veux me 
faire une pipe?” — “Do you want to give me a blowjob?”  Saying 
“une pipe” is the most polite way of referring to fellatio in French, 
but it is technically a slang term.  The term “la fellation” is not 
commonly used.  The ensuing dialogue has Marie using the term 
“une pipe” quite frequently as she explains that she doesn’t want to 
give him a blowjob now, but would rather give him a blowjob the 
next time they see each other.  The English subtitles do a relatively 
good job of conveying Marie’s openness in talking about sex, and 
consistently use the term “blowjob” as a translation.  Perhaps a 
slightly more polite choice would have been the expression “go 
down on,” but since that can be used to refer to oral sex performed 
on either a man or a woman whereas “une pipe” is specifically 
male-oriented, the choice of “blowjob” is not a bad one. 
The dubbed version of the scene, however, is quite 
different.  Instead of Paolo asking “Do you want to give me a 
blowjob,” the voice actor demands “Blow me, baby.”  The effect is 
quite hysterical to the American viewer, and this distracts the 
spectator from the earnestness of the conversation.  For as much as 
that makes Paolo’s dialogue more vulgar or masculine (a point to 
which I will return later), Marie’s dialogue becomes much more 
polite.  Instead of using “blowjob,” she simply refers to “blowing” 
Paolo, and this only occurs once.  In all the other instances where 
Marie would have said “une pipe” (there are at least 4), the voice 
actress euphemistically refers to “that.”  The resulting effect makes 
Marie appear much more reserved about sexuality than she is in 
the French version.  In the case of Romance the distraction caused 
by the need to read subtitles is worth it because the dubbed 
dialogue is an even greater distraction. 
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As I mentioned, the dubbing of “Est-ce que tu veux me 
faire une pipe?” into “Blow me, baby,” does serve to give Paolo’s 
dialogue a hyper-masculine quality, something that is lost in the 
act of dubbing.  The actor intentionally chosen to play Paolo is 
Rocco Siffredi, a European porn star who was born in Italy.  While 
Siffredi is speaking French in Romance, he does speak it with a 
distinctly Italian accent.  The spectator can still get this effect when 
watching Romance with subtitles because they can hear that 
Siffredi’s pronunciation is different from that of all the other 
characters.  When the voice is dubbed over, the accent is lost, and 
Paolo is simply given a very deep voice.  I think this really changes 
the presentation of Paolo as “l’étranger” — both the stranger and 
the foreigner, and very much an “Other” to Marie.  In the English 
dubbed version the dual notion of stranger/foreigner is lost and 
Paolo becomes just a man Marie picked up and doesn’t know.  The 
eroticization of Paolo as the masculine Other could have been 
retained by choosing a voice actor with an Italian, or other exotic 
accent. 
Another obstacle of translation closely associate with the 
use of slang is the use of dialects or regional speech.  In literature 
dialects are often produced in their source language through the 
use of non-standard spelling and grammar conventions.  In a sense, 
this is a first act of translation of an oral form of communication 
into a written form, and although a dialect is merely a variation of 
a standard language and can be understood when heard, the 
transliteration often produces a very foreignizing effect, as is 
experience with the use of multiple Southern dialects in The 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn by Mark Twain.  In literary 
translation, a similar effect can be achieved in the target text by 
several means.  At the very least, if the dialect is not reproduced, 
the use of dialect in the original can be footnoted by the translator, 
with some of the use of dialect being described in narrative 
passages from the original.  The translator may also find it possible 
to produce a similar effect in the target language through non-
standard spellings or sentence constructions.  In translating film, 
footnotes obviously cannot be used, and narrative explanations that 
could explain the use of dialect cannot easily be incorporated.  In 
the case of translating with non-standard spellings and grammar, 
this is not often done in film because it makes reading subtitles 
8  
 
  
much more difficult, and cannot necessarily be picked up in 
dubbing.  In some cases however, it is possible to translate from a 
source dialect to a target dialect within a source and target 
language. 
An example of this is found in German translations of 
African American Vernacular English (AAVE).  Robin Queen 
describes that this translation is not performed along racial lines, 
but rather focuses on the use of AAVE in urban, working-class 
settings, and a connection between the use of AAVE and street 
life.16  The German translations of AAVE incorporate 
colloquialisms from across many dialects, mainly Berlinisch, 
Jugendsprache, and the more general Umgangsprachen into what 
is called the “urban dubbing style.”17  The combinative nature of 
the “urban dubbing style” reflects the fact that in American 
reproductions of AAVE and other dialects in film, the most 
common characteristics of the dialect are emphasized to the point 
of stereotypifying the dialect and its speakers.  The fact that this is 
very much an “urban dubbing style,” rather than a style 
specifically developed for translations of AAVE is illustrated by 
the fact that the same principles are used to translate AAVE as 
dialogue between other urban, male characters involved in street 
life.  Queen presents two very complementary examples, the first a 
section of dialogue from Boyz N the Hood between three black 
men, and a section of dialogue from Jungle Fever between three 
Italian American men from the urban working class.  The linguistic 
characters shared by the German translations of both dialogues 
include “a palatal realization of /g/ (jeht’s); pronominal 
cliticization (dassde, kannste); final consonant deletion (nich, 
gefas); reduction of unstressed syllables (unser rather than unsere); 
and informal phrasal and lexical items (flicken).”18  A similar use 
of “urban dubbing” is seen in the German version of Good Will 
Hunting, where the main characters come from an urban working 
class background in Boston.19 
 
16 Queen, “‘Du hast jar keene Ahnung,’” 521-522, 524. 
17 Ibid., 521-522. 
18 Ibid., 533. 
19 Ibid., 533. 
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A big challenge to translating film that I have not found 
addressed in current scholarship is how to translate what I consider 
to be true polyglot films—films where more than one language is 
spoken.  I will look at the use of both Arabic and French in two 
different ways: in isolated scenes in Chaos20 (2001) directed by 
Coline Serreau, and integrated with French dialogue in Inch’Allah 
Dimanche21 (2001) directed by Yamina Benguigui.  In both cases, 
the challenge for translation is how to translate the language that 
would already be foreign and subtitled in the original French films. 
In Chaos the act of translating is made somewhat easier 
because the scene where Arabic is spoken is separated from the 
rest of the action of the story because it is a flashback.  The 
flashback features narration in French of Malika’s childhood as an 
immigrant from Algeria, but also includes dialogue in Arabic 
between Malika’s father and the man he wants to marry her to.  
The effect of the use of Arabic on the French audience is reflected 
in Malika’s confusion over the man’s visit and her initial 
incomprehension of the situation.  Some of this feeling of 
incomprehension is lost on American audiences because there is no 
difference between the subtitled French and the subtitled Arabic.  
A spectator must be actively listening while reading in order to 
sense the difference in languages.  With dubbing it is even worse 
because everything is dubbed into English, with no sense of 
foreignness inherent in the visitor. 
In Inch’Allah Dimanche the situation is somewhat 
different.  The use of both French and Arabic occurs throughout 
the film, and access to language is very important to the action.  
The story is a family drama, focused again on immigrants from 
Algeria, although Inch’Allah Dimanche is set around 1976, much 
earlier than Chaos.  Zouina comes to live with her husband Ahmed 
in France as part of the regroupement familial which allowed 
Algerian men working in France on permits to bring their families 
to live with them.  Zouina brings with her two sons and one 
daughter, all of school age, and her mother-in-law, Aïcha.  Aïcha is 
a very traditional Algerian, Muslim woman, and she only speaks a 
limited amount of French.  As she plays a major role in the story, 
20 Chaos, DVD, directed by Coline Serreau, 2001, New Yorker Video, 2003. 
21 Inch’Allah Dimanche, DVD, directed by Yamina Benguigui, 2001, 
Filmmovement, 2002. 
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there is necessarily an intermingling of languages.  Zouina speaks 
both Arabic and French, as do Ahmed and their children, although 
the children are only seen speaking in French.  In a pivotal scene in 
the film, Aïcha scolds Zouina in Arabic for letting the children 
draw rather than practice writing.  The eldest son asks her why she 
is so mean (méchante) to their mother, and Aïcha replies asking, 
“Méchante? Qu’est que c’est méchant?  Je ne sais pas qu’est-ce 
que ça veut dire.”  The son gives her the Arabic equivalent and she 
dismisses his accusation.  Aïcha then tells him that he will now be 
responsible for teaching his father how to write and read French. 
It is very clear that the multilingual nature of this household 
is central in this scene, however, the complexities are lost in the 
English subtitles to a spectator who does not know Arabic, or 
cannot differentiate it from the French in the rapid, and rapidly 
alternating dialogue.  I cannot think of a way to convey this 
complexity through subtitling in any way other than introducing 
the subtitle as in Arabic (which would get tedious because of its 
frequent use in the film), or some other system of identification, 
such as color-coding the languages.  I would be most likely to 
recommend a sort of hybrid film translation.  Well done dubbing 
would give the possibility of retaining the foreignness and 
multiplicity.  The French dialogue could be translated into English, 
while the Arabic was left un-dubbed, and translated through 
subtitles — delivered to American audiences in the same way 
French audiences would encounter it. 
While there are many similarities between literary 
translation and film translation, these occur at a very basic level.  
Translating film becomes very complicated because of the need to 
make sure the translated dialogue and narration, in subtitles or 
dubbing, is somewhat synchronized with the movements of the 
speakers lips, gestures, and other actions portrayed on the screen.  
These contribute to the problems of translating dialects and 
multiple languages because there is only so much space for 
subtitling, and dubbing must be done in a manner that is 
understandable, yet distinguishable.  Many of these challenges 
arise from the fact that, except in the case of remakes and 
adaptations, film translations are only half-translations.  The source 
text remains half intact in the images projected on screen.  This is 
what makes it so hard for film translations to be effective.  The 
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source text is always present, reminding the spectator that they 
are hearing or reading a translation.  This is tantamount to an actor 
crossing the cinematic “fourth wall” by directly looking at and 
addressing the audience, thus reminding them that they are 
watching a film, and not experiencing a reality. 
12  
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When considering the relation between languages, it seems 
intuitive that there are common references reflecting simple 
empirical observations.  One would not expect there to be any 
great difficulty in translating terms such as “tree” or “chair;” what 
difficulties arise, however, as translation moves away from these 
basic referential terms?  Willard Quine writes in “Meaning and 
Translation” that “Empirical meaning is what the sentences of one 
language and their firm translations in another language have in 
common.”1  Quine argues that linguistic meaning is purely 
referential and is derived from the symbolism of a term.  He uses 
radical translation—a theoretical situation of creating correlations 
between a familiar language and one completely alien (which he 
calls the “jungle” language)—to draw his point, claiming that 
“What we objectively have is just an evolving adjustment to 
nature, reflected in an evolving set of dispositions to be prompted 
by stimulations to assent to or dissent from occasion sentences.”2  
This view of language is one which begins with common 
references such as basic objects of perception, and then builds 
more complex terms, phrases, and combinations of meanings to 
1 Willard Quine, “Meaning and Translation,” The Translation Studies Reader: 
Second Edition, ed. Lawrence Venuti (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 94. 
2 Ibid., 100. 
 
                                                 
  
express more conceptual notions.  The conceptual grid of 
language as a whole is then that of empirical perception—any 
abstraction is the combination of these more basic terms, and no 
inter-lingual equivalence would be guaranteed between 
abstractions, even assuming that the basic terms have a degree of 
equivalence. 
Quine states that “…the analogies [or, correlations] weaken 
as we move out toward the theoretical sentences, farthest from 
observation.  Thus who would undertake to translate “Neutrinos 
lack mass” into the jungle language?  If anyone does, we may 
expect him to coin new native words or distort the usage of old 
ones.”3  This claim seems true, regardless of whether we accept his 
argument of the empirical nature of inter-lingual relations and of a 
minimal conceptual grid—sense and consideration show how 
difficult translation and understanding become as we move from 
concrete terms towards those more abstract.  For example, the 
phrase “Rabbits have weight” naturally shows itself to be easier to 
translate than “Neutrinos lack mass” due to the former’s basic 
nature of linguistic meaning and the abstract, complex correlations 
of meaning contained in the latter phrase. 
What implications does this difficulty of translating 
abstract language hold in regards to practical matters, outside of 
the realm of Quine’s experiment of radical translation?  
Considering philosophy as a study typically involving abstract 
terms and concepts, we are then faced with an interesting and 
extremely significant difficulty of translating philosophical works.  
Conveyance of meaning through translation is obviously a crucial 
aim for any work that is translated—with this concern of the 
translatability of abstract terminology, however, philosophy seems 
to have an added element of difficulty.  As a field which relies on 
an array of abstract vocabulary, how do we translate a work and 
still remain faithful to both the thinker and the source language 
(SL)?  By translating key terms do we risk disturbing the very 
essence or meaning of a work, and by transplanting an author’s 
thought do we risk changing the very message itself?  Our goal is 
to examine this problem—it will be seen that this is a very real 
risk, and that complete equivalence cannot always be expected, 
3 Ibid., 111. 
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and that in some cases the author’s very ideas can be endangered 
by translation and interpretation. 
 The first example is the ancient Greek term nomos.  
Richard Kraut tells how “the Greek term that is translated as 
‘law’—nomos—covers not only the enactments of a lawgiver or 
legislature, but also the customs, norms, and unwritten rules of a 
community.”4 Our contemporary concept of law lacks the same 
meaning as that of the Greek culture.  We consider law as existing 
beyond societal norms: as Kraut points out, we may say “that 
slavery is contrary to the moral law, and that this law existed 
before the wrongness of slavery began to receive general 
recognition.”  On the contrary, nomos necessarily includes the 
sociological background of a community and its legal system.  
There is a cultural discrepancy, and therefore a potential loss of 
meaning, between the term nomos and the English word “law” into 
which it is typically translated.5 
In his article titled “The Problem of Translating” Hans 
W.L. Freudenthal discusses this problem of equivalence in 
translation.  Words are not isolated terms with static meanings—he 
claims that “Each word has been coined in a specific atmosphere, it 
has its own history; the metamorphoses of meaning throughout 
time often demonstrate this fact [dynamic, mutable nature of 
terms] with a distinctness baffling to linguists.”6  He brings up an 
example from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 
discussing Helen Zimmern’s translation of de Epochistik as 
“science of epochs”: 
 
The phrase “science of epochs” makes no sense at all, and 
the context suggests a very different meaning.  It is obvious 
that the word Epochistik will not be found in any 
dictionary.  The translation of Nietzsche’s works 
presupposes a study of the peculiarities of his brilliant style 
and acquaintance with the fact that his procedure was 
willfully creative in the matter of the coinage of words.  
4 Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 105-106 
5 Ibid., 105-108. 
6 Hans W.L. Freudenthal, “The Problem of Translating,” The Modern Language 
Journal  Vol. 26, No. 1. (Jan. 1942): 63. 
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But more than this: one has to be well informed 
concerning the things constantly present to this 
philosopher’s inner eye and which provide him continually 
with the images, analogies and similarities that he 
explores.7 
 
In this case we see the problem that Quine discussed in 
approaching abstract translation—Epochistik is a term which lacks 
one-to-one equivalence or any easy correlation that does not 
involve significant footnoting or drawn out language.  Interestingly 
enough, in this case even those solutions would seemingly fall 
short, as footnoting and extenuated, lengthy explanations are by no 
means Nietzsche’s style, and would risk changing the very nature 
of his thought—this, however, is an issue which we will briefly 
delay. 
 Does this difficulty and potential untranslatability of 
Epochistik then damage the meaning that Nietzsche intended?  If 
“science of epochs” is not an accurate translation, then some of the 
value or meaning is definitely lost—the question then is if this 
difficulty is significant in whether or not it hinders the conveyance 
of meaning.  Another example may be seen in translations of The 
Genealogy of Morals.  An extremely important aspect of this text 
is the separation between the terms das Böseste and das Schlechte.  
For Nietzsche, the separation between these words, translated by 
Walter Kaufmann as “evil” and “bad” respectively, is immensely 
important to the entire discussion of the “slave” and “nobility,” and 
the very antithesis drawn between these opposite concepts hinge 
around understanding a clear division between the two.  In his 
introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra Kaufmann discusses 
difficulties with the translation by Thomas Common, writing that 
Common “coins ‘baddest’ in a passage in which Nietzsche says 
‘most evil’”8 in The Genealogy of Morals.  Thomas Common’s 
apparent failure to draw an oppositional difference between “Good 
and Bad” and “Good and Evil” by mistranslating das Böseste 
greatly damages Nietzsche’s entire project and demonstrates 
significant loss of meaning stemming from the same basic 
7 Ibid., 62. 
8 Walter Kaufmann, Editor’s Preface, in Frederick Nietzsche, The Portable 
Nietzsche (New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 109. 
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problems seen in the difficulty of understanding what Freudenthal 
considered “the philosopher’s inner eye.” 
 In putting trust into translations, one would hope that it 
would portray the most accurate equivocation possible and would 
not contain gross mistranslations such as Common’s coinage of 
“baddest.”  Nonetheless, even in an ideal translation, the problem 
discussed above is very real and it is understood that translation 
lies in finding a compromise between the source text and the target 
language.  In response to this worry, some translators have chosen 
to leave certain crucial terms untranslated and not risk replacing 
them with a word from the target language which may be loaded 
with a meaning that varies from the source term.  One example of 
this is the English translations of Heidegger and the term Dasein.  
In a version of Being and Time translated by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson, this word is left untranslated and explained in 
its first instance by a footnote.  They tell how “the word ‘Dasein’ 
plays so important a role in this work and is already so familiar to 
the English-speaking reader who has read about Heidegger, that it 
seems simpler to leave it untranslated except in the relatively rare 
passages…”9  This practice of not translating terms then tries to 
avoid this problem of finding a word in the TL that signifies a 
closely accurate meaning for a crucial and difficult word in the SL.  
By leaving the original word untranslated, which can be seen as in 
a sense coining a new word in the TL, the translator then decides to 
explain the meaning outside of the original author’s thought itself, 
using mechanisms such as footnotes—through this the term may 
be expanded and explained more proficiently and still be kept in a 
similar context as the original work. 
 Footnoting and other methods of avoiding the problem of 
untranslatability seem to be closely related to what Jonathan Cohen 
had in mind when he claims in “Are Philosophical Theses Relative 
to Language?” that “this is what constitutes a fundamental 
difference between philosophy and grammar—when philosophical 
theses mention an expression there is nothing to prevent that 
expression’s being translated along with the rest of the thesis.  You 
can find, for instance, books about the rules of Aristotelian logic 
written in many different natural languages and all using the same 
9 John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Footnote in Martin Heidegger, Being 
and Time (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 27. 
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example for a syllogism…”10  Cohen’s statement is in the context 
of an argument between the translatability of grammatical and 
philosophical theses, and while this may be seemingly off-topic, 
his claim is one which is important and shows both truth and 
falsity.  Cohen uses the universal syllogism “all men are mortal” to 
support this assertion of the translatability of philosophical theses, 
and his claim in this specific instance does seem to be true.  This 
example, however, is a very basic instance of “philosophical” 
thought—neither the terms nor the overall proposition portray 
much of a degree of abstraction.  The thesis “All men are mortal” 
is undoubtedly less complex of a claim than a statement such as 
“True moral action follows the categorical imperative.”  This is no 
attempt to make an overall comparison between the translatability 
of Aristotle and Kant, but rather to show a flaw in Cohen’s 
argument.  Granted, philosophical terms and theses may be 
translated with different degrees of equivalence, as a simpler 
proposition such as Cohen’s example seems to lend itself to 
translation rather easily while the latter example would be much 
more difficult.  Nonetheless, his argument seems to fall short of 
any serious critique of the examples given previously—in many 
instances translation deals with concepts of abstraction which are 
loaded with cultural and linguistic meaning that are both 
inseparable (at least to some degree) from the SL and alien to the 
TL.  Furthermore, Cohen’s argument also necessarily considers 
philosophical concepts distinctly separate from grammar and 
language itself.  What happens when philosophy is not separate 
from the use of language? 
An example of this problem may be seen in poetry.  When 
translating poetry do we concern ourselves primarily with retaining 
the meaning of the words and sacrifice the sense and feeling of the 
work?  Or, instead, do we retain the latter and risk damage to the 
meaning, which may be lost from poorer word choices?  Either 
way, the translator risks damage to the original instance of art.  The 
previous examples of philosophical terms in translation 
demonstrate that we cannot always expect a one-to-one 
equivalence when moving into another language, and instead must 
use devices such as footnoting or expanding a thought into a longer 
10 L. Jonathan Cohen, “Are Philosophical Theses Relative to Language?” 
Analysis Vol. 9, No.5. (Apr. 1949): 76. 
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sequence of terms or phrases.  In many instances it could be 
argued that this does not damage the meaning of a philosophical 
thesis or of an abstract concept, such as the argument expressed by 
Cohen.  What if, however, philosophy held similar aspects as those 
of poetry and we could not separate grammar, syntax, and meaning 
so easily? 
In many cases this seems to be a rather absurd question.  
Philosophy, in numerous respects, does seem to be separate from 
the sense of language in the overall work—metaphysics, for 
example, is typically a study in which language serves to logically 
connect philosophical terms.  In this sense, while the terms may 
face difficulties of translation, the translator would most likely 
favor the equivalence of terms over the style of the SL.  But not all 
philosophy is formatted or stylized as metaphysical discourse, not 
all authors use language for the same purposes, and the notion that 
philosophy could use language and feeling in the same way as 
poetry is quite important to the way in which we consider its 
translation. 
Nietzsche’s work serves as an excellent example for this 
consideration.  Unlike metaphysics and similar philosophy, 
Nietzsche sought after a very different project.  It is not a project 
which, like generations of thinkers before, sought to define lofty 
eternals or definite absolutes.  Nietzsche’s philosophy is that which 
is seen in his works such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The 
Antichrist—his project is that of the “revaluation of values,” of the 
pursuit of perspectives.  Sarah Kofman discusses this very nature 
of Nietzsche’s philosophy, writing that  
 
Tyranny is reprehensible in all its forms, including that of 
any philosopher seeking to raise his spontaneous evaluation 
to the status of an absolute value and his style to that of a 
philosophical style ‘in itself’, opposed to poetic style ‘in 
itself’ like truth opposed to untruth, good to evil… Whether 
writing is conceptual or metaphorical (and since Nietzsche 
the opposition has hardly applied any longer), the essential 
thing is… to be at enough of a distance from it to make fun 
of it.11 
11 Sarah Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, trans. Duncan Large (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 3. 
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The typical philosophical style—what Kofman argues as the style 
of the “metaphysician”—is that of transcending both meaning and 
language to absolutes, to logical propositions which are universal, 
or as close to universal as possible.  This is not Nietzsche, and his 
language mirrors his philosophy.  Similar to poetry, language does 
not serve merely as a vehicle for Nietzsche’s meaning, but rather it 
works in conjunction with his philosophy.  His language and his 
thought are not separate—together, they are his meaning.  To quote 
Walter Kaufmann, who seems to understand this very same point:  
 
…it is impossible to be faithful to the content while 
sacrificing the form: meaning and mood are inseparable.  If 
the translator makes things easy for himself and omits a 
play on words, he unwittingly makes a lighthearted pun or 
rhyme look serious, if he does not reduce the whole 
passage to nonsense.12 
 
For Nietzsche this mutual connection is that of his use of 
metaphor—by creating this reflection between meaning and sense, 
between his thought and the very use of his language, he brings 
about the revaluation that his philosophy itself cries out for.  By 
the use of metaphor and poetic style he creates the ability for a 
plurality of perspectives and the capacity for his text to evolve.  As 
our concepts of “truth” change, so must our perspective, our 
thought, and therefore, also our style. 
How do we translate this plurality of style and meaning in a 
work in which they are inseparable?  One reason for Kaufmann’s 
retranslations was that,  
 
For one thing, they completely misrepresent the mood of 
the original—beginning, but unfortunately not ending, with 
their many unjustified archaisms, their ‘thou’ and ‘ye’ with 
the clumsy attendant verb forms, and their whole 
misguided effort to approximate the King James Bible… 
More often than not, he [Thomas Common] either 
12 Walter Kaufmann, Introduction, Frederick Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1982), 6. 
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overlooks a play on words or misunderstands it, an in both 
cases makes nonsense of Nietzsche.13 
  
In this criticism then we see a failure to convey this style and the 
subsequent loss of meaning, the very loss that, “abets the common 
misconception of the austere Nietzsche, when, in fact, no other 
philosopher knew better how to laugh at himself.”14  That is one 
way, then, which it seems we should not translate Nietzsche—
criticism of previous faults may help us, but how do we retain the 
very style which Common seemed to betray? 
Kaufmann explains his attempt at a better translation, 
writing that “an effort has been made to preserve as much as 
possible of his cadences, even where they are awkwardly groping 
or overstrained.  What is thus lost in smoothness is gained for the 
understanding of the development of his style and personality.”15  
Here, foreignizing is preferable to domesticating Nietzsche’s 
language and Kaufmann surely shows this with his criticism of 
Common’s translation and his own preference for “style and 
personality” over smoothness.  Kaufmann’s decision is correct if 
Nietzsche’s style and meaning are inseparable—why risk 
sacrificing both the beauty and innate meaning of writing for a 
higher degree of ease or smoothness? 
The pursuit of this brief talk, however, is not to define 
methods by which translations can become flawless, nor should it 
be seen as an attempt, or at least much of one, to recommend better 
devices or practices for the translator.  We have seen how cultural 
and inter-lingual differences hinder the translation of abstract 
terms—Quine’s claim that “…continuities [between languages], by 
facilitating translation, encourage an illusion of subject matter…”16 
in this case seems to be true.  That is not to say abstract terms 
cannot be translated, but instead that we must realize the existence 
of conceptual differences between languages and beware of 
assuming that a term from the SL holds the very same connotations 
and correlations as the word that we perceive to generate it in the 
TL.  Furthermore, we must also be aware that translation of 
13 Kaufmann, Editor’s Preface, 107-108. 
14 Kaufmann, Introduction, 6. 
15 Ibid., 3. 
16 Quine, “Meaning and Translation,” 111. 
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philosophy and of conceptual thought in general cannot be 
viewed as the translation primarily of vocabulary, but also of the 
translation of thought as a whole.  With the connection between 
style and meaning which was seen in Nietzsche, we must realize 
that to translate is to interpret and that by disregarding or 
privileging any particular aspect we risk damage to the work, 
especially when there is such a dependence on language. 
This difficulty of translation is, at least in part, a reflection 
of Nietzsche’s various interpretations and ideas which, through the 
metaphor, show (or, perhaps only encourage) multiplicity and 
change as the only permanency.  Kaufmann’s criticisms of 
Common in many respects do seem to ring true, as being unable to 
see Nietzsche’s humor within his seriousness, his carefulness 
within his rashness—in short, this very plurality of perspectives—
would doubtlessly damage the translation of Nietzsche’s language 
and his philosophy.  At the same time, however, if as Sarah 
Kofman wrote, “A new reading/writing destroys the traditional 
categories of the book as a closed totality containing a definitive 
meaning, the author’s; in such a way it deconstructs the idea of the 
author as a master of the meaning of the work …”, then maybe we 
may wish to seek particular meaning from the ambiguity and 
multiplicity, from the very “pluralism of interpretations and their 
renewal.”17  Perhaps we cannot completely discard any translation, 
and instead consider different interpretations in translation and if 
perhaps, as Walter Benjamin wrote, “all great texts contain their 
potential translation between the lines…”18
17 Kofman, Nietzsche and Metaphor, 116. 
18  Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Translator: An Introduction to the 
Translation of Baudelaire’s Tableaux Parisiens,” trans. Harry Zohn, The 
Translation Studies Reader: Second Edition, ed. Lawrence Venuti (New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2004), 7. 
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Why Comparative History? A Unity of Difference 
 So much has been published on the First World War that it 
might be more worthwhile to ask, why the Great War again? A 
new call for a reevaluation the war seems to be most trifling, and 
probably met with an occasional yawn: surely someone has 
developed an adequate interpretation by now. However, recent 
efforts by numerous historians in Europe, such as Jay M. Winter, 
Annette Becker, and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, have shown that 
this assertion would be quite wrong. Since the end of the war in 
1918, there have been numerous historical paradigms, each 
focusing on different “configurations” that were believed to be 
important in remembering the war. The aim here is to argue that to 
fully understand the First World War we must examine the 
collective response of the national communities that fought it.  
Naturally, as the war dragged on, and as the cost in life and 
material rose, the representations of the national communities 
changed to adapt to the situation of the times. It can even be said 
that this is the beginning of the change of the nationalist narrative 
from the cultural to the political: after all, words such as “threat”, 
“security”, and “sacred” all belong to the conservative political 
camp. The origins of totalitarianism, whether fascist, Nazi, or 
communist, can be directly traced back to the Great War and the 
 
  
development of the integrated national community. There is 
something to be said of Martin Heidegger’s concern about the 
totalizing and enframing processes that occur in the twentieth 
century, although he would find different sources for this. 
Whatever the origin, the fact is that since the beginning of the 
Modern Age, the issues of identity, both for the individual, and for 
his connection to society, has been of primary concern. It is 
therefore essential to examine the cultural modes of representation 
used by the peoples of the past which they used to aid in making 
sense of their own world, and not to merely trace the notions of 
“progression”, whether if it is a supposed progression of 
technology, political systems, economics, or liberty. Henri Bergson 
was correct that time is duration. However, in order to come to 
express the actions, feelings, ideas, and emotions of our 
predecessors, we must examine it one expression at a time, and 
hopefully, just hopefully, a larger picture will become clear. 
 In a sense, this paper is an exercise in cultural history, in 
which it examines what Jay Winter calls “representations.”  To 
Winter this is merely a part of the shifting paradigm in First World 
War studies, corresponding to the third historiographical 
configuration: cultural history.1 To Winter, “cultural history is a 
history of the intimate…It is a history of signifying practices; it 
studies how men and women make sense of the world in which 
they live.”2  These signifiers can be found in the many ways that 
collective national communities represented their world through 
art, literature, media, music, toys, games, monuments, etc. What 
makes the First World War so important in the terms of the 
national community is how the populations that made up these 
communities responded to the war and the sacrifices made during 
it: “Social identities are legitimized through commemoration. Here 
is one of the major characteristics of contemporary cultural life: 
identity is value.”3 However, the historian must be cautious so as 
not to overstep these cultural signifiers, for the war itself may be 
given too much precedence and itself reified.  In his own 
1 Jay Winter and Antoine Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and 
Controversies, 1914 to the Present (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 25-31. 
2 Ibid., 29. 
3 Ibid., 27-28. 
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argument, Winter maintains that the shift to cultural history was 
made in response to the fall of the Marxist paradigm, where 
histories today do not make sense because of their objectivity, “but 
precisely [because of] their subjectivity, and the question of how 
representative are they is now deemed meaningless.”4 The search 
is not for all-encompassing histories that provide universal 
explanations; rather it is for a history of everyday life, what the 
Germans call the Alltagsgeschichte.  The study of the 
representations that national communities used to define their 
world during specific points in history is called “mentalités.” It is 
what Winter has called “the mental furniture of populations” in the 
past: “Mentalité in this discourse means visceral commitments 
rather than ideologies, unspoken assumptions rather than political 
or social programs.”5 With the decline of historical materialism, 
the turn is made towards the ideas and representations that make 
up the human condition.  For all intents and purposes, this is the 
era of a new historical idealism. 
 This shift to cultural history has been closely aligned with 
the First World War, and with warfare in general.  Stéphane 
Audoin-Rouzeau coined the term “war culture” (culture de guerre) 
alluding to the conceptual mental framework men and women 
draw on to make sense of their world at war. In a series of studies 
on childhood, war atrocities, and mourning practices, Audoin-
Rouzeau showed the way this war culture seeped into every area of 
domestic life.6 He goes so far to argue that war strips man down to 
his barest essentials, allowing the historian to see visibly his ideas 
and beliefs:  
 
The violence specific to warfare is a prism that 
refracts many otherwise invisible aspects of the 
world. Entire societies can be seen anew, but one 
must be willing to look closely. In paroxysms of 
4 Ibid., 27. 
5 Jay Winter, Foreword, in Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Men At War, 1914-1918: 
National Sentiment and Trench Journalism in France during the First World 
War (Washington D.C.: Berg, 1995), ix. 
6 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Men At War, 1914-1918: National Sentiment and 
Trench Journalism in France during the First World War (Washington D.C.: 
Berg, 1995),164. 
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violence everything is stripped naked - starting with men, 
their bodies, their fantasies and desires, their fears, 
passions, beliefs hatreds…the motivations that 
allow them to kill their fellow men and endure the 
terror of confrontation - these pertain to something 
essential - something we shall call their 
‘representations’.7 
 
Audoin-Rouzeau falls in line with the work of British military 
historian John Keegan, in challenging the Clausewitzian notion 
that “war is politics by other means”, both stating a deep truth: war 
is first and foremost a cultural act.8  However, the inseparable 
character of the nation and the people brings merit to this argument 
that war is the creation and unification of culture by other means 
against external “enemies.” After all, had Clausewitz not also said 
“The passions which break forth in war must already have a latent 
existence in the peoples”?9 
 
The Discourses of the National Community 
In an essay entitled, “Of Men and Myths: The Use and 
Abuse of History and the Great War,” Holger H. Herwig examines 
five case studies in which myths about historical events were 
created, and elaborated upon.10 Herwig uses the term myth, not “in 
Joseph Campbell’s sense, whereby myths are designed to teach us 
how to search for meaning, to seek the essence of being alive, and 
to feel the spiritual potentialities of life,” but in the “classic Greek 
sense, in which the myth, for all its inconsistencies and absurdities, 
when accepted as truth, represents the learning and wisdom of a 
7 Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the 
Great War (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2002), 16-17. 
8 Ibid., 18. Cf. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York, NY: Viking Press, 
1976). 
9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War Vol. 1, trans. Colonel J.J. Graham (London: K. 
Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Company, 1908), 26. 
10 Holger H. Herwig, “Of Men and Myths: The Use and Abuse of History and 
the Great War,” The Great War and the Twentieth Century, eds. Jay Winter, 
Geoffrey Parker, and Mary R. Habeck (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2000), 299-330. 
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society.”11 Myths are an essential part of modern political culture. 
They constitute that web of shared meaning by which the members 
of a complex society form and sustain their association, providing 
the unity as something natural, self-evident.12 The narration of 
these myths becomes important, for the names that are given to the 
objects in the narration, as well as those who are either telling the 
story or those who the story is being told to, creates identities, and 
the narrative myth becomes a part of identity.  Names therefore are 
important in the telling of a story, in that, as Jean-François Lyotard 
has pointed out: “Names - define a world, a world of names - the 
cultural world. This world is finite because in it the number of 
available names is finite.”13 These stories of narration fill the gaps 
between these names, and in the case of a myth, according to 
Herwig’s usage, they are placed in the particular gaps of a story 
that are unique to the experience of a society. 
 To expand on Herwig’s example, the historian at times 
provides a helping hand in creating and developing narratives that 
can be taken as either/or truth and identity creation. This is 
particularly so when the historian belongs to a specific community 
that has for a long time accepted a myth as an integral part of 
national identity.  Indeed, after Hayden White and the linguistic 
turn, and after Alain Corbin and Roger Chartier and the history of 
representations, it is impossible to even take eye-witness accounts 
at their face value without raising questions as to how they were 
formulated, constructed, and prefigured by their author’s views. 
Ernest Gellner states that “Nationalism is not the awakening of 
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not 
exist.”14 However, there must be a distinction made: Gellner 
supposes that all nationalism masquerades as a falsity, and does 
not consider its creation. Benedict Anderson places his emphasis 
on the “imagining” of the national community, in which it is 
imagined “because the members of even the smallest nation will 
11 Ibid., 299-300. Cf.  Joseph Campbell, The Power of Myth (New York, NY: 
Doubleday, 1988). 
12 Jeffrey Verhey, The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in 
Germany (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9. 
13 Jean-François Lyotard, The Post-Modern Explained (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 45. 
14 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1964), 169. 
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never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even 
hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.”15 More importantly in terms of the narration, as 
Anderson points out, is that “communities are to be 
distinguished…by the style in which they are imagined.”16 This 
places the emphasis of study on the narrative itself, as it is the 
acceptance of the narrative as truth that becomes part of the 
creation of identity.  
 It is again Jay Winter who points out two kinds of narrative 
discourses that were in use in Europe during, and before the First 
World War. The historical tradition, influenced by Paul Fussell’s 
The Great War and Modern Memory, which focused primarily on 
the British war poets, argued that the war had swept away a set of 
literary conventions and gave us a new and deeply ironic voice.  
This was a point in human history where mankind attacked the 
abstract notions that had been followed blindly: it was the break of 
tradition, and the creation of the Modern.  As Fussell writes: “the 
Great War was perhaps the last to be conceived as taking place 
within a seamless, purposeful ‘history’ involving a coherent stream 
of time running from past through present to future…the Great 
War took place in what was, compared with ours, a static world, 
where the values appeared stable and where the meanings of 
abstractions seemed permanent and reliable.”17 The argument that 
the Great War represented a break in history, and discontinuity 
with the past and with the Modern has been well commented on.  
Kenneth Silver’s Esprit de Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avant-
garde and the First World War writes that after 1914, “self-
control, self-abnegation, and self-denial of so many kinds became 
a national modus vivendi” and that this mood dominated the visual 
arts as it did the rest of social life.  It was only after the war had 
ended that artists could again begin to “invent the world” without 
the shackles of war-related constraints.18 Thus, the war was for 
15 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 6. 
16 Ibid., 6. 
17 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press 1976), 21. 
18 Kenneth Silver, Esprit des Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avant-garde and 
the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 388-389. 
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Silver, a step backwards: modernity was regressive not 
progressive.  Modris Eksteins presents us with another view of 
Modernism in his Rites of Spring: the Great War and the Birth of 
the Modern Age.  Speaking from a distinctly German perspective 
(although Eksteins deals with Britain and France, the main drive of 
the argument is clear), the author echoes the birth of Modernity as 
a creation born of chaos, quoting Elias Canetti: “the banging of 
windows, and the crashing of glass are the robust sounds of fresh 
life, the cries of something new-born.”19 Eksteins’ argument 
follows that the questioning of traditional values, indeed the 
Nietzschean “transvaluation of values” of violence, power, 
aggression, that denote Nazi culture can be traced back to the war 
enthusiasm felt by Germans in August 1914.  This is the reason 
why Eksteins sees profound links between facets of Stravinsky’s 
“Rite of Spring,” the theatricality of the Great War, and the 
primitive choreography of Nazi “culture.” 
 In response, Jay Winter argues in Sites of Memory, Sites of 
Mourning—based on the “collective remembrance” of the Great 
War—Modernity was not solely the only form used to make sense 
of the time.  For Winter, “Modernism was a cultural phenomenon,” 
for sure, but at the same time “a set of what may be called 
‘traditional values’—classical, romantic, or religious images and 
ideas widely disseminated in both elite and popular culture before 
and during the war,” remained.20 For Winter, the war did not 
represent a clear break from the Modern and the traditional, as both 
“forms of imagining the war were evident long before the 
armistice.  Furthermore, the distinction was at times more 
rhetorical than real. Modernists didn’t obliterate traditions; they 
stretched, explored, and reconfigured them in ways that alarmed 
conventional artists, writers, and the public at large.”21 Winter 
notes quite correctly that Modernism follows its own teleology, 
that is always dependent on the past:  
 
‘Modernism’ - more of a temperament than a set of 
19 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern 
Age (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1989), 55. 
20 J.M. Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 2-3. 
21 Ibid., 3. 
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fixed beliefs - left behind as neatly and surgically as some 
scholars suggest a host of images and conventions 
derived from eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
religious, romantic, or classical traditions…it is the 
very teleology of this position - the search for 
precursors or exponents of what later critics have 
admired or rejected - which makes the ‘modernist’ 
hypothesis about the cultural history of the early 
twentieth century just as misleading as other 
tendentious interpretations of recent or not so recent 
history.22  
 
It is interesting here to compare Winter’s work with Anderson’s 
conception of the temporal trappings of nationalism.  For 
Anderson, the narrative of nationalism follows a conception of 
simultaneity, in which time, is “an idea of homogeneous, empty-
time, in which simultaneity is, as it were, transverse, cross-time, 
marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by temporal 
coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.”23 The age of 
nationalism is represented by the connection of past and future, 
which is what gives a national community its distinct identity, and 
culture.  This is not merely a “Modern” mode of interpretation and 
criticism, but one that was in play ever since historical 
consciousness was awaken in Europe at least by the fifteenth-
century; after all the dialectic of ancients and moderns in history 
dated as far back as Machiavelli.24 
 The Great War was a culmination of the traditional modes 
of cultural representations coupled with the discourses of the 
Modern being played out on the battlefield. Although there had 
been wars between nation-states in Europe before, the First World 
War marked the first conflict that encompassed the whole of every 
national community involved. Even the neutral nations, as far 
away as the United States, would not be left untouched. There is no 
discontinuity in the twentieth century between the traditional and 
the Modern, surely the romantic images of war were lost by 1918, 
22 Ibid., 4-5. 
23 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 24. 
24 Niccolò Machiavelli, Selected Political Writings, ed. David Wootton, 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 1994), 159. 
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especially once the war poets and novelists got their hands on 
them, but the men and women of the generation of 1914, the 
masses that made up the armies and workers, went to war that year 
based on the ideas and representations that composed their national 
identities - the war for all belligerent nations was justified by 
defense of the common, collective identity.  However the Great 
War was such a traumatic event, it left many aloft and devoid of 
meaning. The huge excesses in killing and destruction, even after 
the war, made people feel at the time that the war did offer a break 
with the past. After all, how could Europe go back to the way 
things were after such a catastrophe? And although has Jay Winter 
as pointed out, “Auschwitz was not Verdun”, it still must be 
remembered that the “lost generation” of 1914 were executioners 
as well as victims.25  
 
The Nation at War: Singularity and Universality 
Most historians would maintain that the nationalist 
narrative began in France. The Great Revolution had created both 
internal and external concerns, which made it necessary for the 
numerous revolutionary governments to promote the idea of not 
only the nation, but also of the “Republic” in order to maintain 
what had been gained.  There were of course movements against 
this: one can only think of the slaughter of the Vendée, and the 
alienation of the clergy.  However, for the most part, the nationalist 
zeal that overtook France and Europe was quite successful.  The 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen declared: “The 
principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No 
body, no individual can exercise authority that does not expressly 
emanate from it” (article 3).  The nation was to be the collective 
representation of “the general will” that Rousseau had argued 
should be the basis of political government.  As for Rousseau: 
“What causes human misery is the contradiction…between nature 
and social institutions, between man and citizen…Give him over 
entirely to the state or leave him entirely to himself, but if you 
25 J.M. Winter, “Catastrophe and Culture: Recent Trends in the Historiography 
of the First World War,” The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 64, No. 3 (Sept. 
1992): 532. 
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divide his heart you destroy him.”26 In this sense, as a Republic, 
France had chosen to be a nation of citizens, one of civilization, 
not of barbarism.  
 The problems that this causes, argues Tzvetan Todorov is 
that “Legitimation via the nation instead of God has been viewed 
as inseparable from preference for one’s own country at the 
expense of universal principles, membership in a culture - which is 
undeniable and unavoidable - has come to justify the requirement 
that cultural and political entities should coincide.”27 However, 
Todorov has pointed out: “the ‘internal’ nation proceeds from the 
idea of equality, while the ‘external’ nation implies on the contrary 
a preferential choice in favor of one’s own country over all the 
others, thus implying inequality.”28 This is the narrative of national 
community that had formed in the “external” idea of France, the 
geographical construction, which was legitimized by the 
“internal,” cultural France.  Once this distinction between the 
French national community from its neighbors, once the cultural 
and political had been overlapped, the idea that “The French have 
become the foremost people of the universe”, proclaiming one 
deputy in the National Assembly, was created. This notion of 
liberating the beleaguered peoples of Europe from the tyranny of 
monarchical government and despotism grew into the idea of 
“mission civilatrice.” This was based on the moral notion that once 
free, and once they had obtained the rights of man and citizen, it 
was now the duty of the French people to be the beacon of reason 
to the rest of the world, still under the grip of tyrannous kings. 
Durand-Maillane wrote in 1791 that the new constitution “has to 
make the people of France happy, and by imitation, all people.”29 
However, as Eugen Weber points out, it was the rural areas of 
France, and those regions and populations that were hardly 
“French” in the sense of Parisian “civilization,” that were made the 
object of this “civilizing mission.” Weber makes the point that “the 
26 quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and 
Exoticism in French Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1993), 180. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Tzvetan Todorov, Hope and Memory: Lessons from the Twentieth Century 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 253. 
29 Todorov, On Human Diversity, 187. 
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people of whole regions [of France] felt little identity with the 
state or with people of other regions” even by 1870.30  It seems 
that France during and after the Revolution, made a greater effort 
attempting to acclimate the French people to the “civilizing 
process” than external peoples. A student in Paris, Georges 
Valérie, wrote in 1901 that “Conquest is a necessary stage on the 
road to nationalism…[A nation should] bring in larger unity 
groups without a clear cultural identity, to draw in, to enrich, to 
enlighten the uninstructed tribal mind, this is the civilizing mission 
we cannot renounce.”31 It was necessary to assimilate rural 
populations for the simple fact that they were generally conceived 
to have no culture of their own; they were still reliant on antiquated 
ways. These communities could therefore only benefit from their 
integration into the larger French community. Weber suggests it 
may be easier to see the integration of peoples into national 
communities in the light of colonialism.  Throughout Western 
Europe this process was hugely successful, mostly because of the 
growth of nationalist education, mainly through the teaching of 
history.   
Schools taught potent lessons of morality focused on duty, 
effort, and seriousness of purpose. This had been the goal of 
François Guizot as early as 1833, when he defined the instruction 
that schools were intended to provide: reading, writing, and 
arithmetic to furnish essential skills, the teaching of French and of 
the metric system to implant or increase the sense of unity under 
French nationhood, moral and religious instruction to serve 
spiritual and social needs.32 The history of France before the Great 
War was presented in a continuous chain, extending back to 
Roman times, one text declaring “Here we are, more than two 
thousand years ago, in the period when France was still called 
Gaul.”33 France here appears less a nation and more an essence 
projected backwards, invoking the idea of la France éternelle. 
French soldiers and statesmen became heroes; French culture and 
30 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 
1870-1914 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976), 486. 
31 Quoted from Ibid, 486. 
32 Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, 331. 
33 Quoted from Ann-Louise Shapiro, “Fixing History: Narratives of World War I 
in France,” History and Theory, Vol.36, No. 4, (Dec., 1997): 114. 
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style was made primary, the very expression of high art; class 
conflict was completely excluded. In all this, France became a 
nation, indeed a spirit that was eternal and undying. Increasingly, 
French nationalism re-emphasized the differences between 
France’s “mission civilatrice” and Germany’s Kultur and 
Weltpolitik; two distinct teleological narratives, each giving divine 
meaning to the community on opposite sides of the Rhine.  These 
kinds of narratives are what Etienne Balibar call “the two 
symmetrical figures of the illusion of national identity”: where 
history articulates both a national personality and a national 
mission.34 The comparison with Germany fundamentally shaped 
the French national community before the war, and these 
assumptions had a profound effect on how it responded in the early 
days as the Germans invaded France herself.  
 Germany for its part saw not only an external difference 
with France, but also to the east of her borders, to the lands of 
Russia. The Prussian victory in 1870 had led most in the German 
military and government to dismiss the French threat to the West, 
fearing only the possibility of a two-front war. Russia’s huge army 
and vastness of territory provided the Germans with an immediate 
concern and also the opportunity to realize its own historical 
mission. For many Germans, Russia provided the opportunities of 
dynastic expansion, but also an exoteric calling of spirituality. 
Sturm und Drang movement members Klinger and Lenz discerned 
in Russia and its people a spiritual breadth, and even Rilke 
considered Russia his spiritual homeland. Artists, musicians, and 
philosophers from Wagner to Nietzsche, from Spengler to Thomas 
Mann reveled in the exotic imagination of the East.35 However, 
this feeling also was coupled with the imperialistic designs of 
many Germans, concluding that the Eastern peoples provided a 
tabula rosa, where the people were still young, and nobly savage, 
for which provided the opportunity for German Kultur to cultivate. 
It became a fixation of the German imagination to “Drive to the 
34 Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” Becoming 
National, eds. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 132. 
35 Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National 
Identity and German Occupation in World War I, (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 25. 
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East” (the Drang nach Osten) which had developed by at least the 
1860s. This became a commonly held assumption of Germany’s 
ultimate destiny in the ascension of Weltpolitik.  
 If history provided access to the new temporal conceptions 
of nationalism, then geography and its teaching offered the same 
for the spatial. With the learning of sciences and of cosmography, 
the intake of general terms of geographical landscapes that are 
codified in a descriptive language, presenting pupils with a 
universal reference system, complete with uniform rules.36 
Geography provides names and legitimizes space, it was necessary 
for the nation to move towards the resacralization of one part of 
space – the national territory in the teaching of geography. 
Germany told its students of the “special relationship to the 
landscape” and incarnated a collective myth to conquer Russian 
lands.37 In France, the concept of the “Hexagon” was created. For 
school students the geometric figure of the hexagon allowed them 
to conceptualize the image of France as they learned the geography 
of their country. They were also taught the départements as well; 
learning to recite the departments’ names as well as their 
prefectures and sub-prefectures. Of course, regional boundaries did 
not always follow natural boundaries created by climate, weather, 
rivers, and mountains. The Republic made great efforts in trying to 
integrate these natural geographic realities with the abstract 
boundaries of administrative units. School geography was 
successful in implanting national identity and making this national 
identity the property of every Frenchmen.38 
The outbreak of war in 1914 brought all these totalizing 
principles to the forefront of daily life. Years of nationalist 
sentiment and collective identity now spread over in all spheres of 
cultural life. Furthermore, this was not merely a development left 
to one nation, but was a phenomenon experienced by every nation 
that entered the war, including America, usually presented by 
historians as wanting to avoid the war. Ideological battles between 
the academia of the belligerents were fought just as viciously as 
36 Antoine Prost, “The Republican Primary School and French National 
Identity,” Republican Identities in War and Peace: Representations of France in 
the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, NY: Berg, 2002), 74. 
37 Liulevicius, War Land on the Eastern Front, 170.  
38 Ibid., 77. 
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the war on the battlefield. In October 1914, virtually the entire 
German academic profession - over 4,000 names, including almost 
every professor at almost every German university - endorsed a 
declaration entitled “An der Kulturwelt” (To the World of Culture). 
Numbered among them were closet socialists, future pacifists, and 
skeptics, including Max Weber and Alfred Einstein.39 Their list of 
denials concluded with two assertions: first, that the future of 
European culture rested on the victory of German so-called 
“militarism”; and secondly, that in defining this militarism there 
was no distinction to be made between Prussia and the rest of 
Germany, or between the German army and the German nation: 
“both are one.”40 “Our belief,” the declaration continues “is that 
the salvation of all European culture depends on the victory for 
which German ‘militarism’ is fighting, the discipline, the loyalty, 
the spirit of sacrifice of the united free German people.”41 German 
Kultur, which embraced concepts that began with the community 
but were defined nationally, the idea of Geist, was taken in contrast 
to “civilization.” Rudolf Eucken, the German philosopher and 
Nobel Prize winner published on “the world historical significance 
of the German spirit,” asserting that Germany could not be 
defeated while it remained truly united and stood fast in its inner 
strength.42 Hew Strachan argues that the war of 1914 had led the 
Germans away from previous advances in culture, and placed them 
on a new path:  
 
The clash between civilization and Kultur took 
German thought back to its late-eighteenth-century 
roots. In condemning civilization, the philosophers 
of 1914 were reflecting the rationality of the 
Enlightenment and the consequences of the French 
Revolution. They argued that, following what was 
essentially an alien, French track, philosophy had 
39 Hew Strachan, The First World War: Vol, I:  To Arms (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 1122. 
40 Ibid., 1122, Cf. Bernhard Vom Brocke, Wissenschaft und Militarismus 
(Darmstadt WBG, 1985), 649-664. 
41 Ibid., 1129. 
42Hermann Lübbe, Politische Philosophie in Deutschland: Studien Zu Ihrer 
Geschichte (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1974), 176-84. 
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elevated the rule of law and the rights of the individual, 
and so had promoted selfishness and materialism. 
At one level, therefore the summons of 1914 was a 
call to rediscover the ideas of the Aufklärung and to 
refurbish the memory of 1813.43  
 
It was yet another clash between the discourses of the traditional 
and the Modern. 
 This declaration by the German academic profession only 
legitimated the claims of their French counterparts. The French 
responded with their declaration on November 3. It contained the 
names of 100 members of the French literary and artistic world, 
including Gerorges Clemenceau, Barrès, Debussy, Gide, Matisse, 
and Monet. Declaring that “the intellectual and moral richness of 
humanity is created by the natural variety and independence of all 
nations’ gifts,” it was clear that it was a statement of the kind of 
universalizing principle that the Republic had always claimed as 
the self-anointed beacon of civilization.44 On December 12, 
Bergson told the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques that 
German philosophy was “a translation into intellectual terms of her 
brutality, her appetites, and her vices.” Germany’s actions were 
merely “barbarism reinforced by civilization.”45 The image of the 
barbarous German enemy was not merely used to legitimize the 
war cause. It also offered an opportunity to be directed towards 
particular ends, such as war loans or military recruitment, and to 
solicit the support of foreign neutrals.46  
As the ideological battles were being fought with words 
and documents, the realities of war were being experienced by 
ordinary soldiers and civilians in the front-lines and in the 
occupied territories. Few had to be read rhetoric about the brutality 
of war in 1914. However, many used the nationalist discourse to 
make sense of what was happening around them. As the Germans 
approached the city of Lille, Madame Delahaye-Théry, witnessed 
43 Strachan, The First World War, 1129-30. 
44 Ibid., 1121. 
45 Henri Bergson, Meaning of War: Life and Matter in Conflict (London: T.F. 
Unwin, 1915), 33. 
46 John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 292. 
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the retreat of the French army, and wrote that “The Germans are 
coming. It’s the end. The end for us.”47 It must be remembered that 
although most of the stories of German barbarization were 
exaggerated, horrible events did take place. As Modris Eksteins 
put it:  
 
If babies were not systematically snatched from 
mothers’ arms and smashed against brick walls, if 
nuns were not deliberately sought out for sodomy, 
rape, and slaughter, if old people were not made to 
crawl on all fours before being riddled with bullets, 
considerable numbers of hostages were shot, 
including women and children and octogenarians.48 
 
 It must also be remembered that the “atrocities” committed by the 
Germans, while both real and definite, the representations used by 
the French and Allies to designate the German enemy were also a 
manner, and John Horne and Allan Kramer point out: “To find a 
language for the realities of the German invasion.”49 However, 
taken further, it could also, and should be said that it was the 
attempt at elucidation of the realities of warfare in the age of 
national communities and total war. The Germans were certainly 
not alone in perpetrating brutal acts in 1914, and the equivocal use 
of imagery, such as myths of the franc-tireur and the French with 
the severed hands, reduced a complex and emotionally charged 
situation to an emblematic person or action.50 Naturally, women 
and children were for the French the most readily accessible link to 
the imagery of a peaceful France forced into war by the German 
aggressor. The image of raped women and severed hands became 
the signifier to the cause of the national community. The myths 
provided accessible justifications for the continuation of the war, 
and outlined a purpose for the unity now obtained by the state. In 
this way, the national community, the state, and the war were 
47 Helen McPhail, The Long Silence: Civilian Life Under the German 
Occupation of Northern France, 1914-1918 (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 
19. 
48 Eksteins, Rites of Spring, 158. 
49 Horne and Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914, 225. 
50 Ibid., 204. 
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forged into one mentality, one experience, and one representation 
that made the conflict seem as a fight to death, initiating a fatalism 
and grim determination that only helped to totalize the war further. 
Rudolf Binding, a German soldier serving on the Western 
Front during 1918, wrote in his diary on August 12, expressing that 
what he was experiencing during the war was something that was a 
part of “uncontrollable movements and forces”: 
 
In the end, even if an individual nation does not get 
its deserts, humanity will. This generation has no 
future, and deserves none. Anyone who belongs to 
it lives no more. It is almost a consolation to realize 
this. All that an individual can do to get out of the 
wrack is to find some way of hewing out blocks of 
stone wherewith to found a new structure which to 
this generation will be nothing, and leave it as a 
legacy to others.51 
 
Binding’s prophetic words would indeed become realized: the 
legacy of the First World War would surely be remembered in 
stone, but the largest exposition of the legacy of the “lost 
generation” would be expressed through history itself. The 
mistakes made prior to and during 1914 would be repeated again 
and again to this very day. The language of the national 
community, although apparently held to be singular to the specific 
community, is in reality a universal logic aimed at totalizing. This 
is how we must look at the First World War when attempting to 
understand how and why this war, and the rest of the twentieth 
century became the horrible blood-bath that it was.
51 Rudolf Georg Binding, A Fatalist at War, trans. Ian F. D. Morrow (Boston, 
MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), 243. 
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Preface 
Lu Xun the writer was in many ways born of the 
Revolution of 1911. Originally a writer of Classical Chinese, he 
was one of the first to write in the Vernacular following the literary 
revolution of 1917. This transition was prompted by the escalation 
of nationalistic thought and the idea that China needed to reform 
itself, in both the political and cultural arena. John Fairbank, in The 
Cambridge History of China, quotes Hu Shi, one of Lu Xun’s 
contemporaries, as stating, “A dead language can never produce a 
living literature; if a living literature is to be produced, there must 
be a living tool."1  The “living tool” quickly developed into the 
Vernacular. Lu Xun’s power in wielding that tool was almost 
immediately recognized as significant. His short stories and essays 
were culturally relevant, criticizing China’s outdated traditions and 
Confucian rituals. Lu Xun’s first story, 狂人日記  (Kuangren Riji, or 
“A Madman’s Diary”) was published in May of 1918 and was 
quickly followed by his slightly longer story, 阿 Q 正 传, (Ah Q 
Zhengzhuan, or “The True Story of Ah Q) in 1921.  
阿 Q 正 传 was first translated into English in 1926, only 
four years after its initial publication, by George Kin Leung. 
According to the Encyclopedia of Literary Translation into 
English, Leung’s translation “suffers from its flat and stilted 
1 John K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 467. 
 
                                                 
 
English”2 but nevertheless retains value as the first translation of 
Lu Xun’s writing into a Western language. In 1930, E.H.F. Mills 
produced a slightly abridged translation of three of Lu Xun’s 
stories, among them “阿 Q 正 传”, published in his volume The 
Tragedy of Ah Gui. In 1938, two years after Lu Xun’s death, the 
first edition of his Complete Works was published. Presently, all of 
his diaries, essays, short stories, poems and translations are 
available. 
Although translations of “阿 Q 正 传” emerged beginning in 
the 1920s, it was after 1950 that two of the most recognized 
translations today were produced.  Yang Xianyi and Gladys Yang 
contributed the most comprehensive collection of Lu Xun’s stories 
in translation in 1956, a collection which is still widely read today 
and within which “阿 Q 正 传” is translated into “fluent and smooth 
English”3 that has nevertheless been criticized for being too 
British. Additionally, it has been pointed out that in their 
translation, the Yangs fail “to register the different modes in which 
Lu Xun writes literature in the vernacular, and by which he plays 
with Chinese literary language.”4  Indeed, in the Encyclopedia of 
Literary Translation into English, Olive Classe also points out that 
“some may find that the [Yangs’] translation does not reflect 
adequately the various idiosyncratic voices of the authors.”5 
The Yangs’ translation stands in contrast to William A. 
Lyell’s translation, Diary of a Madman and Other Stories in 1990. 
Lyell translates Lu Xun’s words into American rather than British 
English, and, according to the Encyclopedia, “successfully 
capture[s] the nuances of stylistic diversity in the original…and 
should be commended for its abundant scholarly references.”6  
Some critics will perhaps disagree; Lyell’s translation, although 
“enthusiastic” with a style that is “racy and slangy,” makes 
noticeable changes to the original Chinese, substituting modern 
American phrases for those of early twentieth century China, in a 
2 Olive Classe, "Lu Xun," Encyclopedia of Literary Translation into English 
(Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2000), 868. 
3 Ibid., 869. 
4 Jeremy Tambling, Madmen and Other Survivors: Reading Lu Xun's Fiction 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), 5. 
5 Classe, "Lu Xun," 869. 
6 Ibid., 869. 
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clear act of domestication.7  Hans J. Vermeer states that in all 
translation, “one must translate, consciously and consistently, in 
accordance with some principle respecting the source text.”8  
Lyell’s translation is widely-recognized as having a defined 
skopos; in fact, in his introduction to the translation, Lyell states: 
 
I have opted for the attempt to suggest something of Lu 
Xun’s style in English, for more than any other modern 
Chinese author, Lu Xun is inseparable from his style. I 
have tried to recreate the experience of reading Lu Xun in 
Chinese, often asking myself the question, ‘How would he 
have said this if his native language had been American 
English.9 
 
 Lyell’s skopos is clearly to domesticate the text; he “leaves 
the reader in peace as much as possible and moves the writer 
towards him.”10  Lu Xun’s statement, “连 他 先 前 的 行 状,” for 
example, is translated as, “there is even some uncertainty regarding 
his ‘background’”11 in the Yangs’ translation, while Lyell 
translates it as, “there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding his 
‘official resume.’”12  The term “official resume” immediately 
identifies the translation as one that has been Westernized to a 
certain extent, as well as domesticated. Later in Lu Xun’s original 
version, Ah Q thinks “他 想：这 是 错 的，可 笑！油 煎 大 头 
鱼，未 庄 豆 加 上 半 寸 长 的 葱 叶，城 里 却 加 上 切 玉 德 
葱 丝，她 想：这 也 是 错 的，可 笑!” which the Yangs 
translate (word for word) as, “‘This is wrong. Ridiculous!’ Again, 
7 Tambling, Madmen and Other Survivors, 5. 
8 Hans J. Vermeer, "Skopos and Commission in Translational Action," The 
Translation Studies Reader, ed. Lawrence Venuti (New York: Routledge, 2000), 
234. 
9 William A. Lyell, “Introduction,” in Xun Lu, Diary of a Madman and Other 
Stories (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), xl. 
10 Friedrich Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translating," The 
Translation Studies Reader, ed. Lawrence Venuti (New York: Routledge, 2000), 
49. 
11 Lu Xun, The Complete Stories of Lu Xun, trans. Xianyi Yang and Gladys 
Yang (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1981), 17. 
12 Lu Xun, Diary of a Madman and Other Stories, ed. William A. Lyell 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 107. 
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when they fried large-headed fish in oil the Weizhuang villagers all 
added shallots sliced in half an inch thick, whereas the 
townspeople added finely shredded shallots, and he thought, ‘This 
is wrong, too. Ridiculous!”13  Lyell, however, in one of the more 
obvious domestications in his translation, states, “That’s not right, 
that’s flatass stupid!’ he thought to himself. ‘On the other hand, I 
gotta remember that next to me, Wei Villagers are just a bunch of 
hicks. They’ve never even seen how bigheads are fried in town.”14  
Lyell is arguably engaging in what Antoine Berman, in his essay 
“Translation and the Trials of the Foreign,” calls Qualitative 
Impoverishment. Lyell, in his use of modern American slang, has 
“replace[d] terms, expressions and figures in the original with 
terms, expressions and figures which lack their signifying or 
‘iconic’ richness.”15  
 Lyell’s domestication of the text is almost at odds with his 
insertion of numerous footnotes in order to explain cultural 
references. Lyell makes a conscious effort to preserve many of the 
cultural references within the text, utilizing footnotes to clarify 
those elements that would undoubtedly be unfamiliar to foreign 
readers, such as Confucian ideas taken directly from the Analects. 
The question arises, however, of the connection between Lyell’s 
skopos and his placement of Chinese idioms throughout the text. 
Throughout most of the text, Lyell is indeed seen to domesticate in 
accordance with his aforementioned skopos. However, if Lu Xun’s 
“native language had been American English,”16 his culture 
arguably would have been born of America as well. He certainly 
would not have quoted the Analects, nor would he have mentioned 
Confucius. Lyell chooses not to alter the Chinese, a decision that 
does not align with his use of terms such as “hicks” and “flatass.” 
Though he does not mention this in his introduction, it can be 
assumed that his translation encompasses more than one skopos.
13 Lu Xun, The Complete Stories of Lu Xun, 19. 
14 Lu Xun, Diary of a Madman and Other Stories, 108. 
15 Antoine Berman, "Translation and the Trials of the Foreign," The Translation 
Studies Reader, ed. Lawrence Venuti (New York: Routledge, 2000), 283. 
16 Lyell, “Introduction,” xl. 
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A New Translation of Lu Xun’s  “阿 Q 正 传” 
 
阿 Q “ 先 前 阔”， 见 识 高,  而 
且“真 能 做”，本 来 几   乎 是 一 
个 “ 完 人”了，但 可  惜 他 本 质 
上  还 有 一 些 缺  点。最 恼 人 
的 是  在 他 头 皮  上. 颇 有 几 
处 不 知 起  于 任   时 的 癞 疮 
疤。这 虽 然 也  在 他 的 身 
体 ，而 看 阿Q 的 意  思, 倒 也 
似 乎 以 为 不 足 贵 的, 因 为 他 
讳 说“癞”以 及 以 切 近 于“见”的 
音，后 来 推 而 广 之, “光”也 讳, 
“亮”也 讳，再 后  来，连 “ 灯” 
“ 烛”都 讳 了。一  犯 讳，不 问 
后 心 与 无 心，阿 Q 便 全 疤 通 
红 的 发 起 怒  来, 估 量 了 对 
手，口 讷 的 他 便   骂，其 力 
小 的 他 便 打； 然 而 不 知 怎 
么 一 回 事，总 还 是 阿Q  吃 
亏 的 时 候 多。于 是 他 渐 渐 
的 变  了 方 针，大 抵 改 为 怒 
目 而 视 了。  
 
1  Ah Q used to be a “well-off” man of far- 
2  reaching knowledge and experience. He 
3  was “highly competent” and, originally, 
4  almost a “perfect person,” but 
5 unfortunately, he had a few physical flaws,  
6 the most annoying of which were on his 
7 scalp. He had a few patches where at some 
8  uncertain time leprosy scars had appeared.  
9  Although these scars were a part of his 
10 own body, Ah Q did not seem to find 
11 them adequately noble, because he 
12 avoided mentioning the word “leprosy”  
13 as well as any words that sounded like it.  
 
 
14 Later, he expanded upon this, refusing to  
15 say the words “light” and “bright”. Later  
16 still, even “lamp” and “candle” became  
17 forbidden words. The moment anyone 
18 said any of these words, whether 
19 intentionally or not, Ah Q would become  
20 furious, all of his scars turning red. He 
21 would assess the perpetrator – if it were  
22 someone who was weak in language, he  
23 would verbally abuse him, and if it were  
24 someone weak in strength, he would hit  
25 him. Yet, peculiarly, it was usually Ah Q 
26 who came off worse. As a result, he 
27 gradually changed his method of attack  
28 to, for the most part, an angry glare. 
 
Translation Notes  
In my translation, I chose to foreignize, rather than 
domesticate. In my opinion, William Lyell’s translation produces a 
text that is completely unlike Lu Xun’s original text; in fact, it falls 
quite neatly into John Dryden’s definition of paraphrase. Lyell 
states, “For more than any other modern Chinese author, Lu Xun is 
inseparable from his style.”1  Although agreeing with this 
statement, I do not believe that Lyell’s translation has preserved Lu 
Xun’s unique style. Therefore, even though I did not produce a 
word for word translation, I attempted to bring the reader to the 
author. In doing so, however, I recognized immediately several 
problems that other translators had experienced.  
I chose this particular passage for one simple reason: when 
I first read it in English, I did not understand it. Perhaps due to the 
fact that I was well aware that it was translated from Chinese, I 
wondered if a pun had existed within the Chinese that had been 
lost in translation. Specifically, I did not understand why Ah Q 
extended his taboo to include words such as “bright” and “lamp.” I 
thought that perhaps the Chinese words for “bright,” “lamp,” etc. 
rhymed with the Chinese word for “leprosy,” and that the resulting 
joke would not translate easily into English, due to the lack of 
1 Ibid., lv. 
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homonyms. I thought that if I translated this passage myself, I 
could translate it in such a way that those reading it in English 
would also be able to understand the joke, or, at the very least, 
better understand the passage itself. I wondered if I could produce 
a foreignizing translation that was a bit clearer. After reading the 
passage in its original Chinese, however, I did not experience any 
immediate moment of clarity, as I expected I would – none of the 
words in question seemed to rhyme in the slightest. Only after 
considering the passage for a length of time did I come to any 
semblance of a conclusion. The passage, like much of Lu Xun’s 
writing, is polysemous. Ah Q is by very nature a foolish character. 
The fact that he associates seemingly arbitrary words with his scars 
attests to that; the passage therefore can indeed be read simply as 
intending to further convey Ah Q’s idiocy. However, it is also 
possible that Ah Q fears the shiny, reflective nature of his scars, 
and mere mention of any word that signifies a light-producing 
object angers him. When I referred to the Yangs’ translation, I 
discovered that while I translated the phrase “癞 疮 疤” as 
“leprosy scars,” the Yangs’ had translated it as “shiny ringworm 
scars,” and Lyell had translated it as “shiny scars” from “an attack 
of scabies.” The term “shiny,” however, is completely absent from 
Lu Xun’s original work; in fact, aside from the words “light,” 
“bright,” etc., there are no terms in the story that even have the 
slightest connotation of reflection. Obviously, both the Yangs and 
Lyell deemed the passage unambiguous in meaning, and inserted 
the phrase “shiny” to give English readers an early clue of the joke 
to come. However, if there is no “early clue” present in the 
Chinese, then it is possible that Chinese readers and Westerners 
reading a foreignized translation are equally likely to either 
understand or be confused by the passage. Lu Xun’s positioning of 
a subtle joke within his lines is evidence of his unique, polysemous 
style, a style that even Lyell has acknowledged as “inseparable” 
from Lu Xun himself.2  In their efforts to participate in what 
Antoine Berman calls “clarification,” both the Yangs and Lyell 
have slightly diluted the subtlety of Lu Xun’s style in their 
translations. In my translation, I decided not to leave the original 
2 Ibid., xl. 
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joke in peace, choosing not to clarify (or hint at, as the case may 
be) in English what is not clarified in Lu Xun’s original Chinese.  
 Another major issue I encountered with my translation, one 
that has probably become evident by my discussion in the previous 
paragraph, also deals with the phrase “癞 疮 疤.”  “癞” is 
pronounced “lai,” and is, quite simply, a sore-producing skin 
disease. The two characters that follow it – “疮”, which means 
“sore”, and “疤”, which means “scar” – do not alter the disease 
itself; rather, they merely intensify the severity of the disease. 
“癞,” then, is not leprosy, nor is it scabies or ringworm. In fact, it 
has no name in English, nor, it seems, is it specific in Chinese. In a 
twentieth century Chinese hospital, three patients who have 
leprosy, scabies and ringworm, respectively, could all be 
diagnosed has being plagued by “癞.” When I first translated the 
passage, I decided not to translate the term “癞”, and, in 
accordance with my skopos of foreignizing, simply left it as a 
Chinese character. However, as I continued to translate, when I 
arrived at the terms “light,” “bright,” “lamp,” and “candle,” I found 
myself in an impossible situation. By allowing the character “癞” 
to remain in my English translation, I had made it almost 
impossible for readers to understand not only the joke, but the 
passage as a whole, which is in opposition to my reasons for 
translating in the first place. My skopos, in this instance, could not 
exist peacefully with my desire to make the passage readable. I 
decided, therefore, that I would choose a term that was more 
foreign than ringworm or scabies, as I believed both of those terms 
domesticated “癞” to a greater degree than was necessary. In 
modern Western society, “scabies” has a comical air, while 
“ringworm” does not quite have the connotations of severity that is 
attached to the term “癞” in Chinese. Leprosy, with its 
connotations of irregularity and gravity, as well as the slight air of 
mystery that surrounds it, seemed to be a better fit. In choosing the 
term “leprosy,” I believe I was able to preserve my skopos while at 
the same time, producing a comprehensible translation.  
 The last sizable problem I encountered in my translation 
was Lu Xun’s use of quotation marks to designate commonly-used 
phrases in twentieth-century Chinese society. In his first line (lines 
1-3), he uses the phrase, “先 前 阔”, which I translated as “used 
 48 
 
to be a well-off man.” “先 前” simply means “previously” or “in 
the past.” However, the term “阔” is polysemous, and can be used 
to mean “rich,” “broad” or simply “good.” Lyell chooses to 
translate the term as “rich,” while I chose “well-off.” Though I do 
believe Lu Xun is stating that Ah Q used to be wealthy, I wanted to 
choose a term that would attempt to preserve the polysemy of  
“阔” in my English translation.
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 Translation is a necessary part of ordinary psychological 
development.  A successful translation brings with it “unpleasure” 
because the Kultur in which we live is a veneer of things we know 
and have to suppress in order to mitigate the demands of the id 
(das Es).  Repression (die verdrangung) is motivated by our desire 
not to feel unpleasure through translation.  According to Freud, 
manifestations of the id (das Es) are translated through the ego 
(das Ich).  The ego acts as the translator of drives (der Trieb) into 
acceptable actions.  Through the process of psychoanalysis, the 
analyst assumes the role of the translator (ego).   
Freud believed that spoken language is not important to 
analysis of the unconscious.   Spoken language has limits that do 
not compare to the feelings or effects of the drives within us.  In 
nominalism, the thing is what the name is.  Reality is bound by the 
name you ascribe to that reality.  Therefore, the world is defined by 
the limits of language and given names.  A notion of German 
Romanticism is the possibility of infinite potentiation of language.  
Language lacking limits has a magical quality that links two 
worlds.  There is a double consciousness between the two worlds 
of thought/drive and the linguistic expression of the thought/drive.  
 
 
One defines the other and they are interlocked.  When drives are 
translated into words by the ego and then expressed, this double 
consciousness produces a double figuration.  There is a translation 
process from drive into language within the self, and then another 
translation from language of the self into an outward expression to 
the analyst.   
 The process of transference (die Übertragung) is suggested 
by Freud to be a false connection.   The client experiences 
thoughts, feelings, and memories derived from previous events and 
relationships and projects these onto the analyst. In this process, 
through the translation of thoughts into expression to the analyst, 
the client redirects feelings towards the analyst himself/herself.  
The connection is false because instead of fixing the actual 
problem, the problem is transferred to the analyst.  The patient 
believes that through expression, he/she is being finally 
understood. The client may develop erotic feelings for the 
therapist; these feelings may actually form a barrier and interfere 
with the analyst helping the client.   
 Freud believed that the desire for cathexis (die Besetzung) 
drives us.  Cathexis is the libido’s charge of energy.  This psychic 
energy is attached to a person, object, or body.  The release of this 
charge of energy creates a feeling of pleasure, whereas, a 
successful translation brings with it “unpleasure.”  Repression and 
transference are defense mechanisms used to cope with the 
unconscious unpleasure.   
 Freud believed in three kinds of translations: intrasystemic, 
intersystemic, and interpsychic.  An intrasystemic translation 
occurs writing a system of one language where there is a transfer 
of one to another.  An intersystemic translation is between 
languages or somatic systems.  For example, a hysteric performs 
an intersystemic translation from body (ailments) to language 
(complaints).  The type of translation most applicable to 
transference (die Übertragung) is interpsychic.  This translation 
focuses on the shift from object to object.  Counter-transference is 
also an interpsychic translation.  
 According to Freud, all of the following are translations: 
dreams, hysterical, obsessive and phobic symptomatologies, 
parapraxes, fetishes, choice of means of suicide, and the analyst’s 
interpretations.  To focus on the last example, the analyst’s own 
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interpretations are a translation of the client’s expressed emotions 
and behaviors.  If the analyst is translating the already translated 
double figuration, he/she becomes a third variable that deduces the 
original drive (das Trieb).  The analyst becomes the ego, but is 
only human and thus imperfect.  A translator can make mistakes, 
and drives can be translated inaccurately.  The ego cannot make 
mistakes unless it is pressured by the id to act in a malevolent way.   
The translator can easily make a mistake in evaluating a patient if 
he/she is not careful.   
In analyzing the patient, it is pivotal to be accurate in order 
to provide an appropriate treatment plan.  If the analyst makes 
mistakes in translation, he/she is putting the patient at risk.   One 
way in which the analyst could make an error is by becoming too 
involved in the patient’s own testimonies and narratives and thus 
transfer his/her own repressed feelings to the patient.  This is a 
phenomenon known as counter-transference.  Counter-transference 
may lead to a skewed translation of drives.   
Whereas Freud emphasizes transference and counter-
transference as projective identification techniques through an 
interpsychic translation, the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan 
revises Freud in viewing the self as constituted by its relationship 
to an other, with the primary developmental stage beginning with 
the experience of viewing oneself in a mirror.  Lacan’s mirror 
stage is the first moment in which the subject recognizes the self in 
a mirrored reflection.   A transformation takes place when the 
subject assumes identification in an image.  This transformation 
becomes an interpsychic translation. 
 Lacan described his ideas as “Return to Freud” because he 
translated the ideas of Freud into a structural-linguistic 
terminology that removed agency and subjectivity in their 
interpretation.  Though Lacan believed his philosophy was “Return 
to Freud” in nature, many of his ideas differed significantly from 
Freud’s.  For instance, Freud believed that the unconscious and 
linguistic conscious were two separate entities, very segregated 
and only joined through the ego’s translation.  Lacan, on the other 
hand, believed that the unconscious was as complicated as the 
conscious and therefore also structured linguistically.  "For Lacan, 
Freud's central insight was not…that the unconscious exists, but 
that it has structure, that this structure affects in innumerable ways 
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what we say and do, and that in thus betraying itself it becomes 
accessible to analysis."1 
Julia Kristeva departs from Lacanian ideology and argues 
that Lacan’s bracketing of the drives (Trieb) “castrates” Freud’s 
discovery.  In Kelly Oliver’s “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father and the 
Crisis of the Paternal Function,” she writes, “Kristeva, protecting 
the Father of psychoanalysis from this castration threat by his most 
prodigal son, reinscribes the drives in language.  Her tactic is to 
reinscribe language in the body, arguing that the dynamics that 
operate the Symbolic are already working within the material of 
the body and the presymbolic imaginary.”2  It was Kristva’s goal 
to trace the signifier through the body in order to reinscribe the 
body in language at the same time. 
For herself, Kristeva sets up the difficult task of connecting 
the body and language, and she chose to do so by recovering a 
repressed maternal body and the abject maternal body.   The 
connection of language to body is an interpsychic translation 
because it translates one object through another object.  This case 
uses language and bodies as the two objects.  In addition to the 
maternal body, Kristeva uses the notion of the imaginary father to 
connect body and language.  The imaginary father is defined by 
Oliver as a screen for the mother’s love, associated, as it is, with 
the child’s relationship to its conception and the mother’s womb.  
“The imaginary father provides the support necessary to allow the 
child to move into the Symbolic.  This is a move from the mother’s 
body to the mother’s desire through the mother’s love…The 
semiotic body is abjected if necessary, but only for the sake of 
what motivates the bond in the first place: maternal love.”3  
Maternal love is a translator from body to desire, and therefore an 
interpsychic translation.  In order to understand this translation, it 
is necessary to understand the notion of the semiotic body of 
Kristeva and mirror stage of Lacan. 
1 Malcolm Bowie, “Jacques Lacan,” Structuralism and Since: From Lévi-
Strauss to Derrida, ed. John Sturrock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 
118 
2 Kelly Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father and the Crisis in the Paternal 
Function,” Diacritics, Vol. 21, No. 2/3, A Feminist Miscellany 
(Summer/Autumn, 1991), 43. 
3 Ibid., 44. 
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Kristeva believes that semiotic activity is the work of 
drives that stem from a semiotic body.4  She studies the drives that 
emerge prior to the mirror stage.  Kristeva searches to describe the 
way in which the infant body becomes the body proper.  Oliver 
writes, “She (Kristeva) complains that for Lacan the subject is 
constituted at the expense of “the real,” the drives, from which the 
subject will forever be cut off.”5  Kristeva wants to move away 
from the notion of symbolic drives and focus on the real.  For 
Lacan, drives are symbolic.  The analyst must assume the role of 
the ego and translate the symbolic drives expressed by a client. 
Kristeva is concerned with Lacan’s concept of the drive 
(Trieb) because if the drive is already a symbol, the process of 
signification becomes lost and the move between the semiotic and 
the symbolic is “replaced with nothingness.”  The lack brings out 
the unitary being of the subject, and the subject’s being is founded 
on this lack.  Therefore, the drives are lost. “The subject of desire 
lives at the expense of his drives, ever in search of the lacking 
object.”6  At this point, it is the role of the analyst to step in and 
interpret the drive so that the drive is not searching futilely for a 
missing object.  If the translator cannot assist, there is the threat of 
no transference and therefore no interpsychic translation.  The one 
being translated is stuck in a confused state and is unable to replace 
one object with another.  However, there is also the optimistic 
notion of the subject translating his/her own drives without the 
assistance of a therapist who could skew the translation if 
transference, counter-transference, or a simply a misinterpretation 
of drives occurs.  There is the idea of bringing back the semiotic 
body to define the self without a third-party translator.  The ego 
itself can translate. 
“For Kristeva, within Lacanian theory the living body is 
sacrificed to desire.  It becomes only a sign.”7  Kristeva argues that 
when language is not mixed with drives, the drives become 
repressed.  Since the drives are repressed, one must enter into the 
4 Julia Kristeva, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1980), 136. 
5 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), 131. 
6 Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father,” 44. 
7 Ibid., 45. 
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symbolic realm and transcend the self to discover them.  
Drives/desires/emotions experienced in the symbolic realm are not 
real, and when one enters this realm for too long or cannot escape, 
he/she must search for a translator to help them come back to the 
real world.  This translator is the analyst/therapist.  However, 
losing the ability to distinguish between the real world and 
imaginary or symbolic, is becoming psychotic.  In Kristeva’s 
Revolution in Poetic Language, she writes, “…the exemplary 
subject of Lacanian desire is the masochistic neurotic engaging in 
autocastration and bodily mutilation or the completely catatonic 
body of the clinical schizophrenic.”8  Translation of drives is a 
necessary part of psychological development and must be done to 
remove the self from the symbolic realm and understand the real. 
Kristeva has several specific concerns with Lacan’s mirror 
stage.  They are:  
 
Lacan’s account of the mirror stage emphasizes the body as 
other, the body as symbol reflected in the “mirror.”  It 
throws us into a hall of mirrors where we can no longer 
identify the “real” of the body; the real body is 
impossible…Lacan’s account covers over the fact that 
without the body there would be no reflection in the 
mirror.9 
 
Here, Kristeva struggles to explain what motivates the transition 
from the presymbolic to the symbolic.  Oliver writes that “Lacan, 
of course, posits the castration threat as the motive.  But in order to 
experience this threat in the first place, the child must take the 
position as a subject in the mirror stage.”10  The child must realize 
that simultaneously he/she is and is not his/her image.  The image 
is a symbol, but it is also real.  To see what is real, a translation 
must occur between the body and the image of the body, the other.  
Kristeva argues that the mirror stage requires a negation of the 
other to identify the subject as self.   
A translation is impossible when one cannot distinguish 
between subject and other.  If there is no transference between 
8 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 132 
9 Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father,” 45. 
10 Ibid., 45. 
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object and another there is also no transcendence of the subject.  
The subject is stuck in a realm without the possibility of self-
discovery and needs a translator to explain the symbolic and the 
real.  Herein lies another problem identified by Kristeva with 
Lacan’s theory: the paradox of its cyclical motion.  She believes 
that for Lacan, “…the child takes a position as subject so that he 
can negate his image in order to take a position as subject.”11  
Clearly, when the mirror stage is already symbolic, it cannot be 
used to explain the onset of the Symbolic.  Kristeva believes that 
the only way to explain the change from presymbolic to symbolic 
is to acknowledge the “material element, which is heterogeneous to 
the Symbolic.”  Rejection is not unique to the symbolic, but it 
operates first in the semiotic body.  This is different from Lacan’s 
view that the symbol opens up the world of negativity.   
Kristeva uses psychoanalytic principles of Freud to further 
prove that negativity is “gestural and kinetic – the bodily act of 
throwing and retrieving the reel.”12  She believes that the Symbolic 
is founded both in lack and excess because if it were “merely 
founded on a lack, then there is all the more reason for avoiding it 
altogether, for taking refuge in neurosis and psychosis.”13  Since 
the primary example of material negativity is anality, the notion of 
the Symbolic founded solely on lack is disrupted.  “In anality, 
rejection precedes the Symbolic.”14  This disproves the Lacanian 
theory that the move from presymbolic to symbolic is motivated by 
a castration threat or sense of lack.  In the place of lack, Kristeva 
credits the notion of excess and pleasure that moves the child into 
the Symbolic realm.  The id and libido drives are therefore keys in 
the discovery of the Symbolic realm.  Excess is equally as harmful 
as lack, and best controlled by the ego.  Drives must be translated 
by the ego to make sense of the self and remain balanced.   
Kristeva’s feminist psychoanalytic theory places an 
emphasis Lacan’s notion of returning to dyadic union.  Lacan 
believed that we are unconsciously trying to return to the dyadic 
union of mother and child, which is lost in the mirror stage.  
Kristeva explores the maternal function in and before the child’s 
11 Ibid., 45. 
12 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 170. 
13 Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father,” 45. 
14 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 151. 
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attaining of subjectivity and entrance into the Symbolic realm.  
“For her, material rejection operates according to a maternal logic, 
which prefigures the Law of the Father.  This law before the Law 
is the law of the mother’s body which regulates the oral and anal 
drives.”15  To explain this notion of law before Law, Kristeva uses 
the semiotic chora, the organizing principle of the maternal body.  
Kristeva defines the chora in a footnote in “Le sujet en proces”: 
 
The chora is a womb or a nurse in which elements are 
without identity and without reason.  The chora is a place 
of chaos and which is and which becomes, preliminary to 
the constitution of the first measurable body…the chora 
plays with the body of the mother – of woman – , but in the 
signifying process.”16 
 
In the chora, “maternal regulation sets up paternal 
prohibition.”  The mother is the regulator of what goes into and out 
of her child’s body.  She regulates the child’s body in relation to 
her own.  “Kristeva maintains that the first sounds the child makes 
mimic his mother-child dyadic bodily relationship.”17  The mother 
acts as the translator for her child’s drives, filtering out the 
important and unimportant so that there is no excess or lack.   
In order for the child to see itself as a separate entity from 
his/her mother, an interpsychic translation from object to object is 
required.  The child must see the difference of his/her being from 
the mother in order to attain more complex drives of his/her own 
and language.  When the child can see himself/herself as separate 
from the mother, there is the responsibility to translate drives with 
one’s own ego.  This may create a problem for those who are 
dependent on the translations of their mothers for what is right and 
wrong.  When the child realizes that he/she is not the mother, 
he/she becomes a new subject and creates new language that 
mimics the words of the mother.  Kristeva argues that, “…it is the 
incorporation of the patterns of language through speech of the 
other that enables the infant to communicate and thus commune 
15 Ibid., 27. 
16 Julia Kristeva, “Le sujet en proces,” Polylogue (Paris: Seuil, 1974), 57.   
17 Oliver, “Kristeva’s Imaginary Father,” 46. 
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with others.”18  Since communication is central in psychotherapy, 
language and imitation translation of the mother’s language in is 
necessary for transcendence of the self.  When the child’s 
realization in the mirror stage forces a break in the dyadic union, 
the child’s own ego must become the translator.  The mother as 
translator of drives will no longer suffice because the connection 
has been severed.   
For Kristeva, to become autonomous, a child must break 
away from identification by abjecting its mother.  The child 
“…must move from an identification with the mother’s nourishing 
breast to an identitication with its own birth and the horrifying 
maternal sex…”19  Abjection is defined as “an absence (the 
normative condition of the pre-mirror-stage infans) or a collapse 
(the condition of the borderline patient) of the boundaries that 
structure the subject.”  Kristeva herself defines abjection as what 
disturbs identity, system, and order.”20  Kristeva’s writings suggest 
that the maternal body is an abject threat to the Symbolic.  
Examples of prohibition against the maternal body are seen though 
the oedipal prohibition against incest of Freud, against maternal 
desire (jouissance) of Lacan, and/or against the semiotic chora of 
Kristeva.21  
 For Kristeva, the primary drive pleasure threatens the 
Symbolic, and is therefore repressed.  Oliver writes that, “It (the 
maternal body) threatens to uncover the process that leads to the 
appearance of unity and thereby expose that unity as merely one 
moment in the process.  The unity of reason or consciousness 
cannot admit that it is part of a process that alternates between 
unity and the fragmentation and repetition of drives.”22  The 
mother and child must sacrifice their connection so that the child 
can become a subject proper.   
While the mother and child are in a dyadic union, the 
mother negotiates the demands of the child’s drives.  The mother, 
in providing a good model for behavior and language, also acts in 
18 Ibid., 47. 
19 Ibid., 47. 
20 Shuli Barzilai, “Borders of Language: Kristeva’s Critique of Lacan,” PMLA, 
Vol. 106, No. 2. (Mar., 1991), 295. 
21 Oliver, 50. 
22 Ibid., 48. 
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the role of the superego.  However, once the mother becomes the 
abject, she does not correspond to an ego.23  The abject is excluded 
from the superego because it threatens the Symbolic and the 
identity of the newly established and autonomous subject.  The 
child now is forced to create his/her own supergo and ego to 
manage the demands of the drives.  
 For Lacan, an interpretive act centers on the indirection of 
language.  In Volume 7 of Comparative Criticism, Gary Handwerk 
writes on Lacan’s indirection of language and uses a translation to 
explain the detours taken by the speaking subject in the path to 
communication, “…That in which one must be interested is in the 
point of knowing why she wished precisely that the other person 
understand that, and why she did not say it to him clearly, but by 
allusion…If you understand, you are wrong…”24  Lacan’s analysis 
of the indirection of language can be used to explain an ironic 
sense of self-identity which “lies at the heard of ironic self-
presentation.”25  The child who has just recognized his/her image 
in a mirror reflection becomes the subject who is dependent on 
others for status at any point.  Hardwerk writes, “There is no such 
entity as a subject, except by and with other subjects.  This is a 
subject whose definition is finally impossible…it is the sum of its 
interrupted encounters with all its significant others, which serve as 
moments of entry into death…which alone can definitively identify 
the subject.”26  The subject becomes the other in the mirror stage.  
For Freud, the risk of reduction of otherness is solved by 
internalizing the other within the self.  The unconscious is an other 
that is always surrounding the subject.  Even in becoming a 
separate subject from the mother, the unconscious is not 
accessible.  The unconscious cannot be translated.  Lacan writes, 
“That in the subject, which is in the object and is not of the subject, 
is the unconscious.  The unconscious exists in and through speech, 
but is inaccessible insofar as the signification of that speech can 
remain concealed, censured by the ego.”27  The ego translates 
23 Ibid., 48. 
24 Gary J. Handwerk, “Lacan on Psychoanalyis and Literature,” Comparative 
Criticism Vol. 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 106. 
25 Ibid., 107. 
26 Ibid., 107. 
27 Ibid., 108. 
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selectively to protect the self, and filters the drives that are harmful 
to the body and mind.   
 Drives are essential to being human.  The conscious, 
unconscious and preconscious are all translated into behaviors and 
emotions.  In dyadic union, the mother is the translator for the 
child’s drives.  Her translation is perfect until the child realizes 
they must be their own being in the mirror-stage of development.  
In a break from the dyadic union, the child attains subjectivity and 
agency. At this point, the mother loses the ability to translate the 
drives of her child and the child’s drives are translated by the self.  
The ego of the child becomes the translator of drives.  The ego is a 
stable and accurate translator, unless defense mechanisms fail and 
the unconscious drives of the id pervade.   If the ego fails to be a 
translator that molds to fit societal and cultural norms, the subject 
may decide to go through psychotherapy.  At this point, the analyst 
is the translator.  The analyst, however, will never be as effective 
as the mother or unblemished ego since the translation gets skewed 
as it is passed from self to language to analyst.  The pure 
translation of the mother is lost in development of the child.  
Although the loss of the pure translation is unconscious, it creates 
an “unpleasure” that cannot be rectified. The self is not in a 
constant state of suffering, however, so long as the ego can 
compensate for the “unpleasure” through its own interpsychic 
translation and defense mechanisms such as transference.  In 
psychological development, an interpsychic translation by the ego 
takes the place of a pure translation of the mother.  
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Goethe writes, “Everything great molds us from the 
moment we become aware of it.”1  Harold Bloom’s essay 
“Antithetical Criticism: An Introduction,” the precursor to The 
Anxiety of Influence, relates how every poet must face anxiety 
about surmounting preceding poets.  The Romantic poets—
Wordsworth, Keats, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, Blake—were faced 
with going beyond Milton who had to surpass Donne who had to 
somehow transcend Shakespeare, etc.  As each new poet is faced 
with a genealogy that they must rise above in order to canonize 
themselves, they confront a problem that leads to an undeniable 
anxiety.  What these poets must do to overcome genealogy is to 
find a way to retranslate previous poets in order to canonize 
1 Harold Bloom, “Antithetical Criticism: An Introduction,” Diacritics Vol. 1, 
No. 2. (Winter, 1971): 40. 
 
                                                 
 
themselves.  This pursuit, not only incredibly difficult for a male 
writer to accomplish, is even more complicated for the ‘Other:’ 
woman.  For feminine canonization, woman must not only 
transcend those of a genealogical past, woman must overcome a 
principally patriarchal history which forces a radical retranslation 
of the male dominated canon.  Christine de Pizan, a medieval 
French writer, and Letitia Elizabeth Landon, a Romantic poet, are 
women who, though faced with Otherness, broke the bounds of not 
only the male canon but also patriarchal definitions of woman.  
This goal is accomplished through ‘completion’ of a canonized 
author’s text and, often, a calculated misreading of a text to further 
explore or present it in a feminine aspect.  Christine and Landon 
are forced to retranslate important texts—they must “invaginate” a 
source text and, in completing or mistranslating the text, allow 
their retranslation to grant female canonization, genealogically 
based political progress, and, ultimately, an affirmation of their 
personal uniqueness in the realm of a feminine genius. 
 
“The Only Female Member of a Male Canon”: Christine de 
Pizan’s Genealogical Retranslation for Means of Canonization 
 Christine de Pizan overcomes genealogy by first 
canonizing herself among male figures of an older canon.  Keven 
Brownlee’s article “Christine de Pizan: Gender and the New 
Vernacular Canon” reveals how Christine writes a series of 
autobiographical accounts in which she encounters Jean de Meun, 
Dante, Ovid, Boccaccio, and Boethius—who all act as a personal 
canon for her to transcend.  “In these works, Christine engages 
quite polemically with each of her authorities in turn, rewriting 
these auctores in accord with the requirements of her ongoing and 
self-authorizing autobiographical project.  At the same time, she 
establishes her own status as a member of the new multilingual 
canon—French, Italian, Latin—that she has set into place as 
such.”2  Christine is thus, by rewriting these auctores, retranslating 
them.  She will not only ‘complete’ their texts from her perspective 
2 Kevin Brownlee, “Christine de Pizan: Gender and the New Vernacular 
Canon,” Strong Voices, Weak History: Early Women Writers and Canons in 
England, France, and Italy, ed. Pamela Joseph Benson and Victoria Kirkham 
(Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan UP, 2005), 100. 
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but will also retranslate from the source text into a dynamic, 
“hybrid” target language3. 
 Christine de Pizan begins by displacing Jean de Meun: 
“…the single most important author figure in the French 
vernacular canon.”4  She does this in her Debat sur le “Roman de 
la Rose” which is translated as Debate on the “Romance of the 
Rose.”  Christine presents a public debate on de Meun’s text, 
Romance of the Rose, as an event in her autobiography.  This 
debate not only undermines de Meun’s text but is also the first ever 
such debate in French literary history.5  Second, in Chemin de 
longue estude, Christine manipulates Dante’s Divine Comedy in a 
narrative that presents her as a regendered Italian Dante who writes 
in French.6  Next, “…the onset of her widowhood and the 
beginning of her literary career” is set in Mutacion de Fortune in a 
retranslation of Ovid’s Metamorphosis which focuses on a gender 
transformation of woman to man.  Christine is able to empower 
herself as a woman historian but also reveal a startling gender 
change.7  Not only is Christine rewriting and completing these 
canonized works in relation to an autobiographical context—
penetrating the texts with the feminine—she is also constructing 
herself as a woman who has lived through and beyond these men.  
The fourth retranslation is in the Cite des Dames, where Christine 
de Pizan “…radically and visibly rewrites her Boccaccian model, 
the De mulieribus claris,…in such a way as to present herself as a 
‘corrected’ Boccaccio figure, regendered, vernacularized, and 
writing in the first person.  Boccaccio’s third-person, male-
authored Latin treatise on women is rewritten as Christine’s French 
autobiography.”8  Coming out of a retranslation of Boccaccio, 
Christine then authoritatively cites herself as an auctor in the Livre 
des Trois Vertus.  By doing this, she presents herself as a member 
of her canon and then completes this personal canon in part 3 of 
the Avision.9  Here, Christine “stages herself…as a regendered 
3 Christine de Pizan was bilingual in French and Italian which shows in her 
writing. 
4 Brownlee, “Christine de Pizan: Gender and the New Vernacular Canon,” 101. 
5 Ibid., 101. 
6 Ibid., 101. 
7 Ibid., 101. 
8 Ibid., 101. 
9 Ibid., 101-102. 
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Boethius” who is also the “legitimate descendent—as 
autobiographical subject, as writer, and as thinker—of her 
“canonical predecessor.”10  Christine uses genealogical 
retranslation to insert herself as the only female member of an all 
male canon.   
 In penetrating and entering an all male canon, despite 
presenting herself as regendered, Christine is faced with the 
problem of masculinization.  In Cite des Dames Christine 
constructs an all-female canon and, as its writer and creator, 
successfully transcends her own text.  She does this by presenting 
the female writers Cornificia, Proba, and Sappho as masters of 
their craft.  Cornificia “…through a combination of native talent 
and exceptionally hard study, becomes a master poet.”11  Proba is 
similarly shown as a master poet but also a master Virgilian.  
Proba’s work consists of rewriting Virgil under a feminine-
Christian lens.12  Sappho’s literary innovation and productivity are 
stressed as well as the idea that her literary achievements go 
beyond the classical world and maintain influence in the present.  
Furthermore, Carmenta—the inventor of the Latin alphabet—and 
Minerva—as a Greek maiden taken for a goddess and also inventor 
of a shorthand Greek script—are also situated within the text.13  
These women all share a common theme in that they are able to 
attain achievements that are equal to if not more superior than their 
male counterparts.  Christine de Pizan’s strategy “…for 
establishing herself as a new kind of “canonical” woman writer 
involves her presentation of an all-female literary and writerly 
canon firmly situated in the temporal remoteness of the classical 
world.  The fifteenth-century Christine is authorized by the 
example of this canon but remains distant from it.”  Thus, since 
this canon does not include any contemporary woman writers, 
Christine maintains authority as the only and best of the new 
canon.  As well, Cite des Dames authorizes her as truly the only 
woman writer in an all male canon.  Far from complete 
regendering of herself, she creates and situates herself in a 
10 Ibid., 102. 
11 Ibid., 102. 
12 Ibid., 102. 
13 Ibid., 103. 
 66 
                                                 
 
woman’s canon which asserts her undeniable femininity and 
uniqueness. 
 After positioning herself above both a past male and female 
canon, Christine then takes the steps necessary to maintain a 
genealogical link to contemporary French poets that are developing 
a new vernacular literary canon in tying herself to Eustache 
Deschamps.  In a letter to Deschamps, she sets up a “hierarchical, 
genealogical relationship with Deschamps” by naming him as a 
distinguished poet and then saying that she is his student or even 
disciple.14  Christine formulates an identity with Deschamps from 
just writing to him.  Deschamps responds in a ballade in which he 
bestows upon her “canonical status” and even names her his 
“sweet sister.”15  In setting up a master-disciple relationship with 
Deschamps, she links herself again to the vernacular canon.  This 
genealogical stratagem reinforces Christine’s autobiographical 
retranslations of Jean de Meun, Dante, Ovid, Boccaccio, and 
Boethius and her recreation and feminine emphasis of the lives of 
Sappho, Cornificia, and Proba because it further separates her from 
them.  With this third genealogy, Christine strengthens her 
contemporariness and femininity.  As she is clearly a woman—
thanks to the second genealogy—this last genealogy makes her 
unique in her status as the only female writer of a male canon.  
“Her ‘unique’ status as female canonical writer is doubled by 
special links to two key classical writerly models, which provide 
her with a kind of supplementary prestige at the same time as they 
highlight her own exemplary characteristics as a writerly model in 
her own right…”16  Christine is figured not as a member of a 
classical canon or a womanly canon, but “…as the only female 
member of a male canon”—one who looked Otherness in the face 
and transcended it. 
 
The Penetration of the Poetess: Letitia Landon’s Use of 
Genealogical Retranslation in Subverting the Identity of the 
“Poetess” 
 According to Virginia Blain, the word “poetess” was used 
in the late Romantic/early Victorian period to denote a female 
14 Ibid., 105. 
15 Ibid., 106. 
16 Ibid., 108. 
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poet.  At its most neutral, it was a generic term but, often, the 
connotation was derogatory.  Similar to “poetaster,” “poetess” 
could signify a woman poet who simply imitates men or true 
poetry and ascends no higher.17  Letitia Landon, one of the first 
“poetesses,” interestingly expresses and embraces the dual nature 
of the poetess.  Glennis Stephenson suggests Landon’s “Poetic 
self, L.E.L., manages to challenge and subvert, at the very same 
time as it submits to, the boundaries assigned to the poetess.”18  
Landon, as a professional poet, was a self-sufficient woman who 
wrote to ensure the survival of her family.  She would write about 
what would sell—romance, sensuality, vicariousness, etc.  Thus, 
she plays the role of the imitator but, similar to Christine de Pizan, 
actually uses genealogical subversion underneath her words to 
canonize herself.  In mistranslation and retranslation of already 
quickly canonized Romantic male poets, Landon establishes 
herself among and even beyond their accomplishments. 
 Identified as the “Byron of our Poetesses,” Landon actively 
manipulated Byronic texts in her pursuits.  Adriana Craciun writes 
that in “The Enchantress,” “Landon develops a Promethean, 
distinctly Luciferean model of poetic identity and self-creation.  
She accomplishes this by rewriting the biblical fall, and the birth of 
a poet, in a distinctly (proto)feminist way and yet also Byronic 
way.”19  Landon identifies that Byron’s heroes are dangerously 
misogynistic and, in doing so, defines the possibility of the woman 
poet rather than poetess.20  The heroine of this text can be viewed 
as a regendered extension of Manfred and the speaking self never 
allowed to Astarte.21  In Manfred, a dramatic poem by Lord Byron, 
Manfred is a Byronic hero—fallen, alone, refusing to be 
dominated, and introspective.  Astarte, his love, dies when she sees 
Manfred in his fallen nature and symbolizes the notion that women 
become the victims of liberty—those dependent upon the 
patriarchy die.  Manfred, refusing to be dominated even by God, 
17 Virginia Blain, “Letitia Elizabeth Landon, Eliza Mary Hamilton, and the 
Genealogy of the Victorian Poetess,” Victorian Poetry 33, No. 1 (Spring 1995): 
32. 
18 Ibid., 46. 
19 Adriana Craciun, Fatal Women of Romanticism (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge UP, 2003), 204-205. 
20 Ibid., 205. 
21 Ibid., 206. 
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cannot escape himself or his memory22 but can escape, for at least 
some time, from the patriarchy.  Manfred wants knowledge and 
spiritual power but, ultimately, cannot create this freedom without 
destruction.  Landon retranslates the Byronic Manfred into a 
female Medora in “The Enchantress.”  Medora is similarly 
Satanic23 but also, “Like Byron’s Astarte then, the Enchantress has 
both Manfred’s immortal longings, forbidden knowledge, and 
disillusionment, as well as the pity and tenderness which he lacked, 
and loved in Astarte.”24  Furthermore, the Byronic Enchantress, 
out of pity, assumes the life of the dying Medora—showing 
Landon’s notion that the “Satanic overreacher” acquiring 
forbidden knowledge is, in Byron’s poetry, “attained largely at the 
expense of women.”25  Landon ‘misreads’ Byron in order 
retranslate and regender the Byronic hero.  Through misreading, 
Landon completes the hero and gives a voice to the female 
characters in Byron’s poetry.  She revises “Byronic conceits” for a 
distinctly feminist end—empowering the woman with speech.  
Landon also rereads and retranslates Shelley and 
Wordsworth.  Craciun connects “The Prophetess” as a response to 
Shelley’s “Ozymandias.”26  In “Ozymandias” a first person 
narrator meets a traveler who found a statue in the desert.  This 
statue is of Ozymandias, the king of kings, who arrogantly 
commands one to look on his great works and despair, but now 
nothing remains except the colossal wreck of the statue.  Similar to 
“Ozymandias,” the Prophetess “teaches that human work and art 
are powerless against destruction” but Landon does not suggest the 
“possibility that poetry or truth survives the desolation and decay, 
instead suggesting…that Power and Nothingness alone withstand 
time.”27  Landon again completes a canonized poet by retranslating 
his poetry.  However, Landon interestingly manipulates a reverse 
notion of canonization to do it.  Ideally, canonization would entail 
the survival of works.  Instead, only power and nothingness 
22 Manfred is haunted by incest and summons Spirits to grant him forgetfulness 
of his past. 
23 Satanic in the sense of Satan in Milton’s Paradise Lost. 
24 Craciun, Fatal Women of Romanticism, 207. 
25 Ibid., 207. 
26 Ibid., 199. 
27 Ibid., 199. 
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withstand time—the power to retranslate Shelley and insist on his 
nothingness.  If Landon can, with such ease, retranslate and 
regender she will, as Christine, actually survive with time in the 
emphasis of the power of her uniqueness. 
Craciun goes on to relate that in “Life Surveyed,” Landon 
“rereads William Wordsworth’s idealized nature and reveals the 
material decay Wordsworth tried to transcend.”28  For 
Wordsworth’s poetry, where nature becomes an inspiration, 
bowers become the womb29 and in “Tintern Abbey” this parallel is 
completed as the poet can establish a kind of dyadic union30 with 
nature.  Language is needed to describe the state, but nature can 
still allow for transcendence to the state.  Craciun writes that: 
“Landon’s ironic treatment [in “Life Surveyed”] of the landmark 
Romantic experience of transcendence on a mountain top 
demonstrates that the ‘purity’ and ‘glories’ of such transcendent 
visions are only possible through active denial of the ultimately 
inescapable ills of the material, and in this case distinctly urban, 
world and its ‘close and bounded atmosphere’.”31  Landon here 
completely retranslates the Wordsworthian affinity with nature 
from that of an ultimate state of transcendence to one of denial.  
This retranslation not only reveals the practicality of woman in the 
shadow of male idealism, it reveals an acceptance of the Symbolic 
Order.  Landon has accepted law, language, desire, civilization, 
28 Ibid., 231. 
29 This is the case in Wordsworth’s “Nutting.” 
30 The dyadic union or the Imaginary is defined by Lacan as the bond between 
mother and child in the womb and directly afterwards.  All the child knows is 
the mother and therefore together they have a unity.  The child defines itself 
through the mother and really does not know the idea of “I.”  In order to attain 
subjectivity, the child must leave the dyadic union.  This happens through the 
father in the mirror stage.  Within the Symbolic Order the child becomes “I.”  
The child sees their reflection in a mirror and realizes that they are a separate 
entity from the mother.  When this happens, the dyadic union is broken and the 
child begins to have desire, law, separation, and ultimately, language as they 
agglomerate into a body ready to enter civilization.  Lacan insists that 
humankind is always, unconsciously, trying to return to the dyadic union 
because of the repression created once one leaves the union.  However, the 
“only” way back is through dreams and, generally, death. 
Toril Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (New York, NY: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1985), 99-101. 
31 Craciun, Fatal Women of Romanticism, 231. 
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and consciousness—using language as her profession to survive in 
the urban world.  This use of genealogy is not simply that of 
dismantling Wordsworth but, more importantly, a penetration—
invagination—of Wordsworth poetry for female political progress. 
This continuing motif of manipulation of genealogy for not 
only self-canonization but female progress is found again in 
Landon’s retranslation of Thomas Lovell Beddoes—a non-
canonized poet.  Beddoes’ The Improvisatore is retranslated in 
Landon’s The Improvisatrice.  Landon rewrites this long poem in a 
very similar format to Beddoes but from a female viewpoint to 
correct his “tortuous misogyny.”32  Virginia Blain suggests that she 
does this in her usage of Sappho as “a model of doomed female 
genius.”33  Sappho’s problem “…is the inevitable loss of love 
suffered by a woman who exhibits her genius in public (prostitutes 
herself)…”  The Sappho described in Landon’s poem is similar to 
the poetess: she must write in the public sphere to make money or 
gain any recognition.  But, in order for a woman to write 
something that a man would want to read in the 19th century she 
would have to write from the viewpoint of the Other.  She would 
have to give the reader something no man could—but, in the 
process, possibly suffer from remaining as the Other.  Landon 
neatly sidesteps the ‘public woman’ dilemma by “…constructing 
her poetry as a kind of tragic peepshow, and the ‘poetess’ as 
puppet/victim.  This was a very successful strategy because it left 
an implied space beyond the L.E.L. masquerade for the reader to 
imagine some ‘real’ agent at work.”34  Landon’s retranslations then 
often situate her writing as the Other but, when ‘stripping’ away 
the more vulgar language, a woman’s genealogical pursuit for 
political progress is found. 
 
Translational Transcendence of Otherness and Embracing the 
Feminine Genius 
 In Translation and Gender: Translating in the “Era of 
Feminism,” Luise von Flotow writes:  “Gender awareness in 
translation practice poses questions about the links between social 
32 Blain, “Letitia Elizabeth Landon, Eliza Mary Hamilton, and the Genealogy of 
the Victorian Poetess,” 41. 
33 Ibid., 41. 
34 Ibid., 43. 
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stereotypes and linguistic forms, about the politics of language and 
cultural difference, about the ethics of translation, and about 
reviving inaccessible works for contemporary readers.  It 
highlights the importance of the cultural context in which 
translation is done.”35  Christine de Pizan and Letitia Landon both 
retranslate their predecessors in explicitly gendered ways.  
Canonized texts are retranslated as Christine and Landon 
invaginate them—penetrating the text for distinct, genealogically 
based political progress.  These women, despite being faced with 
Otherness, do not accept their ‘position’ but actively subvert it 
through interventionist retranslation.  As von Flotow describes in 
her notion of interventionist feminist translation: feminist 
translators will often “correct” texts—intervening and making 
changes to a source text that departs from a feminist perspective.36  
This is exactly what Christine and Landon accomplish in their 
genealogical retranslations, regardless of whether or not 
canonization is achieved.  Both Christine and Landon are able to 
transcend Otherness and, in doing so, attain feminine genius 
through a unique creation of their own types of language. 
Martin Le Franc insists of “…Christine as the single—but 
glorious and triumphant—female member of the new French 
literary canon that she had herself earlier expanded and regendered 
by a strategic act of self-inclusion.”37  As Christine uses 
genealogical retranslation to insert herself into the canon, she is 
able to step outside of Otherness while remaining a woman.  
Because of her unique gendered status as the only woman author 
of a fully male canon, “…she simultaneously continues, corrects, 
and completes” the canonical texts that she retranslates.38  
Christine, as a translator, continues, corrects, and completes.  She 
brings regendered texts to the present, asserting her femininity, but 
also her equality.  These texts are then kept “alive,” to her 
contemporary standards, as well as infuse a new “Franco-Italian 
vernacular hybridity” within her target culture.39  As a foreignizing 
35 Luise Von Flotow, Translation and Gender: Translating in the “Era of 
Feminism” (Ottowa: University of Ottowa Press, 1997), 14. 
36 Ibid., 24. 
37 Brownlee, “Christine de Pizan: Gender and the New Vernacular Canon,” 108. 
38 Ibid., 102. 
39 Ibid., 102. 
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element in translation brings aspects of the source language into a 
target text and language, so too does Christine in creating her own 
kind of ‘woman’s language’ in this hybrid language.  Rene 
d’Anjou also stresses that: “this bilingual aspect of Christine’s new 
vernacular canon is extended and monumentalized.”40  Christine’s 
language is not only unique, it is monumental.  As the only woman 
in an all-male canon who speaks in an invigorating gendered 
hybrid-bilingual language, Christine is not only able to maintain 
her femininity but go beyond.  Christine most certainly does not 
become a man but, greater than an Other, becomes a creator—
becomes a genius. 
Letitia Landon faces the same problem of Otherness but is 
also able to transcend.  Landon, using poetry as her profession, 
must embrace the dual nature of the poetess.  She is ‘forced,’ as the 
imitational side of poetess would imply, to ‘misread’ her 
predecessors and write about romance and sensuality.  A criticism 
by many of her contemporaries was of her focus on these notions 
of romance and sensuality.  But, Blain writes, “Men as well as 
women rushed to read her, drawn in by the titillation of the half-
veiled subject matter as much as by the mellifluous verbal skills so 
effortlessly displayed.  She was a nineteenth-century ‘performance 
poet’…”41  Landon indeed performs—putting on a show in her 
words—but only to sell her work.  As a ‘poetess,’ she would not be 
able to sell poems on surface subjects tackled by ‘true’ poets like 
Keats, Byron, or Shelley.  She would not be able to sustain 
professionalism.  Instead, she became “…a true poet whose work 
subverts her cultures reading of femininity through a technique 
identified by Irigaray as that of exaggerated mimesis.”42  Instead of 
becoming man by becoming Byron or Shelley, she uses her 
femininity as only a woman could: by creating poetry as a kind of 
“peepshow” for cultural critique. 
Underneath her words lies the true language of Letitia 
Landon.  This notion of the dual notion of poetess in Landon—the 
‘puppet’ versus the ‘real agent’ is exemplified in her poem “Love’s 
Last Lesson.”  The narrator asks for forgetfulness of a lover who 
40 Ibid., 109. 
41 Blain, “Letitia Elizabeth Landon, Eliza Mary Hamilton, and the Genealogy of 
the Victorian Poetess,” 46. 
42 Ibid., 43. 
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has left her tortured.  Superficially, the poem relates this 
heartbreaking.  Underneath the words however, lies the meaning 
that the poem is more about self-expression and language than 
love.  Landon writes, “I loved unconsciously: your name was 
all/That seem’d in language, and to me the world/Was only made 
for you;…”43  The love within her was placed through the 
language of the lover.  By articulating her own words, by finally 
speaking for herself, the narrator is able to begin to forget.  This 
mess inside of her, her ‘heartbreak,’ is the language of the 
patriarchy—a false language that has left her bereft.  She must 
learn “love’s last lesson”: creation of the self in self-expression, in 
subjectivity.  The narrator must write her lover down on paper and, 
throwing him away, maintain her own identity from words.  On the 
surface, the poem is about a lost love; below, the poem reveals that 
in the creation of your own language, woman can shed the 
patriarchy that has forgotten her. 
Thus, L.E.L.’s language is one of translation of the self and 
all women into words.  Landon writes as if the Other and gives a 
superficial perspective of Otherness in order to sell her poetry.  
But, when ‘stripping’ away her language, Landon invaginates 
canonical male poets’ texts to allow for genealogically political 
progress.  Her texts give the means for a retranslation of female 
characters like Byron’s Astarte into speaking subjects.  
Furthermore, her poems extend the notion of a language of 
‘exaggerated mimesis.’  Even Landon’s superficial language plays 
a role in identity as that of a foil.  In a time period still greatly 
influenced by Rousseauian gender practices, woman would not ‘be 
able’ to truly read accomplished male poets.  In Landon’s 
“exaggerated mimesis” she reveals this notion by often 
‘mistranslating’ her predecessors.  “Love’s Last Lesson” begins: 
“Teach it me, if you can –forgetfulness!”44 compared to Byron’s 
Manfred: “‘What wouldst thou with us, son of mortals—
say?’/Manfred: ‘Forgetfulness—’”45  Landon ‘misreads’ the 
43 Letitia Elizabeth Landon, “Love’s Last Lesson,” British Literature 1780-
1830, ed. A.K. Mellor and R.E. Matlak (Boston, MA: Heinle & Heinle, 1996), 
1387. 
44 Ibid., 1386. 
45 Lord Byron, Manfred, A Dramatic Poem, British Literature 1780-1830, ed. 
A.K. Mellor and R.E. Matlak (Boston, MA: Heinle & Heinle, 1996), 929. 
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Byronic need for forgetting a terrible deed and replaces it with 
forgetting, what would seem, a childishly over-passionate love 
affair.  Landon however, manipulates mistranslation in order to 
successfully use the poem to create her own language.  She 
‘penetrates’ the canonized male texts and ‘withdrawals’ a language 
for femininity.  She, like Christine, uses genealogy to ascend into a 
canon of men.  Yet, in creating her own language and retranslation 
of these canonized poets, Landon emphasizes her uniqueness and, 
in this transcendence, attains feminine genius. 
To return to Bloom’s essay Antithetical Criticism: An 
Introduction, Christine de Pizan and Letitia Landon successfully 
use clinamen46 and tessera47 to genealogically retranslate 
canonized authors.  “In the movement of tessera, the precursor is 
rescued from his supposed incompleteness.  He is regarded as not 
having gone far enough, rather than having fallen in the wrong 
direction.”48  The canonized precursors, often forgetting or 
silencing woman, are incomplete.  Instead, Christine and Landon 
are not only able to transcend this male canon, they are able to 
create their own woman’s language—initiating an original and 
unprecedented advance in their time.  Because of this, they are able 
to transcend the male canon and, in doing so, attain a notion of 
feminine genius promulgated by Julia Kristeva.  Kristeva writes 
that feminine genius is: “…the flourishing of the individual in his 
or her uniqueness, to what makes an individual who he or she is 
and raises him or her above ordinariness—genius being the most 
complex, the most appealing, and the most fruitful form of this 
uniqueness at a particular moment in history and, given that it is 
so, the form that is lasting and universal.”49  Landon and Christine 
creatively challenge the sociohistorical conditions of their 
identities and, with innovative uniqueness, are able go beyond the 
patriarchy.  They become women no longer Others but something 
greater—the unique “only female member of a male canon”—who 
46 Clinamen: misreading because of the assumption that the precursor was 
wrong. 
47 Tessera: completion because the precursor is, logically, incomplete. 
48 Harold Bloom, “Antithetical Criticism: An Introduction,” Diacritics Vol. 1, 
No. 2. (Winter, 1971): 44. 
49 Julia Kristeva, “Is There a Feminine Genius?” Critical Inquiry 30, No. 3 
(2004 Spring): 494. 
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speak a pure language that does not cling to the past but breaks 
free from the shackles of the patriarchy and embraces the woman’s 
present.
 76 
 
Do Russians and 
Americans View 
Space in the Same 
Way? 
 
 
Evgeny Makarov 
Moscow State Linguistic University 
 
 
We live in civilization. 
There is no breaking away from it. 
Here everything is in language 
and through language. 
- Alexander Zinoviev The Yawning Heights 
 
 
There is a fundamental truth in this passage; human language 
is, indeed, a highly complex system which embraces the world in a 
way nothing else does. No society would be possible without 
language and any social activity is linguistic in its essence. Thus it 
is in language that the objective answers to the questions facing the 
humanities are to be looked for. If everything is in language, 
success here depends just on how keen we are on finding those 
answers. 
Languages are mediators of ideas. They mediate ideas 
differently because their categories do not fully coincide. It seems, 
however, that all languages are equally suitable for 
 
 
communication, meaning that, if a conceptual category does not 
have a linguistic correlate, there is a more general linguistic 
category to cover this function and, if some category does not 
exist, there is no need for it to exist because its functions are 
performed by other categories. Thus, Russian, unlike English, has 
no articles but the functions the article performs in English are 
performed in Russian by word order or by lexical means. 
This paper looks at how the range of conceptual categories of 
space is reflected in the categories Russian and English operate. It 
is important to make a distinction between coordinate and 
categorical spatial relations. The former include distance, speed of 
motion and size, and are mostly processed by the right hemisphere. 
Their representations involve numerical specifications rather than 
linguistic categorization. The latter, on the contrary, are mostly 
processed by the left hemisphere, require to be categorized in 
languages and are the exclusive focus of this paper. 
To locate a target object, called the figure, reference to 
another object, called the ground, needs to be established. Two 
basic kinds of relations between the figure and ground are possible: 
contiguity and displacement. When the figure and ground are 
contiguous a topological relation is established. Topological 
relations are most often coded in language by means of spatial 
prepositions, at being the most obvious example, whose meaning 
is any kind of contiguity. Both Russian and English can specify all 
the major types of contiguity. Thus, superadjacency (on the 
horizontal plane) and attachment (on the vertical plane) are 
prototypically coded by на in Russian and on in English; 
containment is coded by в and in, respectively; penetration is 
coded by через and сквозь in Russian as opposed to through in 
English; subadjacency is coded by под and under. However, the 
difference lies in the fact that specification is always required in 
Russian whereas in English it is often enough to gloss contiguity 
by at. 
It is also important to remark on the following: Russian 
favors prepositions prototypically denoting superadjacency or 
attachment while English favors containment prepositions. This is 
a manifestation of the difference in the conceptual coding of space 
between Russian and English. In an earlier paper we argued that, 
unlike Russian, English operates the conceptual metaphor 
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MOVEMENT IN SPACE IS MANIPULATION OF SOLID 
OBJECTS, where space was for the first time described as a target 
metaphorical domain. Metaphorical objects have metaphorical 
borders, delimiting a kind of “personal space” which alien objects 
must not enter. Since borders surround (metaphorically) spaces, the 
latter are perceived as containers. It is exactly for this reason that 
English tends to represent contiguous spaces as closed, even when 
they have no physical borders. Hence the English equivalents for 
the Russian на улице, на дереве, на картине are in the street, in 
the tree, in the picture. In Russian, a reverse tendency can be 
observed: contiguous spaces are represented as open, even when 
they do have physical borders. Hence the Russian equivalents for 
the English in the post office, in the linguistics department, in the 
railway station are на почте, на кафедре лингвистики, на 
вокзале. 
Since topological relations are very abstract they seem likely 
to be cross-linguistically universal. However, considerable 
diversity in the kinds of topological relations has been revealed in 
recent studies. Thus, it has been pointed out that the Mayan 
language Tzeltal features a closed class of dispositional adjectives 
that provide for far more detailed specifications than the 
prepositions mentioned above; Makah has suffixes encoding 
locations such as “at the rear of a house,” “at the base of an upright 
object,” “at the head of a canoe”: Karuk has an unlikely suffix –
vara meaning “in through a tubular space”. As these examples 
show, attention has generally been turned toward exotic languages 
and away from similar phenomena observed in languages like 
English and Russian. For example, in English there are a number 
of prepositions starting with the once-prefix a- denoting extremely 
specific locations and positions: aboard (“at a ship”, now extended 
to “at a public transportation means”, such as a plane, bus or train, 
but not a car), astride (“with one’s legs on either side of”), atop 
(“at the top of”), to name but a few. 
When the figure and ground are displaced or disproportionate 
it is not enough to establish a topological relation. A projective 
relation is needed, i.e., an indication of the direction from the 
ground, in which to search for the figure. To specify a direction, 
we need a coordinate system, or frame of reference, and it has been 
established that languages use just three types of reference frames. 
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When the figure and ground are disproportionate, the latter has to 
be partitioned and an axis has to be projected from its center to a 
designated part, as in The boy is in the back of the car. This kind of 
coordinate system is called the intrinsic frame of reference because 
it relies on reference to the inherent or intrinsic parts of the ground. 
The intrinsic frame is cross-linguistically by far the most 
widespread of coordinate systems. 
In both English and Russian part assignment within the 
intrinsic frame uses the canonical orientation of the artifact, 
determined by the leading facet in typical motion (the front of a 
truck – передняя часть грузовика), the facet with a perceptual 
apparatus (the front of a camera – передняя часть камеры), the 
characteristic orientation of the object to the user (the front of 
a blackboard – передняя часть доски), or of the user to the object 
(the front of a desk – передняя часть стола). If an artifact has no 
canonical orientation, part assignment occurs within the relative 
frame of reference. 
It is common for both English and Russian to describe 
locations within the intrinsic frame of reference in terms of human 
body parts, employing the conceptual metaphor GROUND IS 
BODY; GROUND PARTS ARE BODY PARTS. This kind of 
representation is somewhat more common in English, but the main 
difference between the two languages here is in the choice of body 
parts. Consider, for instance, the following expressions: the eye of 
a hurricane (needle, potato), the nose of an airplane, the mouth of 
a cave, the head of a nail, the neck of a guitar, the arms of a river, 
the hands of a clock, the foot of a mountain, as opposed to шляпка 
гвоздя, рукава реки, хвост поезда, подножие горы. As it 
follows from the analysis of a number of instances, English favors 
facial or upper parts of the body, which are inward and focus on 
the personality, whereas Russian tends to choose lower parts or 
elements of apparel, including clothes and accessories, which can 
be viewed as extensions of the body but are outward rather than 
inward. 
When the figure and ground are displaced, the relative and 
absolute frames of reference are used. Unlike the binary intrinsic 
frame, requiring only figure and ground to operate, they are ternary 
(except when cardinal directions are used): they also require 
information about the spatial disposition of a third participant 
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outside the figure/ground dyad, namely the viewpoint. The relative 
frame of reference projects the bodily axes of the viewer, front and 
back, left and right, onto the ground to specify the figure’s 
location, as in The boy is to the left of the house (i.e., on the 
speaker’s left). The absolute frame of reference, unlike the two 
other frames, uses abstract, antecedently fixed bearings such as the 
cardinal directions (north – south/east – west) (the only possibility 
for Indo-European languages), fall of land (uphill – 
downhill/across) (Tzeltal), coastline (landward – seaward/parallel 
to the coast), river flow (upriver – downriver/away from – towards 
the river). Absolute systems of reference are the only type to 
sustain full logical inferences under different viewpoints but the 
costs of absolute computation are higher because it requires a 
significant cognitive overhead. 
Like most other Indo-European languages, English and 
Russian use all three mentioned frames and seem to have a 
preference for the relative frame unless there are specific 
conditions provoking the use of either the intrinsic or absolute 
frame. However, the question would remain if their frequencies of 
occurrence are the same in English and Russian until we carried 
out a series of experiments to answer it. It has emerged that 
English (at least, its American variety) relies on the absolute frame 
far more heavily than Russian by often preferring the cardinal 
directions. Here is a sample of how a spatial scene is coded in 
American English in absolute terms: 
I leave the house and walk north about one block to 
Speedway Boulevard. Then I cross Speedway and walk about 100 
feet to the bus stop. I take the bus west about 6 miles which takes 
about 25 minutes. I get off the bus at Speedway Boulevard and 
Cherry Avenue by the university. Then I walk west one block and 
then cross Speedway once again. Then I walk two blocks south and 
turn on 1st. I walk west again one block and then go my building. 
Our Russian respondents described similar scenes by using 
the relative terms справа and слева to explain position and 
направо and налево to explain direction. Both Russian and 
American descriptions gave distances and times, but Russian 
descriptions also referred to additional grounds. One gets the 
impression that Russian speakers do not merely pursue the aim of 
stating directions, but also describe the environment, providing 
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details that would seem irrelevant to an American speaker. Here is 
an example: 
Я обхожу свой дом, при этом он остается слева; выхожу 
из метро по ходу поезда; после выхода из метро иду по 
направлению к пешеходному переходу; сначала по левой 
стороне будет невысокое здание белого цвета, потом 
маленькие магазинчики; слева будет небольшой ресторан на 
первом этаже старого жилого дома; здание справа от меня, в 
глубине. 
This linguistic difference cannot but have strong cognitive 
consequences. English speakers create a fairly accurate mental 
map based on cardinal directions. This requires them to calculate 
such directions whenever they go to an unknown area. For Russian 
speakers, objects of the environment and their mutual dispositions 
are more important because memorizing them allows imbedding 
themselves into that environment and describing it in relative 
terms. 
A question arises: what caused American, but not Russian, 
speakers to use cardinal directions so extensively? Although we do 
not have a ready answer, we can assume that cardinal directions 
became important in English when England became a maritime 
nation. A marine environment gives one nothing to rely upon but 
the compass and environmental clues such as the sun. 
The ability for absolute orientation was inherited by the 
USA. A possible explanation of the tenacity of cardinal point 
orientation in the USA may lie in its history of westward 
expansion, which required Americans to constantly monitor and 
register directions. The rectangular state division in the USA may 
be a variety of a mnemonic technique that facilitated orientation in 
the open, unbounded space that surrounded American colonists. 
Extra evidence of this comes from the fact that cardinal point 
orientation has been shown to be more common in the West and 
Midwest than in the thirteen original states. 
The rectangular or square structure is no less common for 
American towns and villages, i.e., for rural America, where vast 
territories had to be clearly and definitely demarcated. It is not to 
be wondered at, then, that the compass directions of the main 
streets of cities and towns are known to virtually all Americans 
from the map. Other directions can be calculated from a primary 
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direction, the task made easier by the right angles at the 
intersections. Many names of American streets and highways also 
contain cardinal direction specifications, so that the average U.S. 
citizen has a striking command of the ‘practical’ geography of their 
immediate and outer surroundings, but the same average American 
will be noted for an astonishing inability to learn foreign 
geography, where names rather than directions have to be 
memorized. 
A final point to be made here is that we have concentrated on 
the frames of reference on the horizontal plane for the simple 
reason that they usually coincide along the vertical dimension. If a 
flag waves above a building, it does so within all three frames: it is 
located within the region that radiates from the top of the building 
(intrinsic frame); it is higher than the building from the observer’s 
point of view (relative frame); and it is higher than the building 
along the vertical axis defined by gravity (absolute frame). 
Apart from topological and projective relations, there is a 
special kind of spatial reference called spatial deixis. Deixis is 
generally understood in linguistics and pragmatics as reference by 
means of an expression whose interpretation is relative to the 
extralinguistic context of the utterance (in the case of spatial 
deixis, the location of a participant in the speech event, typically 
the speaker). Spatial deictic expressions in English and Russian 
include demonstrative pronouns (this – that, these – those; этот – 
тот, эти – те), deictic adverbs (here – there; здесь/тут – там), and 
deictic verbs of motion or transfer (come – go, bring – take – fetch, 
прийти – уйти, принести – унести). These are binary divisions 
based on whether motion or transfer proceeds in the direction 
toward the speaker (hither) or away from the speaker (thither). In 
English, there exist two corresponding sets of verbs; in Russian, 
the distinction is coded by deictic prefixes при-, под(о)-, у-, от(о)- 
and some others added to deixis-neutral verb roots. Derivational 
prefixes of the kind can be added to virtually any verb root that can 
be interpreted as involving either a physical or metaphorical 
movement vis-à-vis the speaker in much the same way as 
prepositions or prepositional adverbs can be added to most English 
verbs to form phrasal verbs (cf. Он подошел поближе – He came 
up closer, Пришла зима – Winter has set in, Он ушел от нас/из 
жизни – He has passed away). 
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It is important to note that deictic references in English are 
far more rigidly defined by the speaker’s position than in Russian. 
Consider the following example: two Americans are talking and, 
when they are about to say goodbye to each other one of them 
says, ‘When you go home, please send me an email’, meaning 
‘once you are back home’. If we tried to render this perfectly 
simple sentence into Russian we would get «Когда ты 
придешь/приедешь/вернешься домой, отправь мне email». 
English, therefore, does not allow the speaker to shift the deictic 
center to any point other than where they are physically located, 
whereas the Russian tendency to portray spatial scenes in fine 
detail we have mentioned earlier clearly prevails here as well. Here 
is another example to demonstrate this difference: a football 
commentator is giving a running commentary on a fast-moving 
game which is shown by a different camera every few seconds, and 
is referring to one of the players as ‘this, no that, player’, 
correcting himself once the view and the player’s position on the 
screen in relation to the viewer change. This change would not find 
a manifestation in the speech of a Russian commentator and a 
correction of the kind would instead lead to ambiguity in 
interpretation (a plausible reading is that he now means a different 
player). 
A final point we would like to make in regard to spatial 
representation in English and Russian concerns the way motion 
proper is described, a point almost entirely neglected in the 
existing literature. It stands to reason that both languages possess a 
few modal categories to specify the manner of motion, but they do 
it differently. It may be necessary, for example, to specify the 
transportation means, for which Russian has a whole set of 
specific verbs: идти (пешком) – ехать – лететь – плыть, etc., 
whereas English mostly uses just two verbs, to go and, 
interestingly, to travel, unless further specification is pragmatically 
relevant. 
It may also be necessary to specify whether motion is 
unidirectional or omnidirectional and this distinction is manifested 
in most Russian verbs of motion through the category of the 
number of directions, as in идти – ходить, ехать – ездить, 
плыть – плавать, etc. These verbs have two fully independent 
conjugational paradigms. The verbs идти, ехать, плыть, etc. 
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denote unidirectional, purposeful motion, while the verbs ходить, 
ездить, плавать, etc. denote recurrent or habitual actions 
involving motion. Compare the following: Я иду в театр (сейчас, 
вечером, завтра). / I am going to the theater (now, tonight, 
tomorrow) (an action proceeding at the moment of speaking). Я 
(обычно, часто, иногда) хожу в театр. / I (usually, often, 
sometimes) go to the theater (a repeated action in the present). 
Now let us look at how these verbs are used with reference to past 
actions. Я шел в театр. / I was going to the theater (a background 
action in a narrative). Я ходил в театр (вчера, раньше). / I 
went/used to go to the theater (yesterday, before) (either an 
accomplished action in the past involving going to the theater and 
back, or an action repeated in the past but probably not any more). 
It follows from these examples that English does not feature the 
number of directions category but provides for this distinction by 
means of the more generally applied aspectual paradigms as well 
as lexically. 
We have thus summed up some of our findings about how 
Russian and English represent space. We hope to have shown that 
they do not always do it in the same way and that the unearthed 
differences should have an impact on further linguistic and 
epistemological research, on teaching Russian or English as a 
second language, translation, interpreting, discourse analysis and 
many other applications. 
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When Christian missionaries came to North America 
during the epoch of great geographical discoveries, they were 
surprised to find out that the native peoples had no concept of the 
Western notion of God; the idea of a Supreme Being was 
altogether foreign to them and was replaced by the belief in an 
invisible, mysterious, and impersonal force inherent in people, 
animals, lifeless subjects, filling with itself the world surrounding 
the person and causing all his life. The Eskimos name this force 
sila (or khila) using a word similar to the Russian word sila, that is 
“a force.” The Iroquois call it orenda, among the Algonquin a 
different word is used for this force, manitou, which bears the 
same meaning.  The same force is also known under the name of 
wakan or wakanda among the Sioux, poknut among the Shoshone, 
yek among the Tlinkit, sgâna among the Haida, and nauala among 
the Kwakiutl. But such a belief is not peculiar to the indigenous 
peoples of North America, and it may be observed in the internal 
areas of Africa, Southeast Asia, and Oceania. 
 
 
The same concept is found among the Malayans as kramat, 
among the Indo-Chinese tribes as deng, as megbe among the 
African Pygmies, as njama among the tribes of Western Sudan, 
and as umoja among the Zulu. In Santa Cruz the word malete is 
used; at Saa in Malante all persons and things in which this 
supernatural force resides are said to be saka, that is “hot.” 
Additionally, among the peoples of Oceania—the Melanesians and 
Polynesians—the impersonal force is known as mana. As the 
American scholars Robert H. Lowie and Robert. R. Marett both 
cogently argued, somewhat similar concepts exist in religious 
systems as far apart as the Crow and Iroquois of America and the 
Ekoi of Africa. 
It is in Melanesia that the belief in an impersonal force was 
studied for the first time. The English ethnographer and missionary 
Robert Codrington was the first to describe in detail the belief in 
mana. His book The Melanesians appeared in 1891 and, after it 
had been recognized that all of the above mentioned terms are the 
exact equivalent of the Melanesians’ mana, this name was 
introduced by Robert Marett in 1915 as a common term to denote 
all the variations of an impersonal force represented in different 
non-Western religions. 
According to Codrington mana is a supernatural power of 
influence belonging to the region of the unseen. He writes: “This is 
what works to effect everything which is beyond the ordinary 
power of men, outside the common processes of nature, it is 
present in the atmosphere of life, attaches itself to persons and to 
things, and is manifested by results which can only be ascribed to 
its operation. When one has got it he can use it and direct it, but its 
force may break forth at some new point.”1  The life and social 
position of every person are supposed to depend on mana. He 
becomes a chief by the virtue of mana. If a man is successful in 
fighting it means that he has got mana. If his pigs multiply and 
gardens are productive, it is not because he is industrious but 
because the stones in his garden are full of mana. 
The French sociologist Emile Durkheim, describing the 
beliefs of the Native American tribes and especially the Sioux, 
writes that the force wakan “is not a definite and definable power, 
1 Robert Codrington, The Melanesians: Studies in Their Anthropology and Folk-
lore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891), 119-120. 
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the power of doing this or that; it is a power in absolute sense, with 
no epithet of determination of any sort. The various divine powers 
are only particular manifestations and personifications of it; each 
of them is this power seen under one of its numerous aspects.”2 
Taking the words in a larger sense, one may say that it is the god 
adored by each totemic cult, however, it is a god in a specific 
sense. “Yet,” Durkheim writes, “it is an impersonal god, without 
name or history, immanent in the world and diffused in an 
innumerable multitude of things.”3 
As a rule, mana is perceived as something ambiguous, 
ambivalent; it cannot be considered only useful or only harmful to 
the person. However, sometimes it is supposed to be only nocuous, 
as, for example, arunkult among the Australian tribe aranda or 
onim among the Papuans of New Guinea. 
Robert Marett and Bronislav Malinovsky consider the 
belief in an impersonal force, or, animatism, as historically the first 
form of religious consciousness and, moreover, as “a minimum of 
religion” in general, which is kept by all later religions. To 
delineate a belief in impersonal forces Marett suggested the taboo-
mana formula which was also adopted by him for his own 
minimum definition of religion. He defined this kind of belief by 
the term “animatism” to distinguish it from what Edward B. Taylor 
called “animism,” that is a belief in supernatural beings. 
As to the objections pointing out that people of primitive 
societies are unable to suggest any abstract concept of the 
impersonal force Durkheim writes that they do not represent this 
force in an abstract form, on the contrary, under the influence of 
some causes they have been led to conceive it under the form of an 
animal, or of vegetable species, or, in a word, of a visible object.  
The fact that mana can be embodied in different objects 
and can be conveyed from one possessor to another, flowing 
through every living and nonliving thing keeping its magic 
properties, has led the German scholar K. Oberhuber to conclude 
that it has a totemic origin, and, in Durkheim’s opinion, “totemism 
is the religion, not of such and such animals or men or images, but 
of an anonymous and impersonal force found in each of these 
2 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (London: Allen 
and Unwin), 193. 
3 Ibid., 189. 
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beings but not to be confounded with one of them. No one 
possesses it entirely, and all participate in it. It is so completely 
independent of the particular subjects in whom it incarnates itself, 
that it precedes them and survives them.”4 
In this connection it seems to me, that the idea of 
impersonal force has become one of the major archetypes of 
mythological and religious consciousness, or, so to speak, “an 
animatistic minimum,” whose presence in culture and spirituality 
of the subsequent millennia has manifested itself in a wide range—
from a level of household and ceremonial magic up to a level of 
deep philosophical thoughts and concepts. 
The presence of this archetype in polytheism is proven by 
the Sumerian concept of me, a powerful mysterious force operating 
the world of gods and people and, like mana, capable of 
incarnating itself in different objects. The meaning of the word me 
is similar to that of the Sumerian verb of existence me (“to be”); 
actually, it is the same word. It is remarkable, that the Indo-Iranian 
name of the magic force maya has taken its origin in the verb mаn 
(“to think”), and the second part of the word, -ya, whatever 
etymology it has, is associated with the old Indian verb ya (“to 
go”). The German linguist Wilhelm Humboldt writes that the 
radical ya- is actively used in word-formation. In this case, maya 
may be understood as a movement of the thought.  
It is curious that a lot of terms used by different cultures to 
denote an impersonal force has the phoneme m either at the 
beginning of the word (malete. mana, manitou, maya, me, megbe) 
or in the middle of it (kramat, njama, umoja). The Algonquin’s 
manitou is consonant with the Melanesians’ mana, which in turn 
completely coincides with a word from one of the Near-Eastern 
texts written in the Mandean language in 400 A.D. and containing 
the following phrase: “I swear by the great Mana.” In this context, 
the term Mana is supposed to have originated in the above-
mentioned verb man (“to think”). Of course, these facts are no 
more than mere coincidences, but they deserve to be mentioned 
here. 
Just like the Sumerian term me combining the meanings of 
a noun and a verb, the word mana is both a noun substantive and a 
4 Ibid., 188. 
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verb; a transitive form of the verb, manag, manahi, managi, means 
to impart mana, or to influence with it. Codrington writes: “An 
object in which mana resides, and a spirit which naturally has 
mana, is said to be mana, with the use of the verb; a man has 
mana, but cannot properly be said to be mana.”5 
In my opinion, similar word usage can be found among the 
Algonquin. According to the Christian priest father Alluets, in 
1670 he was allowed into a remote Algonquin village in which 
white men had never been seen before. The Algonquin were 
amazed to see his white skin and black attire and took him neither 
for a human being, nor for a deity, but for an embodiment of the 
divine force manitou. He was invited to come into a wigwam 
where he was surrounded by several old Indians. One of them 
came nearer to the priest with two handfuls of tobacco, which 
many Native American tribes used for sacrifice, and addressed him 
with the following words: “It is very good, Black Dress, that you 
have visited us. Manifest your favour to us. You are Manitou. We 
shall give you some tobacco.” 
The archetypal significance of the belief in an impersonal 
force may be proven by the factor of historical succession. Under 
the influence of Sumerian beliefs, the Elamic concept of the magic 
force kiten inherent in deities has arisen. The Akkadian concept of 
the tables of destiny has also originated in me.  
Similar views and their similar evolution may also be found 
among the Indo-Iranian tribes.  Like mana which is an ambiguous 
force, maya, as has been shown by the French scholar L. Renou, is 
also ambivalent. In the Rig-Veda it is said to be, on the one hand, 
“supernatural wisdom” or “a magic force of transformations” when 
it concerns gods and, on the other hand, “magical charms,” 
“deceit” when it concerns demons and enemies. In the Iranian 
mythological and poetical tradition the divine entity khvarno, or 
pharn, is also ambivalent. As a rule it is supposed to bring riches 
and authority to people, however, the notion of “bad pharn” is not 
foreign to the Iranians. While possessing mana makes one a chief, 
having pharn makes one a king, gives him supreme, imperial 
authority. Khavrno is considered both as an impersonal sacral 
entity—a sort of impersonal anonymous force—and as a 
5 Codrington, The Melanesians, 119. 
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personified divine character, which also resonates with the belief in 
an impersonal force capable of filling with itself different subjects 
and objects. It can be possessed by deities and people for whom it, 
as well as mana, is embodied in the house, family, health, cattle. 
Just like me which can be owned by cities and temples, khvarno 
can be incarnated in the settlement, area, and country. The term 
pharn shows the same way of the semantic development that the 
term me. If the notion of me has produced the tables of destiny, 
pharn is perceived as happiness, fate or destiny. As the English 
specialist in Zoroastrianism, Mary Boyes points out that khvarena 
(one of the forms of the word pharn) is often associated with the 
goddess of destiny Ashi. This name in the Zend language 
corresponds with the word asha or rta (arta), the latter being 
characteristic of Indo-Aryan tribes, meaning the general law, the 
natural order of things, which resembles, in essence and 
phonetically, the Chinese notion of Тао (“Way”). It seems to me 
that asha is to khvarno what Tao is to te: Tao gives rise to things, 
and te rears, cultivates, improves them—that is, operates like an 
impersonal vital force. Generally speaking, the English equivalent 
for te is the word power and the title of the Chinese treatise Tao-te 
ching reads in English as The Book of the Way and Its Power.  
Pharn taken in the sense of destiny is often compared to the 
Greek goddess Tikhe and to the Roman goddess Fortuna. 
Therefore, the concept of an impersonal force, when incorporated 
into more “developed” religions, is exposed to some 
transformations: first this force begins to be perceived as destiny, 
and then it is personified in a female image. Maya in the Post-
Vedaic period is not only considered as the illusiveness of life (as 
in Vishnuism) which is connected with one of its meanings 
displayed in the Rig-Veda (that is, deceit, charms, illusion), but 
maya is also identified with a divine woman, sometimes with the 
goddess Durga. 
I think that the gradual personification of an impersonal 
force in a female image may be observed and proven with the use 
of linguistic data. The Latin words Fortuna and fors (“a case”), on 
the one hand, and the words fortitudo (“force”) and fortis 
(“strong”) have originated in the same radical. The name Eva 
meaning, in the Semitic languages, “life,” goes back to the 
Nostratic radical haju (“a vital force”); it should be added that the 
 92 
 
Nostratic language is the oldest language of the Eurasian continent 
which existed before its division into the Indo-European, Semitic, 
Altai, and other languages. арии 
The Iranian entity khvarno has some features in common 
with the force manitou of the Algonquin of North America. One of 
the meanings of the term khvarno, “light,” “shine,” correlates it to 
sunlight (the Vedaic word svar which is related to the word 
khvarno also means “light,” “shine,” “sun”; of the same radical are 
the name of the Slavic god of fire Svarog and the Greek word 
charisma meaning, first, a special personal quality or power of an 
individual making him capable of influencing or inspiring large 
numbers of people, and, secondly, a quality inherent in a thing 
which inspires great enthusiasm and devotion). In general fire was 
one of the major objects of worship among the Indo-Aryan tribes. 
It is from fire that khvarno has come into Zarathustra’s mother. 
The American ethnographer Lewis Spence, in his book The Myths 
of the North American Indians,6 points out that the Native 
American’s “theology” originated in their views of sunlight. Their 
initial notions of a divine force were the same that those 
characteristic of the primitive peoples of Europe and Asia. The 
Native American’s concept of a god was the idea of a great 
powerful force residing in the sky and manifesting itself in 
sunshine. A connection between the idea of an impersonal force 
and the cult of fire can be shown with the above mentioned term 
saka (“hot”), meaning a person or thing in which the impersonal 
force resides. The Tokhar word muk, meaning “a magic force,” is 
paronymous with the Indo-European words meaning “fire,” for 
example, with the Latin word ignis. 
The archetype of an impersonal force is also present in the 
philosophical concepts in which not a personified deity, but an 
abstraction, general idea, or impersonal immanent divinity diffused 
in the phenomena of the world is declared to be a subject of cult. 
Such a theory was developed by the American thinker Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. Emphasizing this feature of Emerson’s 
transcendental idealism, William James writes, in his work The 
6 Lewis Spence, The Myths of the North American Indians (London: George G. 
Harrap & Co, 1914). 
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Varieties of Religious Experience,7 that in America there are many 
churches without God that are called ethical societies or moral 
unions and in which people worship abstract concepts and general 
ideas. This fact, which has become an important feature 
characteristic of the American mentality, makes James suggest a 
broad interpretation of the term divinity, understanding it as a sort 
of general quality.  That Americans are inclined to operating 
general ideas to a larger extent than their English ancestors is 
pointed out by the French thinker Alexis de Tocqueville, in his 
work Democracy in America.8  He specifies that this inclination 
has been expressed, first of all, in pantheism. 
 In my opinion, pantheism undoubtedly contains, in a 
rudimentary form, the above mentioned “animatistic minimum.” 
The dissolution of God in the world bears a close similarity to the 
dissolution of an impersonal force in it. According to de 
Tocqueville, the spreading of pantheism is accounted for by the 
equalizing of conditions under which people live in a democratic 
society, which induces them to speculate not of separate facts, but 
of all their multitude as a whole and to reduce different 
consequences to one reason. People of a democratic epoch 
continuously invent abstract words and personify their meanings, 
forcing them to act like real persons. Such phrase as, for example, 
“the natural course of things demands that the world be governed 
by endowments” would be, in de Tocqueville’s opinion, quite 
natural for them.  
Of course, this enthusiasm for general ideas may partially 
be accounted for by contacts of the new and Native Americans. On 
the one hand, Christian preachers, trying to adapt local beliefs for 
their own concepts of God, have transformed the impersonal force 
orenda or wakanda into a personified image of Great Spirit; on the 
other hand, American colonists adjoining to the Native American 
culture, have apprehended to some extent the beliefs particular to 
the Native Americans. 
However, a more significant role in forming this inclination 
to abstract ideas belongs to the archetype of an impersonal force as 
7 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1982). 
8 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Harper and Row, 
1966). 
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a “minimum of religion” in general. The French sociologist 
Raimon Aron sees the cause that has originated clan totemism 
based on the belief in an impersonal force in the recognition of the 
sacral which appears to be a force borrowed from the collectivity 
and surpassing all the individuals. We can draw, thus, a conclusion 
that, having turned into an archetype, the idea of impersonal force 
starts to cause an effect. It is society that becomes a true object of 
worship, it is sociality that embodies in itself an impersonal and 
anonymous force identified with divinity.  
Perhaps it is this inclination toward general ideas and 
abstract concepts that has led George Lucas to the idea of the Force 
developed in his Star Wars series.  The Force is viewed as a 
metaphysical, binding, and ubiquitous power that is behind the Jedi 
and Sith monastic orders. Both the Jedi and the Sith use the Force 
to gain their power. Jedi Master Obi-Wan Kenobi describes it as 
follows: “The Force is what gives a Jedi his power. It’s an energy 
field created by all living things. It surrounds us, penetrates us, and 
binds the galaxy together.”9 There are two different views of the 
Force among the characters of the Star Wars series and among 
admirers of the movie. Some of them think of the Force as a non-
corporeal sentient entity that may be capable of intelligent 
thought—almost as if it were a sort of Chinese chi—while others 
simply consider it something that can be manipulated and used as 
though it were a tool.  
It is widely recognized that: 
 
The principles of the Force resonate with those of some real 
world religions, including the Shinto religion of Japan, 
Buddhism, and certain Celtic druidic concepts. The Force is 
also supposed to bear a close similarity to the Chinese 
notion of qigong, or chi, and the splitting of the Force into 
light side and dark sides echoes the concept of Yin and 
Yang in Eastern philosophy (though this is not a perfect 
translation, as the dark side is considered a force of evil by 
the Jedi and this moral duality is not the same as the 
Eastern concept). Along with the concepts of Yin and Yang, 
the concept of a ubiquitous Force is concurrent to the real 
9 Star Wars Episode IV – A New Hope. DVD, directed by George Lucas, 1977, 
Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment, 2006. 
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world concept of a Tao or Way, which is said to flow 
everywhere in the universe. The concept of the Force also 
borrows heavily from Hindu theology, which also 
expresses a belief in a unifying Brahman energy that 
composes and is a composite of the Universe (and by 
extension, God), and can be used for either good or bad. In 
fact, this is particularly similar to the concept of the 
Potentium and the Unifying Force in that while the power 
can be perverted for evil, it ultimately leads only to a 
conclusion that is good. A connection is drawn to 
Zoroastrianism with the duality of the Force. The 
dichotomy between Ahura Mazda (the One God) and 
Angra Mainyu/Ahrima (the evil spirit) is nearly identical to 
the concept of the light and dark sides of the Force. . . . 
Generally speaking, the Force is considered as an 
amalgamation of many religions and philosophies, and is 
intended as a metaphor for spirituality itself.10 
 
It is strange, however, that the concept of an impersonal force, 
mana, is not mentioned in the numerous lists of beliefs which this 
idea is supposed to resonate with. 
In my opinion, it is not with chi or any other above-
mentioned phenomenon but with mana that the Force has many 
traits in common. Let us compare what has already been said of 
mana to what is known about the Force. Obi-Wan Kenobi’s 
definition of the Force is somewhat similar to the above quoted 
definition of mana suggested by Robert Codrington. Like mana the 
Force works to affect everything which is beyond the ordinary 
power of men: it is present in the atmosphere of life, and attaches 
itself to persons and to things, flowing through every living thing. 
It partially exists inside the life forms that use it, and draws energy 
from their emotions. 
The Force is ambivalent, it is divided into two aspects: the 
light side and the dark side. These aspects are concerned with the 
moral compass of the Force in its various manifestations. The light 
side of the Force is the facet aligned with good, benevolence, and 
healing, while the dark side of the Force was the element aligned 
10 <http://starwars.wikia.com> 
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with fear, hatred, aggression, and malevolence.  
The Force is also divided into two more aspects: the 
Unifying Force, which essentially embraces space and time in its 
entirety, and the Living Force, which deals with the energy of 
living things. This refers us to the combination of a natural order 
and impersonal force which is characteristic of many religions and 
is represented as has already been shown in the notion of asha and 
khvarno or Tao and te. 
It is important to note that a major property of the 
impersonal force with an important archetypal significance is its 
fluidity, liquidity which enables it to be poured in the world and 
allows one to associate it with water. Additionally, the English 
word force means both “power” and “a waterfall” or “a cascade.” 
The concept of mana has been developed by the islanders living 
among oceanic waters. The Sumerian force me resides at the 
depths of the underground ocean of fresh waters Absu, a secret 
place which is inaccessible even for gods. Only goddess Inanna 
has managed to steal me from the owner of Abzu, god of wisdom 
Enki. One of main objects of worship among the Indo-Iranians, 
alongside with fire, was water. In Zend it is spoken of khvarno 
hidden at the depths of waters. To the Ocean which has a lot of 
names depending on what coast it washes, Emerson compares the 
Spirit generating everything in the world and getting in its different 
manifestations the names of Love, Truth, or Good. If the person 
departs from these coasts, he will be deprived of power and 
support and his being will get narrower and narrower. Here, we 
can draw one more parallel with the religion of Zend. The concept 
of asha or rta is multiple-valued: with respect to the world of 
things it is a sort of natural order, and in an ethical sense it means 
in principle what Emerson speaks of. And at last as Luke 
Skywalker says in the Star Wars, “The Force is a river from which 
many can drink, and the training of the Jedi is not the only cup 
which can catch it.” 
So, the basic properties of an impersonal force are its sacral 
character, impersonality, liquidity, and ambivalence. It is curious, 
that if combining the initial letters of these words, we will get the 
Russian word sila, that is “a force.”  
The above mentioned facts show that the old beliefs in an 
impersonal force are present in later religions as an archetype 
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defining many important components of mythological and 
religious consciousness and even of social consciousness as a 
whole. 
The well-known phrase from the Star Wars series “May the 
Force be with you” is not only the quintessence of the Jedi’s 
religion, but also the apotheosis of the archetypal being of the idea 
of an impersonal force in the modern world.  
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Scanning the airwaves, all that could be found was static.  
And then, one minute before the hour, through the disturbance 
came the notes of “Moscow Nights”.  Perhaps elsewhere the Cold 
War was frigid and stale, but here, over high frequency radio, the 
Cold War was hot.  Radio Moscow played a leading role in that hot 
war over the airwaves – just as much as the Voice of America, 
Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty.  Yet, very little has 
surfaced in the West regarding the role of Radio Moscow in the 
Cold War.  My paper works to analyze this significant player in the 
battle between the United States and the Soviet Union.  I explore 
the organization and programming of Radio Moscow and its 
connection to the Soviet Government.  In addition, I seek to 
analyze its reception in the United States and, most importantly, 
how it was used as a vehicle of Soviet foreign policy around the 
world. 
 
Early Broadcasting in Russia (to 1941) 
From a very early time, the leadership of the revolutionary 
Bolshevik party in Russia recognized the importance of mass 
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communication, a point only strengthened after the October 
Revolution of 1917.  Soon after the creation of the Soviet 
Government in Moscow, the Department of Agitation and 
Propaganda was set up to coordinate and control all the media 
outlets in the nation. 1  While the new government recognized the 
importance of newspapers and magazines, they jumped on the new 
technology that could spread their word most effectively to a 
population spread out over 6.6 million square miles. 
Radio would soon have the capacity to spread information 
about health, sanitation, and agriculture, as well as the message of 
the central government across the vastness of Soviet territory.2  
With Lenin’s message of world revolution, radio could spread the 
movement into Europe and Africa.  Within two years of the 
establishment of a Moscow radio laboratory in 1922, ten stations 
were in operation in the Soviet Union.  While stations were 
allowed to be established by organizations and collectives, radio 
broadcasting effectively remained in the hands of the Soviet 
government.3  As the new state evolved, the Soviet leadership 
recognized the need for international broadcasting.  The creation of 
Radio Moscow filled this need. Established in 1929 with French, 
English, and German language services, programming expanded 
with Swedish, Turkish, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, Hungarian, 
Czech, and Russian services by 1932.4  Like domestic 
programming, Radio Moscow expounded the successes of the 
1917 Revolution and the recent accomplishments of the Soviet 
Government. 
 
Great Patriotic War (1941-1945) 
By the end of the 1930s, the Soviet Union faced new 
challenges on its borders, particularly to the west.  Adolf Hitler’s 
territorial expansion into Austria, Czechoslovakia and even farther 
east was making the Soviet leadership nervous.  The Molotov-
1 Philo C. Wasburn, Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio 
Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality (Westport: Praeger, 
1992), 1. 
2 Ibid., 2. 
3 Ibid., 4. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
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Ribbentrop Pact kept the Germans at bay until the Nazi invasion of 
June 22, 1941. 
As German forces invaded Soviet territory as a part of 
Operation Barbarossa, they entered a country that had experienced 
great gains in the radio field.  Over 100 broadcast stations were 
found across the country.5  However, the June invasion caught the 
Soviet government by surprise, giving the state’s broadcast 
apparatus little time to join the war footing.  Still, Radio Moscow 
managed to establish broadcasting to German-occupied territories 
in their own languages early in the war.6  The increased 
broadcasting over distances and construction of new, powerful 
stations would serve Radio Moscow well over the war and post-
war years.   
Though reaching occupied territories as well as the 
expanses of Soviet territory with the government’s message was 
important, the Soviet leadership recognized the importance of 
counteracting German radio.  The war of the airwaves was 
characterized by premature declarations of victory, reports of 
atrocities on the opposing side, and accounts of conditions on the 
enemy’s home front.  Early in the war, the Germans took the upper 
hand over the feeble attempts by Radio Moscow to counteract their 
claims.  However, by 1942, Moscow had managed to gain listener 
trust.  As James von Geldern notes, the factors included, “relative 
reliability, the willingness to trust listeners to reach their own 
conclusions, and improved fortunes of war”.7 
Indeed, the Soviets had gained the upper hand.  Though the 
Great Patriotic War left nearly 14% of the Soviet population as 
casualties, it also left the propaganda apparatus of the Soviet state 
in a revitalized condition.  Wartime broadcasting boosted Radio 
Moscow’s staff to thirteen native broadcasters capable of 
producing programming in most European languages.8  The station 
included a strong German language department, particularly useful 
in the coming decades of post-war occupation of Germany.  
5 James Von Geldern, "Radio Moscow: the Voice From the Center," Culture and 
Entertainment in Wartime Russia, ed. Richard Stites (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 
1995), 45. 
6 Ibid., 47. 
7 Ibid., 57. 
8 Ibid., 58. 
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Finally, technology had been upgraded, providing Radio Moscow 
with facilities to reach most of the Eurasian continent.  By 1945, 
Radio Moscow was broadcasting in 29 different languages.9 
 
 
Expansion of International Broadcasting during the Early 
Cold War (1945-1965) 
 While Victory in Europe and later Victory in Japan ended 
the shooting war in 1945, another battle was just beginning.  The 
wartime relationship between the Soviet Union and the western 
allies had always been plagued by some mutual mistrust.  This 
mistrust soon escalated as the occupation of conquered territories 
progressed. 
 To meet the escalation of tensions between the Soviet 
Union and the west, Radio Moscow continued to increase its 
broadcast capabilities and target populations.  The first addition to 
Radio Moscow’s language services was Korean in 1946, followed 
closely by Uighur and Mongolian.  The Korean service became 
particularly important with the occupation of the northern half of 
the Korean Peninsula by the Red Army and the beginning of the 
Korean Conflict in 1951.  Language services to the Indian 
Subcontinent and South Asia were also added in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s.10 
 Radio Moscow also expanded many of its preexisting 
language services to serve new requirements.  At the end of the 
1940s, the Arabic service moved from broadcasting 7.5 hours per 
week to 42 hours per week, one of Radio Moscow’s largest.  
Persian language broadcasting increased to 31.5 hours per week in 
1950, and Turkish to 31¼ per week.  European language 
broadcasts also expanded, however, they tended to favor Western 
Europe.  Weekly broadcasts in English expanded to 38 hours, 
French to 28 hours, and German to 55 hours per week.   Italian and 
Finnish language services also experienced modest increases.  
Surprisingly, weekly broadcasts to Yugoslavia were cut nearly by 
half, while broadcasts to Czechoslovakia were completely cut.  
9 "Radio Moscow in the War Years," Voice of Russia, 2004. 16 Nov. 2006 
<http://www.vor.ru/English/75/program_5.html>.  
10 Bernard Bumpus and Barbara Skelt, “Seventy Years of International 
Broadcasting,” Communication and Society 14 (Paris: UNESCO, 1983): 49. 
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Similarly, the end of the 1940s brought a cut of 10 hours from the 
Mandarin Chinese service to 14 hours per week.11 
 In response to Radio Moscow and other Soviet 
broadcasters, the United States also stepped up broadcasting to 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  By 1956, the Voice of 
America was broadcasting more than 300 hours per week to the 
Soviet Union.  Radio Liberation (changed in 1963 to Radio 
Liberty) was established in 1951 by the United States to broadcast 
to the Soviet Union in Russian and other Soviet languages.  It 
began with a 20-minute Russian program repeated for 12 hours a 
day.  By 1957, it had increased to speaking 17 Soviet languages 
from 11 transmitters.  At the same time, Radio Free Europe began 
speaking to Eastern Europe.  By 1954, it was broadcasting 124¾ 
hours a week to Poland alone.12 
 These increases in broadcasting hours by both sides began 
the Cold War radio battles.  As global crises evolved and other 
nations joined or left spheres of influence, language services and 
their weekly outputs changed to reflect the situation.  The 
developing African independence movements in the late 1950s and 
1960s changed Radio Moscow’s meager African services, adding 
Portuguese and 11 African languages, including Somali, Zulu, and 
Malagasy.  English and French language output for the African 
continent was also increased by the end of the decade.13     
 
Purpose of International Political Broadcasting and Radio 
Moscow 
 In today’s capitalist market, large and small businesses 
recognize the need for a public image and dissemination of 
information about their services.  Many use word of mouth, 
billboards, and radio and television spots to inform potential 
customers.  Likewise, since the beginning of the modern system of 
international politics, nation-states have recognized a similar need 
to create a good public image around the world.  The United 
Kingdom uses the British Broadcasting Company (BBC), not only 
to serve the needs of the domestic population, but also to 
disseminate a British viewpoint over radio, television, and the 
11 Ibid., 48. 
12 Ibid., 48. 
13 Ibid., 58. 
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Internet to non-British nationals.  Newscasts may cover a story in 
China, unrelated to the British Isles.  However, commentary and 
analysis can come from a British perspective, subtly bringing the 
audience into the British approach. 
 Though highly-skewed to the Western ear, Radio Moscow 
sought to establish the same relationship with the listener during 
the Cold War.  By explaining the Soviet perspective of an issue, 
the audience could be drawn into Moscow’s outlook.  While they 
might not have agreed with the opinion, they would now at least 
understand Moscow’s position as it related to their own.  Thus, the 
Soviet system became less intangible and ever so much more 
rational. 
 The creation of borders and barriers to trade among nations 
prohibits the flow of personal contact and information.  A traveler 
or good must be approved to exit and enter a country through a 
visa or trade regime.  However, radio waves, with the exception of 
jamming and atmospheric phenomena, cannot be stopped at the 
border.  Thus, the medium of radio provides nations with the 
ability to speak to peoples of another state without interaction with 
the second government.  While a government may not be able to 
publish an inflammatory document in another country without 
diplomatic problems, it may be able to broadcast the information to 
the other country without reservation.  Radio can bring 
international relations from the international summit to the level of 
the individual citizen. 
 
Organization and Control of Radio Moscow 
Radio broadcasting originating from the Soviet Union 
operated on a multilevel system.  At the bottom stood local 
broadcasters, followed by stations in the various oblasts and krays.  
At the top stood the central broadcasting system, under which 
Radio Moscow fell. 
In 1961, control over of broadcasting in the Soviet Union 
was held by the State Committee of Radio and Television 
Broadcasting.14  The Committee itself was a direct part of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR, which became Sovmin after 
1946.  According to S.V. Kaftanov, Chairman of the State 
14 S.V. Kaftanov, Radio and Television in the USSR (Washington: U.S. Joint 
Publications Research Service, 1961), 31. 
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Committee for Radio and Television Broadcasting, reported in 
1961 that the Committee’s tasks included: illuminating “domestic 
and foreign policies of the Communist Party and of the Soviet 
government,” “introduction of the radio listeners and television 
viewers to the best works of literature, music and to the theatrical 
art of the peoples of the USSR,” and “exposing the anti-national 
essence of bourgeois ideology, morality and reactionary 
propaganda”.15  By keeping the Committee chairman directly 
responsible to the Council of Ministers, the state was able to 
maintain control over all news, educational, cultural, and 
entertainment programming broadcast over the state apparatus, 
including Radio Moscow. 
 
Programming Content: An Hour With Radio Moscow 
While a history of the broadcasting service is important, a 
dissection of a one-hour broadcast also yields great insight into 
Radio Moscow’s role in Soviet policy.  Typically, a few minutes 
before the hour, an interval signal, usually the popular tune 
Moscow Nights, would be broadcast to indicate the beginning of 
programming.  On the hour, the Kremlin chimes would be heard, 
followed by a full news summary.  The news summary would 
usually take into account domestic events beginning with the 
Communist Party, followed by stories from satellite nations, and 
condemnations of events in the capitalist world.  Following the 
news, a feature would be presented, often a musical program or 
commentary on current events.  Topics often included the life of 
the Soviet worker, United States arms policy, or the success of 
farm programs in the Soviet republics.  Musical programs regularly 
highlighted Russian and Soviet composers and artists.16  Multiple 
feature programs were offered throughout the hour, but none 
compared with Moscow Mailbag.  For 40 years, until his death in 
2005, the English-language program was hosted by Joe Adamov 
and featured listener questions ranging from the KGB to the artist 
of a traditional Russian song.  The broadcast would be concluded 
with a recap of various program notes and then the cycle would 
begin again with Moscow Nights. 
15 Ibid., 31-32. 
16 Martin Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1987), 277. 
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News Broadcasting 
In the early years of the Cold War, as it had before, Radio 
Moscow stuck to a news format.  Gayle Durham Hollander 
described some of the important topics in news broadcasts:   
 
In 1960, Partiinaya Zhizn indicated the following 
major change in procedure:  “The central radio 
stations in Moscow must first of all ensure timely 
broadcasts of important political information, 
effective commentary on domestic and foreign 
events, the organization of various artistic 
programs…Because radio should give the 
population the important news before the 
newspapers do, TASS has been instructed to 
transmit news immediately to central and local 
stations.”17 
 
The “major change in procedure” she describes comes not from the 
content of the radio programming, but rather the shift in 
responsibility for major stories from the newspapers to radio 
stations.  Concerning newscasts, Kaftanov described the materials 
to be found in news bulletins around 1960: 
 
Materials pertaining to the Seven Year Plan for the 
Development of the National Economy of the 
USSR occupy a place of importance in all 
presentations of “The Latest News”, about the 
progress of work towards the fulfillment of that 
plan, materials about how the Soviet people are 
executing the decisions of the Party and the 
government, information on themes dealing with 
political, party, Komsomol, and trade union life.18 
 
News programs generally stuck to the events within the 
Communist Party first, then those stories that exemplified Soviet 
17 Gayle Durham Hollander, "Recent Developments in Soviet Radio and 
Television News Reporting," The Public Opinion Quarterly 31 (1967): 360. 
18 Kaftanov, Radio and Television in the USSR, 41. 
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activities around the world, other socialist movements, and events 
in the Warsaw Pact nations.   
 Though well past the early Cold War years of the 1950s 
and 1960s, the newscast of July 1, 1985 provides evidence as to 
how the Soviet Union portrayed itself over its global mouthpiece.  
Headlines lead with information about the full session of the 
Central Committee, followed by details of the meeting of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.  Next, a story about the 
condemnation of the U.S. ‘Star Wars’ defense plan, a project 
particularly detested by Moscow, by an international group of 
physicians.  Subsequent stories touched upon another mass 
meeting in Greece condemning American deployment of missiles 
to Europe and continuing problems following the Union Carbide 
disaster in Bhopal, India.   
The major global story of the day concerned the release of 
39 American hostages from TWA Flight 847.  However, the only 
remote reference to the story was in Radio Moscow’s description 
of U.S. negotiations with the French concerning terrorism, which it 
described as an attempt at, “military action against a number of 
sovereign nations and national liberation movements”.19   
Likewise, it played down the removal of Grigori Romanov from 
the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, regarded by many 
to be Mikhail Gorbachev’s major rival.  Instead, it stated that he 
was, “retiring on pension on account of his health”.20  In this way, 
news briefings were strictly controlled to follow the official 
government line. 
In addition to hourly newscasts, Radio Moscow presented 
news magazines and special interest commentaries based on 
current and historical news stories.  In the 1985 broadcast, the 
hourly newscast was followed by ’The Way We See It’ A Look at 
the Soviet Union and the World, today devoted to contrasting U.S. 
missile deployment with Soviet policy.21  Later commentaries 
dealt with survivors of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima visiting 
Moscow and thanking the government, “for their tremendous 
efforts to ease world tensions” and the denunciation of the United 
19 Ebon, The Soviet Propaganda Machine, 273-274. 
20 Ibid., 278. 
21 Ibid., 275. 
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States’ negative attitude toward arms negotiations by a British 
labor union.   
 
Jamming 
 In addition to the attention that the Soviet government gave 
to its own international broadcasting, another indication of the 
medium’s importance came in the government’s active jamming 
campaign.  In international broadcasting, the act of jamming refers 
to one station or power deliberately broadcasting on a frequency 
already in use by another station for the purposes of preventing the 
signal from being received.  While Radio Moscow’s signals were 
rarely jammed by other nations, the Soviet Union actively jammed 
the broadcasts of Western stations such as the BBC and the Voice 
of America.  The purpose of this was to prevent Soviet citizens 
from being able to tune in the Western broadcasters, fearing 
“Western cultural infiltration”.22  Indeed, they may have had cause 
to worry: the Voice of America estimated 8 million Soviet citizens 
listened into Western broadcasts. 
 In response to increased broadcasts directed to the Soviet 
Union, a campaign of jamming the Voice of America and the BBC 
from an estimated 150 transmitters within Soviet territory in 1949.  
While this scale of jamming was effective, it was most certainly 
not without cost.  U.S. Government estimates in 1950 indicated 
that the Soviet Union was spending $17.5 million a year on 
jamming, or an amount equal to the Voice of America’s total 
budget.  Indeed, a U.S. diplomat speculated that the Soviets, 
“devoted four times the capital equipment in transmitters and 
monitoring stations and ten times the manpower to block Western 
broadcasts” following the Voice of America’s increased efforts to 
circumvent jamming.23   
 Had the Soviet Union not recognized the role that 
international broadcasting could play in changing domestic public 
opinion (or conversely, the role it could play in changing Western 
public opinion), they would not have invested much needed capital 
in jamming activities from the end of World War II right up until 
1989.  The United States also recognized this importance and used 
22 Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold 
War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin's P, 1997), 33. 
23 Ibid., 36. 
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it as a way of tying up Soviet resources in jamming and 
international broadcasting.   
 
Reception in the United States 
It is important to remember that broadcasting is a two-way 
exchange: the broadcaster transmits and the listener must listen to 
the signal.  With this in mind, what was the reception of Radio 
Moscow in one of its major targets, the United States?  Don D. 
Smith investigated the impact of Radio Moscow’s broadcasts in 
the late 1960s.  In his article “Some Effects of Radio Moscow’s 
North American Broadcasts”, Smith revealed that there was a 
“sizable audience”.24   
Operating on the theory that Radio Moscow’s 
programming was anti-American and did not meet general 
standards of effective communication, Smith still found that 
Americans who regularly listened to the programs were, none the 
less, influenced by what they heard.  In a previous survey of 
general shortwave radio listening habits, he discovered that 9% of 
the national sample had listened to foreign radio broadcasts within 
the last year, with 6% of the sample having specifically listened to 
political or news programming.25  When those indicating a high 
interest in international affairs were surveyed, the most mentioned 
station was Radio Moscow.26  Though they recognized that the 
information was biased and propaganda-based, they also noted that 
such broadcasts were, “useful in (1) making them more aware of 
what other countries are thinking about the United States, (2) 
giving them additional information about world affairs, and (3) 
telling the other side of the story”.27  The majority of this audience 
was made up of male professionals and those with at least some 
college education.28   
In the case of Smith’s Radio Moscow study, he found that, 
despite the listening population’s biases about the content of 
broadcasts, their direction of opinion consistently changed to favor 
24 Don D. Smith, "Some Effects of Radio Moscow's North American 
Broadcasts," The Public Opinion Quarterly 34 (1970): 541. 
25 Ibid., 540. 
26 Ibid., 543. 
27 Ibid., 545. 
28 Ibid., 544. 
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Moscow’s line.  Seventy percent of the experimental group had 
their views toward the Soviet Union and Moscow’s policies 
change for the better, especially those who had held very negative 
views to begin.29  One participant commented that the broadcasts 
made them see that the Soviet Union was not just some, “’monster 
with atomic bombs in each hand; instead they’re human, as 
concerned with human affairs as we are’”.30   
However, in one of his final conclusions, Smith remarked 
that the effectiveness of Radio Moscow broadcasts could not 
completely be attributed to the presentation of information.  
 
The broadcasts seem to have had an effect, not 
because of any particular skill in communication, 
but because conditions in our own [American] 
society had led the audience to hold unrealistic 
negative images which, upon actual exposure, were 
clearly refuted for many of the listeners.31 
 
The crux of Smith’s point is that many of the respondents 
were affected by the difference in opinions between Radio 
Moscow and the American domestic media.  As one reply put it, 
“’When they [Radio Moscow] say something that is different from 
what you read in American newspapers you begin comparing, and 
sometimes what they say makes more sense’”.32  Many of those 
who reported an unexpected change for the better in their opinion 
of the Soviet Union based on Radio Moscow broadcasts also 
reported that American media played a role in this change.  Their 
attention to shortwave broadcasts from the Soviet bloc exposed 
them to other sources, which, on occasion, they found to be 
credible or even more reasonable than what the American media 
was saying. 
In terms of strictly technical reception in the United States, 
it is impossible to say how strong signals were received during the 
1950s and 1960s.  Quality of shortwave signals is subject to a host 
29 Ibid.,  546. 
30 Ibid., 549. 
31 Ibid., 550. 
32 Don D. Smith, "America's Short-Wave Audience: Twenty-Five Years Later," 
The Public Opinion Quarterly 33 (1969): 545. 
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of variables, including transmitting power, atmospheric conditions 
(including weather), local terrain, and interference from other 
stations on nearby frequencies.  There are indications that Radio 
Moscow’s North American Service was consistently available 
throughout the Continental United States, as reported by various 
newspapers, university researchers, and regular listeners.33 
 While Radio Moscow’s in-house surveys have not yet 
surfaced, the audience research of the major American 
broadcasters has.  The period studied by Smith was just the 
beginning of larger-scale audience research by the Voice of 
America and Radio Liberty.  Methodology, and a system by which 
to interview travelers from the Soviet Union, was only seriously 
worked out by 1970.  Until then, Soviet travelers in the West were 
interviewed on an ad hoc basis, only allowing basic inferences 
about listening habits.34  However, in the period between 1972 and 
1990, the Soviet Area Audience and Opinion Research (SAAOR) 
unit of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was able to interview 
upwards of 50,000 Soviet travelers in the West and more than 
25,000 legal immigrants.35 
 The first audience quantification using the system was 
between 1970 and 1972, in which SAAOR estimated that the 
Voice of America reached 23% and Radio Liberty 11% of the 
Soviet adult population weekly.  By 1980, the VOA was estimated 
to reach 15% and Radio Liberty, 8%.36  These numbers remained 
consistent throughout the 1980s and 1990s for the VOA.  
However, Radio Liberty experienced a climb from 7% in 1980 to 
10% in 1985.  This was followed by a sharp increase in listeners in 
1989 to around 17% of the adult Soviet population.37  This is due 
to the cessation of Soviet jamming of the station that had been 
constant for decades.  Overall, RFE/RL research of listening habits 
found that audiences were dominated by urban males between ages 
33 Edna C. Sorber, “An Analysis of the Persuasion Used in Radio Moscow's 
North American Service” diss. Univ. of Wisconsin, 1959, 139. 
34 R. Eugene Parta, Discovering the Hidden Listener: an Empirical Assessment 
of Radio Liberty and Western Broadcasting to the USSR During the Cold War 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2007), 2. 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Ibid., 5. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
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30 and 50, concentrated around Moscow, Leningrad, the Baltics, 
and Trans-Caucuses. 
 While these estimates have been disputed by some, the 
statistics still show that there was a far greater audience to Western 
radio stations such as the Voice of America and Radio Liberty in 
the Soviet Union than there was for Soviet broadcasts in the United 
States.  Between 1970 and 1970, SAAOR found that the VOA was 
reaching around 23% of the Soviet adult population.  However, 
Smith found that only 9% of the U.S. population listened to 
international radio overall, and not one specific station. 
 
Conclusions 
What conclusions can be drawn about Radio Moscow’s use 
in the early Cold War?  Perhaps the most important thing about 
Radio Moscow’s international services was the value placed on 
them by the Soviet Government.  Even without a budgetary 
measure of value, it is apparent that Radio Moscow was a vital part 
of the Soviet broadcasting apparatus from the mid-1930s.  By 
1932, Soviet radio was broadcasting abroad in 11 languages, rising 
to 29 by the close of the War.  Officials in the Kremlin saw that 
shortwave broadcasts were a way to spread Soviet opinion and 
views on international affairs and to counteract the influence of the 
capitalist system.   
The link between the Soviet Government and Radio 
Moscow is indisputable – the station was operated by the 
government under the State Committee on Radio and Television 
Broadcasting, within the central radio broadcasting system.  News 
broadcasts, a staple of Radio Moscow’s programming since the 
Great Patriotic War, were still subject to pre-broadcast censorship 
by the government and concentrated on party and government 
news. 
Finally, though the audience for Radio Moscow’s 
broadcasts was rather insignificant in the United States, the station 
did manage to reach some of its goals.  Though listeners reported 
that they did not experience a change of heart regarding the Soviet 
Union, they did report that some of their overall opinions had 
changed.  In the end, the overall listenership to Radio Moscow was 
relatively small, seeing as the total nationwide audience for all 
international political broadcasting in November of 1966 equaled 
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2% of Americans, or about 2 million people. While listeners 
reported one of their top favorites to be Radio Moscow, the 
station’s listener base would be significantly less than 2 million, 
and thus not drastically altering overall U.S. public opinion.  This 
is in sharp contrast to the Soviet audience for Radio Liberty and 
the Voice of America.  However, Radio Moscow’s value outside of 
the United States is relatively unknown.  Many throughout the 
world, particularly in the developing world, tuned in regularly to 
Moscow’s broadcasts. 
Despite a relatively small group of listeners in the United States 
and the role of censorship played in listeners’ opinions, the role of 
Radio Moscow in the USSR’s foreign policy apparatus cannot be 
underplayed.  The attention paid to Radio Moscow by the central 
government and its rapid development through the 1930s and 
1940s provides compelling evidence for its value to the state.  The 
station’s broadcasts provided invaluable insight into Soviet life for 
Western governments and the general public.
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Tom Stoppard’s  
The Coast of Utopia  
in Russia:  
Cultural Adaptation 
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 Tom Stoppard’s theatrical trilogy The Coast of Utopia (in 
Russian Берег Утопии) premiered in London in 2002. Since that 
time, it has been performed in New York, and, just recently, in 
Moscow at the RAMT, the National Youth Theatre. The last 
performance was in the beginning of April 2008. In March, I was 
privileged enough to be able to go see the performance. I had 
wanted to see the plays on stage ever since I read the trilogy the 
year before and it particularly interested to me to see the 
performance in Russian. I was curious to discover what Russians 
would think of these Tony-award-winning plays which, while 
written by an Englishman, have a profoundly Russian subject 
matter. 
 The Coast of Utopia recounts the lives of several early 
Russian revolutionaries, among them Alexander Herzen (in 
Russian Герцен) and Michael Bakunin, as well as those of their 
friends and peers, such as the author Ivan Turgenev and the literary 
critic Vissarion Belinsky. Each play runs for about three hours, and 
though they are meant to be able to stand alone they work best as a 
whole. In Moscow they were always shown together, one after the 
next from noon until almost eleven at night.   
 
 
 The first play, Voyage, takes place between 1833 and 1844, 
in a variety of places including “Premukhino, the Bakunin estate,”1 
and “Moscow.”2  Voyage deals mostly with Michael Bakunin’s 
youth and his search to find himself through the study of 
philosophy, which he does not really understand but cites with 
abandon. Finally, Bakunin decides that “revolution is his new 
philosophy of self-fulfillment,”3 thus setting his path to the future. 
Belinsky is also important in this play in his attempt to establish 
himself as a literary critic. Herzen is also present as a young writer 
and activist. In addition, Bakunin’s parents and four sisters play 
significant roles.  
 The second play, Shipwreck, takes place “between 1846 
and 1852 at Sokolovo, a gentleman’s estate fifteen miles outside 
Moscow; Salzbrunn, Germany, Paris; Dresden; and Nice.”4  The 
most prominent character in this play is Alexander Herzen. The 
story recounts the experiences that he and his wife, Natalie, 
encounter while living in Western Europe (mainly in Paris), where 
they are allowed to go to seek medical aid for their younger son, 
Kolya, who is deaf. Herzen spends much time discussing 
revolutionary theory and even witnesses firsthand the forming of 
the 2nd Republic in France, as well as its fall. Bakunin is also 
present in this play; he takes part in the revolutions that Herzen 
discusses and eventually is sent to prison in Siberia for this. 
Turgenev and Belinsky are present, though Belinsky dies during 
the time covered by the play. There are also some characters which 
appear only in this play, such as George and Emma Herwegh, a 
German revolutionary poet and his devoted wife. The play ends 
with Kolya’s tragic death in a shipwreck and the subsequent death 
of Natalie. As the play ends, Herzen leaves for England with his 
surviving children. 
 Salvage, the third installment of the trilogy, takes place 
between 18535 and 1868.6  In this play Herzen continues to be the 
1 Tom Stoppard, Voyage, in The Coast of Utopia (New York: Grove Press, 
2002), 1. 
2 Ibid., 52. 
3 Ibid., 109. 
4 Tom Stoppard, Shipwreck, in The Coast of Utopia (New York: Grove Press, 
2002), xiii. 
5 Tom Stoppard, Salvage, in The Coast of Utopia (New York: Grove Press, 
2002), 1. 
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main character and focus. The action follows his efforts to publish 
insurrectionary newspapers from abroad, as well as his 
complicated family situation, in which for a while he is sharing the 
wife of his friend Nicolas Ogarev, (whose name is also Natalie.) 
The play ends shortly before his death; the last scene is a dream of 
Herzen’s in which Turgenev and Karl Marx are discussing the 
future of Russia and that of the world in general.  
 Due to their complexity, any interpretation of these plays 
relies heavily on the reader’s or spectator’s preunderstanding. That 
is to say, the way in which the trilogy is appreciated is highly 
dependant on the spectator’s level of background knowledge about 
the subject. In Richard E. Palmer’s essay “Hermeneuein and 
Hermeneia: The Modern Significance of their Ancient Usage,” he 
explains hermeneutic preunderstanding as thus:  
 
Explanatory interpretation makes us aware that explanation 
is contextual, is “horizonal.” It must be made within a 
horizon of already granted meanings and intentions. In 
hermeneutics, this area of assumed understanding is called 
preunderstanding. One may fruitfully ask what 
preunderstanding is necessary in  order to understand 
the (given) text. … It might be asked what horizon of 
interpretation a great literary text inhabits, and how the 
horizon of an individual’s  own world of intentions, hopes, 
and preinterpretations is related to it.7 
 
 Clearly, not every viewer of Stoppard’s trilogy will 
interpret or understand it in the same way. The plays, concerned as 
they are with a particular aspect of Russian and European history, 
require some familiarity with Russian history, as well as 
philosophy and the history of socialism, to be understood. A 
viewer whose preunderstanding emphasizes one of these aspects 
over another will thus interpret the play differently than someone 
whose preunderstanding emphasizes a different aspect. A viewer 
who is completely unfamiliar with this era of history may not get 
anything from these plays at all.  
6 Ibid., 111. 
7 Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1969), 25. 
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 One example of this is the difference in comprehension of 
one theme in Voyage that my mother and I experienced. She read 
the play before I did and found it hard to get through. One thing 
that puzzled her was the attestation of certain characters that 
Russia has no literature (except for that written by Pushkin.)  
 In Voyage, the following discussion occurs: 
 
ALEXANDER: … They write better Russian than I do – 
what a shame there’s nothing worth reading (over his 
daughters’ protests), apart from…  
DAUGHTERS: Pushkin! 
ALEXANDER: … Pushkin.8 
 
 This theme is reprised several times over the course of the 
play, as Belinsky makes it his thesis that, “we have no literature.”9  
He argues that, for the most part, what is published in Russia (in 
his era) is an imitation of Western literature and, furthermore, that 
should Russia develop its own literary tradition, “literature can 
replace, can actually become Russia! It can be greater and more 
real than the external reality.”10  Even in this monologue, though, 
he acknowledges that there is, “Pushkin, or Gogol’s new stories, 
definitely Gogol, and there’s more to come.”11  Being, as I am, a 
student of Russian literature, this statement makes sense to me. My 
mother, though, due to her lack of knowledge of the subject, 
remains confused. I understood that the fact that the scene took 
place in the 1830’s means that many of the most well-known 
Russian authors had not yet begun to write, but she did not.  
 Likewise, understanding something about the link between 
romanticism and the rise of nationalism is key to understanding 
Belinksy’s argument that a national literary tradition would create 
a new Russia and bring her grandeur, and a short article about this 
subject was apparently included in the play’s program when it was 
performed in New York to aid the spectators in their appreciation. 
 But what sort of preunderstanding would a Muscovite 
viewer of Stoppard’s trilogy bring to the work? Presumably, the 
8 Stoppard, Voyage, 2. 
9 Ibid., 34. 
10 Ibid., 80. 
11 Ibid., 81. 
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Russian spectators would better know the historical era. They 
would have heard of Herzen and Bakunin and would probably not 
need to ask why none of the characters, in their discussions of 
Russian literature of the 1830s, were mentioning Tolstoy or 
Dostoevsky. But what more would they know? And what would 
they think of the whole concept in the first place? Would they be 
pleased that an Englishman had taken interest in their history, or 
would they feel that it was not his place to write about a foreign 
culture in such detail? If Stoppard’s research was flawed, would 
they notice? Would mistakes bother them? 
 Of course, the answers to these questions depend on the 
individual spectator. Nonetheless, it seems that Russian audiences 
generally like The Coast of Utopia. My host sister in Moscow 
affirms that at least Voyage has a Chekhovian feel to it, an opinion 
echoed by some critics. “Время в спектакле постоянно 
возвращается к каким-то исходным точкам и сюжетам 
(излюбленный стоппардовский ‘флэш-бэк’). Для театра такие 
сюжеты — ‘чеховский’…”12 (Time in this show is continually 
returning to some initial starting point and subject, Stoppard’s 
beloved “flash back.” In theatre, such a “Chekhovian” subject…).  
This article from The Banner (Znamya) goes on to point out that 
Chekhov’s plays have also been performed on the stage at the 
National Youth Theatre and suggests that Stoppard’s trilogy is not 
out of place there. 
 In fact, it seems that many consider The Coast of Utopia 
very apt and appropriate to contemporary Russia. An article in 
“More Intelligent Life” discusses this:  
 
“What kind of literature and what kind of life is the same 
question,” as Belinsky says in the play. It is still the same in 
Russia today. Borodin's production has everything to do 
with modern Russian life, its ideas and ideals, its 
comprehension of the past and contemplation of the 
future…Russian state ideologists are hard at work trying to 
persuade themselves and the country that democracy and 
respect for individual rights and liberty are of no use to its 
people, that Russia always prospered when it was ruled by 
12 Svetlana Vasilieva, “Tom Stoppard. Bereg Utopii,” The Banner 3 (2008) 
<http://magazines.russ.ru/znamia/2008/3/vas25.html> 
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despotic tsars and that there is nothing in Russian history to 
be embarrassed about. The characters have returned to a 
country where their dreams about justice and freedom 
evoke mostly sneers, whereas Nicholas I, one of Russia's 
most senseless autocrats, evokes sympathy and respect. “I'd 
love to read an article by Herzen, with his lacerating wit, 
about contemporary Russia,” Stoppard says.13 
 
 According to this same article, the spectators after the first 
Russian performance argued “not about the merits of the 
production, but about what has been said on stage. This surprises 
Stoppard: "It is as if people are responding to statements. They 
seem to imply that my plays fill some sort of gap-I don't quite 
believe it."14 
 It’s true that names such as Herzen’s are familiar in Russia, 
but the significance of these historical figures was changed during 
the Soviet era. The article goes on to say that Isaiah Berlin, who 
inspired Stoppard's interest in Herzen, wrote that "the singular 
irony of history was that Herzen—who wanted individual liberty 
more than happiness, or efficiency or justice, and denounced 
organized planning, economic centralization and governmental 
authority—was canonized by the Soviet government,” and that 
“the Soviet and post-Soviet eras also deformed the language that 
expressed those sentiments. Words such as "honor" and "duty" 
were first extolled and abused by the Communists then turned into 
a joke by their successors. Stoppard's trilogy has not only taken off 
layers of bronze paint from Herzen or Belinsky and brought them 
back to life, it has rehabilitated their language.”15 
 During the rehearsal period for Coast of Utopia, in order to 
help the actors understand the characters that they were to play, 
Stoppard organized trips to Premukhino, the Bakunin family estate, 
and also to Herzen’s hometown, where they cleaned up an old 
statue of Herzen and his friend Ogarev, also a prominent character 
in Coast of Utopia. Thus, although the actors’ preunderstanding of 
13 “Stoppard In Moscow: ‘The Coast of Utopia’ Returns Home,” Intelligent Life 
Magazine (Dec. 2008), <http://www.moreintelligentlife.com/story/stoppard-
moscow> 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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the subject may have labeled the trilogy’s heroes as proto-
Marxists, through their historical exploration and the trilogy itself 
they came to see the characters as individuals with their own ideas, 
and, most importantly, their own lives.  The Znamya article agrees 
with this. “По сцене ходят не “портреты”, а живые, милые 
люди.”16 (“Portraits don’t walk out on the stage, but rather living, 
likeable people”).  
 When I went to see the show the theatre was almost full 
and the spectators seemed to be enjoying themselves. It seems that 
the critics like the plays well enough, too. I would have liked to be 
able to interview more individual Russians about their impressions 
and opinions, though. As thus, my attempts at understanding The 
Coast of Utopia’s place in Russian society is far from complete. I 
am eager to learn more and hope to do so soon.
16 Vasilieva, “Tom Stoppard. Bereg Utopii.” 
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Students of the 
Foreign1 
 
 
 
Nicholas K. Kupensky 
Moscow International University 
 
 
 
 I would like to offer an afterword to this collection of 
essays with the hope of briefly conceptualizing these two meetings 
of Student-Scholars and offering some suggestions on how to 
approach student-scholarship from a foreign point of view. 
 First of all – what is a Student-Scholar?  To being with, the 
very notion of a “student-scholar” or “student-scholarship” is a 
contradiction in terms in its combination of two seemingly 
diametrically opposed concepts.  At first glace, we could define 
this difference between what either party knows.  We are able to 
recognize Scholars because they possess knowledge that is 
“authorized,” “professional,” and “intellectually mature” in 
contradistinction to the Student’s knowledge, which is 
“unauthorized,” “amateurish,” intellectually “childish,” or “naïve.”  
In fact, one Ivy League graduate school locates the very point at 
which a Student transitions into a Scholar by stating that the Ph.D. 
dissertation “heralds your transformation from a consumer to a 
producer of knowledge.”  Thus, the authorization of Students to 
call themselves Scholars occurs through the academic practices of 
completing graduate programs, publishing in professional journals, 
1 A version of the  following essay was presented at the Russian State 
University for the Humanities colloquium for Student-Scholars entitled “From a 
Foreign Point of View: Student Readings of Russian and American Culture” on 
24 April 2008. “Students of the Foreign” was presented as the opening remarks 
to the gathering. 
 
                                                 
 
reviewing the research of one’s peers, presenting research at 
professional conferences, keeping in mind all the while that these 
rites of passages are controlled and supervised by an academy 
populated by those who have already completed it. 
 Yet, recent trends in literary criticism have begun to call 
into question the transcendental nature of rigid binary pairs, many 
of which are located in the reading and interpretation of cultural 
texts.  Roland Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” fixes as the 
object of his criticism the binarism of “authorized” and 
“unauthorized” interpretation of a text, connecting “authorized” 
readings with the sanctified personality of the “Author-God.”  He 
explains: 
 
To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to 
furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing. . . . In 
the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be disentangled, 
nothing deciphered; the structure can be followed, ‘run’ 
(like the thread of a stocking) at every point and at every 
level, but there is nothing beneath: the space of writing is to 
be ranged over, not pierced; writing ceaselessly posits 
meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a 
systematic exemption of meaning.2  
 
Rather than approaching our cultural texts in hopes of 
“deciphering” fixed meanings, we are then compelled to view what 
we are researching as a “multi-dimensional space in which a 
variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash.”  What 
does this have to say to the Student-Scholar distinction?  It 
compels us to move towards the realization that the preferencing of 
“authorized” Scholarly readings over “unauthorized” Student ones 
emerges out of the distinction between the processes which 
authorized who is permitted to “produce” knowledge and who is 
forced to “consume” it, disregarding the majority of readings, 
interpretations, interactions, intersections, denials, refusals, 
affirmations, inspirations, and discoveries that occur during these 
moments of “unauthorized” Student readings.  The move away 
from an understanding of the “work” as singular, monolithic, and 
2 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” Image-Music-Text, trans. Stephen 
Heath (NY: Hill and Wang, 1977), 147. 
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coherent towards the valuation of the subjectivity of the reader and 
his or her multiple points of view threatens the clarity and stability 
of the Student-Scholar distinction if the “authorized,” 
“legitimized,” “mature” scholarly readings turn out to be only one 
voice in the polyphony of possible readings.  Thus, the 
decentralization and deauthorization of knowledge from the 
academy commemorates the “Death of the Scholar” and the “Birth 
of the Student,” and it is in this movement away from the Scholar-
God unlocking the meanings of texts that the variety of readings 
that texts sustain necessitates the creation of a colloquium 
dedicated to Student-Scholarship, a conference where Student-
Scholars are permitted to explore their own subjectivities, 
suspended in a particular historical, cultural, and linguistic 
moment. 
 This brings me to my second question – what does it mean 
to be a Student of the Foreign?  Perhaps, it would be better to first 
ask, can one be a Scholar of the Foreign?  This undoubtedly 
sounds strange, for someone calling themselves a Scholar of the 
Foreign makes a claim of authority over that which is 
epistemologically not their own.  A Scholar of a foreign culture 
does not possess a native’s knowledge, language, customs, or 
culture, and consequently is an intruder, an interloper, claiming a 
position of authority and privilege that may fundamentally differ 
from the perspectives generated from within the culture.  We can 
easily put the Foreigner-Native opposition along the same axis as 
we have with the Student-Scholar.  Taking America, for example, I 
as a native in the old view would have privileged positions, 
perspectives, and knowledge of American culture, authorized 
primarily by the fact that I was born in the United States, possess 
an insider’s knowledge of its language, history, customs, and 
culture, and myself actively participate in and prolong its traditions 
and cultural processes.  In comparison with my readings of 
American life, the interpretations generated beyond the country’s 
borders would then be unauthorized until having undergone the 
American right of passage of being a citizens, thus, making the 
transition from possessing outsider’s to insider’s knowledge.  
 If we put this Foreign-Native paradigm under the same 
scrutiny, however, one immediately comes to realize that the 
reason why all of us are here today is because one of the most 
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valuable routes to achieving higher levels of understanding about 
our own cultures and the foreign ones that we study is intimately 
connected to searching out, collecting, and evaluating as many 
possible readings of our respective cultures as possible, or put 
differently, seeing ourselves from a Foreign Point of View.  We 
can see that those of us who study the Foreign, research the 
Foreign, and dive deep into the minutia of the Foreign that may 
otherwise be overlooked by Natives – we generate the very 
multiplicity of readings that the post-structuralist Student-Scholar 
calls for, mindful that the identity of the texts we study is ever 
unstable, shifting, and amorphous and – strangely – dependent 
upon and constituted by us.  The readings generated through 
interactions with the foreign not only reconstitute, reconstrue, and 
reenvision the text, but are in fact integral to its being.   
So what I would like to propose, then, is that those of us 
who study that which is not our own – that which is alien, strange, 
different, or, simply, foreign – are constantly reminded of our 
status as Students with a capital S, reminded that we are going to 
be lifelong consumers of the knowledge of the other.  We all 
participated in these two conferences to meditate upon, call 
attention to, and celebrate the intersections and divergences of 
different cultures and what we have to teach each other.  Each of 
us simultaneously embodied the roles of Students and Scholars and 
were transformed into Students of that which is our own.  In other 
words, the participants of both conferences collectively took the 
first, crucial step towards an understanding of just exactly what it 
means to be a Student of the Foreign 
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